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THE FEDERAL DEFENCE
OF
AUSTRALASIA



Yours faithfully
Geo. Cathcart Gray

THE FEDERAL DEFENCE /

OF

AUSTRALASIA

BY

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"LORD CLYDE," "INDIA AND AUSTRALIA DURING WAR," "LITERARY SKETCHES,"
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"AUSTRALIAN ARMY, NAVY, AND DEFENCE REVIEW"

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To
All Arms of the Defence Forces
AND
The Patriotic Sons of Australasia
“I DEDICATE—I DEDICATE” THIS BOOK
BELIEVING THAT IT WILL HELP TO FEDERATE THE COLONIES,
BLEND COLONIAL WITH IMPERIAL INTERESTS,
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF SEA-POWER AND EMPIRE,
AND HOLD OUR OWN
AGAINST THE WORLD IN ARMS.

Sea and strand, and a lordlier land that sea-tides rolling and rising sun
Clasp and lighten in climes that brighten with day when day that was here
is done.
Call aloud on their children, proud with trust that future and past are one.
Far and near from the swan's nest here the storm-birds bred of her fair white
breast,
Sons whose home was the sea-wave's foam, have borne the fame of her east
and west;
North and south has the storm-wind's mouth rung praise of England and
England's quest.
Fame, wherever her flag flew, never forbore to fly with an equal wing;
France and Spain with their warrior train bowed down before her as thrall to
king;
India knelt at her feet, and felt her sway more fruitful of life than spring.

Where the footfall sounds of England, where the smile of England shines,
Rings the tread and laughs the face of freedom, fair as hope divines
Days to be, more brave than ours and lit by lordlier stars for signs.

A. SWINBURNE.

P R E F A C E

THIS book should do very well without a Preface. It speaks for itself, and in prospecting to find the true solution of the Federal Defence of Australia, I hope to have found the true colour. My scheme will be regarded as an advance upon the Commandants' scheme, which has been circumscribed by political and retrenchment considerations. The Colonies will not always be preaching retrenchment, therefore, the scheme which I venture to propound will be found both practical and permanent. I have duly weighed the opinions and arguments of many naval and military experts, and out of their *à priori* thought, I have tried to make the subject plain to all those who love Australasia and the sea-girt isles of the Atlantic, from whose shores the Australian populations have sprung. We are all British yet, and especially when foreign nations seek to break up the British and Colonial Empire. May the people of the United Kingdom and the British Colonies never forget each other in peace or war ; be true to each other in the midst of threat or danger ; and whilst furthering the

"Hands all round, and round, and round!"

Some persons may term me an "Imperialist." Like all true Britishers and good Anglo-Australians, I am very proud to be one. But life is short, federal defence is urgently wanted, and in closing this book, I do not forget that this is "a time of holly," therefore, why should prefaces be long? The want of tact in the Queensland Parliament by not passing the Convention resolutions will sadly delay Federation, and, therefore, Federal Defence. This playing with Federation, as Shakespeare says, "is a shame to us all." May the purport of this book tend to bring refractory legislators and parliaments into a strong and compact federal line! This is the end of my Preface.

GEORGE C. CRAIG.

*Queensland Chambers,
Bridge Street, Sydney,
Australia.*

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FIELD-MARSHAL Rt. HON. VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., etc.,
Commander-in-Chief.

Lafayette, Photo.

THE
FEDERAL DEFENCE OF AUSTRALASIA

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY

I PURPOSE, out of much confused thought and conflict of opinion, to design and formulate the existing naval and military forces in the Colonies of Australasia into one grand, true, solid, and permanent organization of Federal Defence, suitable to the safety of the Commonwealth, the requirements of the people, the rapid expansion of Colonial progress and civilization in the Southern Hemisphere, blended with the commerce and prosperity of Imperial Empire. The literature of Australasian defence has been confined to speeches, newspaper leaders, magazine articles, professional and parliamentary reports ; but the confused mass has never yet been reduced to anything like a complete system, in book form. The task is formidable, full of political and martial interest, subject to the keen criticism and consideration of all classes of the great Anglo-Saxon-Celtic family at home and abroad, devoted to the love of Queen, Empire, and Australasia.

With the advent of federation the time is ripe to present the characteristics of the question to the public in a plain

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and instructive form. I do not address this volume to false patriots nor republican legislators—"friends of every country but their own"; but rather to those noble sons of the British race at Home or in the Colonies, true to kith and kin, and who glory in the name of Anglo-Australian. There is a growing thirst for Federal aspiration, national ambition, and, considering the envy of foreign nations—Federal defence. The work of the author is a labour of love, and being assisted in many quarters I hope, at least, to produce the *colour* of what should be the true united defence of our priceless heritage. When the people are thoroughly alive to the importance of Federal defence, blended with that of Mother England, I am certain they will be convinced by my scheme, if properly grasped and realized. Australians are slow to understand the dangers or the horrors of war. Nor do they know that their wealth, progress, and prosperity depend upon the maintenance of the sea-power, the union and integrity of the whole Empire. The true Australians are no false patriots, but are ready to share the dangers and cost of Empire. The command of the sea has a deal to do with the freedom, progress, and natural growth of Australasia, as it has everything to do with the defence of the United Kingdom, and itself. The Royal Navy is the first line of defence for the Colonies and the frontiers of the Imperial Empire, but as it is the first duty of the said Navy to be at sea in the event of sudden war, the naval and military forces of the second and third lines of defence must be prepared to defeat invasion in any shape or from any quarter; to defend naval bases and coaling stations, and to undertake the offence-defensive, in the opinion of high military authority. To do this the Colonies must federate, organize, and discipline. So long as foreign nations are

restless, jealous, and ambitious in the East and in the Pacific, Australasia must be ready for defence in the time of peace, and not when “Havoc lets slip the dogs of war”—when it will be *too late*. I strongly advise all young Australians to learn and study the history and traditions of their race in the true national British direction. Let them never turn “dog” upon the old land, nor desert “the old folks at home” in the time of danger and trouble. The British people at home and abroad will never “rue” if they only to themselves prove *true* in the fighting lines of defence against the Queen’s enemies. “A coward loon is he” who stays at home when the drums’ roll or bugle-sounds summon him to arms for the general defence of hearth, family, property, and country. Let the Colonies all join with others as strong conquering units, look all dangers in the face, discipline themselves for a heady fight and sharp battle tactics, federate as one force, and they need not be afraid of any foe. Without drill and discipline, successful defence is hopeless. With it, together with the most effective guns and rifles, victory is certain, and we need not despair of the future of Australasia, nor the fate of the British Empire. “Riflemen form” appears to be the first message of Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, the new Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, for he strongly advises the creation of Reserve Volunteers. Right loyally should Australians obey him.

There is no question that demands so much attention as the defence of the Austral-Pacific and the Empire; how best to organize and maintain it; indeed, no person living can say how soon the events of Europe or the East will put Australasian defence to the sharp and conclusive test. In the face of all the cablegrams and

mysterious diplomacy, there are politicians who still believe that war will never again curse the earth. Would to Heaven that it were so! But we know what international human nature is, and how war between civilized nations so frequently hangs upon a thread, like the sword of Damocles. Federal defence should be above the din, passion, and throes of party. So deeply impressed are some people of the Colonies with foreign affairs, that the Anglo-Saxon family should be united in peace or war, in sunshine or in rain, through weal and woe, that the sentiment of closer union is gaining strength in minds that were heretofore republican and socialistic. Sir George Chesney, Admiral Colomb, Sir Andrew Clark, Sir W. D. Jervis, Colonel Vetch, R.E., and Field-Marshal Sir J. L. Simmons twelve years ago directed attention to the undefended state of the Colonies in the event of sudden war. The hero of Silistria and the lines of Kalafat then said, that the defence of the Colonial Empire was *rotten*, but to-day he sees the wonderful improvement that has overgrown such a number of years. The opinion is also gaining ground, through the inexorable logic of events, that it is unfair for the mother country to bear the whole strain, risk, burden, cost, and responsibility of general defence. The first object is the grasp of sea-power, and the protection of commerce wherever it may be. The Colonies have spent three millions upon defence, and subsidized a naval squadron to help in keeping the Southern Hemisphere for Anglo-Colonial influence. "We depend," said Mr. Reid of Victoria, "upon your manufactures, and England depends upon us for food and raw products." To defend this trade a new system of Imperial Naval Defence is wanted. No one has solved that subject yet. Some genius with a mixture

of Moltke and Mahan has yet to appear to show us how to solve the exact maritime supremacy of our race. England generously pays for keeping up the ocean lines and routes to Australia and New Zealand. The list of forts, coaling stations, and harbours of re-fit are many, viz. Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Colombo, Trincomalee, Hong Kong, Singapore, Table Bay, St. Helena, and the Falklands. To supplement these links in the chain of ocean defence, the Australian Colonies have fortified King George's Sound, Thursday Island, Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Newcastle, Hobart, Otago, Westport, Auckland, etc., and provided themselves with many good war-ships, such as the *Cerberus*, *Protector*, *Paluma*, and *Avernus*. This naval force on the coast is to assist the Royal Navy, and to prevent the capture of harbours, and provide for the further security to our trade-routes and shipping; but there is still much to be done in perfecting the joint defence of the Empire by the Imperial and Colonial forces. Such a unified system cannot be found in a day. It is the work of calm thought, national resolution, and the narrowing down of all party jealousies. The true defence of the Colonial Empire has never been seriously and thoroughly thrashed out, like old corn. The Australian mind has been too busy gold finding, wool growing, and holiday making to grapple with the subject. But the rent in the cloud is opening, and an enlightening public opinion will now steadily do it justice. Lord Overstone once said that "if the general public prove too apathetic to take the necessary precaution or make the necessary efforts, or is too shortsighted and selfish to submit to the necessary sacrifice, they should be prepared to bow to the fate which the whole world will declare we have deserved." The blended forces of the mother country and the

Federal forces of Australia will help to keep up the trade-routes and defend all coaling stations—which must be governed by a military force—also, to defend fortresses from a *coup-de-main*, recapture ports and harbours, and cut off the enemy's lines of communication. The margin of national safety must be largely on the side of the Anglo-Australian offensive and defensive power in the Southern seas, Indian Ocean, and North Pacific.

In this book it will be seen that my main argument for urgent Federal defence, apart from race sentiment, is the expansion of Australian trade in the Pacific, the conservation and further development of trade with the mother country, together with the protection of the same, and the ulterior question which Australian defence gives as to security for the investment of home capital, and for developing the resources and varied products of Australia. The report of the Ottawa Conference prepared by Earl Jersey throws some grave yet brilliant light upon the blending and co-operation of Colonial and British defence for the safety of the whole Empire. I see, as in a mirror, the necessity for the federation of Colonial groups for the purpose of self-defence, but also the greater and eventual organization of Imperial defence for the united, compact, and wide-worlded defence of our Empire. European diplomacy with England is as treacherous as ever, and recent events with foreign powers are convincing the great Anglo-Saxon family at home and abroad, that the British Empire must be maintained against all foes by the Colonial forces. Another great factor in war is for the Colonies to organize and be ready in the days of peace, and not begin to think about it when war is about to be, or has been, declared. To avoid the words "*too late*," is to strike the scientific

blow at any foreign nation at war with England, and the Colonies must be found ready with all their might and wisdom. Australians recognize their being part of the race and Empire, and the Colonies will be found second to none, in not only taking a share in the responsibilities and hard hitting in the days of war, but in laying down their money and lives in defence of "the old flag" and national greatness. Mr. Kipling may depend that the "Native Born" will *stand up* when called upon by Queen and country.

Federal defence became popular when danger was abroad in 1854, 1857, 1860, 1870, 1871, 1879, and 1885. Since the arrival of the Australian Squadron, statesmen have been apt to depend upon the Navy, without having a strong, disciplined, military force ashore. The visit of Sir J. Bevan Edwards was a happy thought, yet his Report, though printed, was practically shelved, like the Commonwealth Bill. It, however, is not yet forgotten by such statesmen as Parkes, Service, Gillies, Griffith, and McIlwraith, nor by such Commandants as Owen, Tulloch, Hutton, Gordon, and other excellent officers who saw the urgent necessity of Federal defence, in the face of such questions as the Dual Alliance, the rise of Russia and Japan as Pacific Powers, to say nothing of the volcanic politics of the United States over the unrecognized Monroe doctrine; or the fact that our local ports and chief harbours are carefully mapped out and lodged in the Admiralty offices at Paris and St. Petersburg—in fact, the armed strength of Australia for offence or defence is better known in Paris than in Sydney or Melbourne. A Russian fleet, without a pilot, sailed past Kangaroo Island, and suddenly anchored off Port Adelaide, whilst its naval lieutenants were once caught surveying Port Jackson and Port Phillip, under the

pretence of fishing. Hobart and New Zealand stand foremost in danger. Russia in 1885 had plans laid for invading Auckland and Wellington, whilst she had everything prepared to force the heads at Port Phillip and seize the wealth held by the Melbourne banks. If a foreign Power knows that Australasia is well defended, it will not risk an expedition ; but if it is known that the Colonies are unprepared, they will most assuredly come in great force to land, burn, pillage, kill, and destroy. The first objective points of a foe will be to capture Port Albany, Hobart, or Thursday Island, before they make a strong and determined attempt to capture Melbourne or Sydney. A daring admiral, with plenty of armed force and ships with men and quick-firing guns, once in possession of these points, would first "go" at Sydney Heads to destroy our naval base at Garden Island, the private docks and engineering establishments ; blow up the fortifications, and seize every penny in the Mint and banks.

In the event of a Russian war with England, it would be necessary for Canada to support the North Pacific fleet of Admiral Stephenson, with a military force to capture and destroy the hostile port of Vladivostock ; and for Australia to send a contingent, paid or not paid by the Imperial or Indian Governments, to some secret points in the Red Sea, then to march through Persia to destroy the Russian railways to the Afghan frontiers, and demoralize the attack upon India from the Caspian base. This illustrates how the Colonies could help powerfully in defending the Empire to which they belong. Five thousand Australians, operating like mounted infantry near Merv or Astrakan, would prevent the army of Kourapatkin from being reinforced from the Caucasus, the capital of which, Tiflis, would be threatened by a British army in Asia Minor. The state of politics in Turkey

points out that England might have to confront both Russia and Turkey, in Asia Minor. I do not think it impossible, with a Persian alliance, that the trans-Caspian railway could not be menaced by an expeditionary army from the Cape and Australia. The destruction of the Russian war-ships and the ships of the Volunteer fleet, together with the capture of Vladivostock, would be much felt in Russia. It would add prestige to the British name in China, Japan, and throughout Asia. It is the present terminus of the Siberian railway, the springing point of a new concentratory army to overawe Corea, with Port Arthur as its goal, and the naval base from whence her fast cruisers could escape to prey upon Colonial and British trade in the Pacific.

Here, in this introduction, I must ask, Where is modern British fatherland? It is not confined to those classic, historical, and sea-girt isles of the Atlantic which direct the affairs of Europe. It has been a most expanding fatherland; a Home and Colonial fatherland. London is certainly the capital, but the fatherland takes in "the Gib," Malta, Aden, India, Mauritius; the best parts of Africa, the wild Karoo, the upper waters of the Nile and Zambesi; the Niger, Congo, Irrawaddy, St. Lawrence, Indus, and Ganges rivers; the stations of the Hindu Kush, the plains of Manitoba and the Punjaub, the ports of Vancouver and New Zealand, the silver-mines of the Barrier Range, the gold-fields of Gympie and Coolgardie, the banks of the Darling, Burdekin, Brisbane, Mitchell, Murray, Yarra, Clarence, and Parramatta rivers. The fatherland or home of the Britisher is in London, Glasgow, Dublin, Quebec, Ottawa, Limasol, Zanzibar, Bombay, Lahore, Delhi, Lucknow, Calcutta, Mandalay, Colombo, Cape Town, Fort Salisbury, Port Louis, Auckland, Vancouver, Hong Kong, Perth, Adelaide,

Brisbane, Hobart, Sydney, Melbourne, Charters Towers, Bourke, Hay, Bendigo, and in places where the sun ever shines—there is the sunshine of the British fatherland, in all its radiant power and glory.

“O'er the glad waters of the dark-blue sea,
Our thoughts as boundless, and our souls as free,
Far as the breeze can bear, the billows foam,
Survey our empire, and behold our home !”

BYRON, *The Corsair*.

Australians are as much Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen as those at home. The heart of England beats true to the responsive heart of Australia. Socialism, free thought, and red republicanism pale before the sterling thought of duty and patriotism of “My Colonial.” When the youth of the Colonies come to read and digest the history and tradition of their race in the world’s history, and are living witnesses to the great awakening of patriotism throughout the Empire, I do not despair of Australia turning out warriors, statesmen, discoverers, philosophers, and hard workers equal to the old land; where poetry exists, valour and patriotism abound.

The strength of a nation lies in its youth, and in the self-sacrifice of that youth. A true Federal defence system of any nation also lies in its special national character. Goltz says—“The leading principles of war are eternal, yet the phenomena with which they have to deal and reckon are subject to continuous change.” It is this rude change which compels nations to be always learning and preparing the art of war during peace. An army and its branches must learn to know how and when to strike—singly or collectively, in small column or large division—the enemy, during the varied phases of a campaign or in deadly battle, like a huge machine or

engine of war. It is idle to deal with defence when that engine is unready to start, and all its parts not well oiled. It is better to blow off steam, than set the wheels in motion, if the engine is not ready for the great start. In the next great war the fate of a nation is doomed if it embarks in war without thought. The mutual distrust of civilized nations will always compel other nations and colonies to keep up a standing naval and military defence. A sickly conception of war and the world's politics will be fatal to Australasian interests. War is bound up with the very culture of a nation. It directs its expansion and civilization. Our country has recently shown a grand repression of war feeling in connection with four powerful States. My main object in writing this book is to create a clear conception of our duty in Australasia, and how it will stand in the event of war. It will be my duty to prove how, in dangerous times like the present, we seek safety and public confidence by working in love and harmony with Old England, and by the Colonies "pulling altogether" in defence of the great British race and Colonial Empire.

Colonel Sir Charles Nugent approved the suggestion that military schools should be established in the Colonies —one would do for Australasia. The Australian Colonies were working spasmodically, pursuing one plan at one place, another at another, with scarcely any system at all. One man is wanted to advise all the Australian Colonies, and to assist them in providing for their defence. The appointment of such a man would be a step towards united action.

Sir George Tryon formed a scheme in 1885 to amalgamate the Australian "mosquito" fleets with the Imperial without wounding the susceptibilities of any Colony. Colonial defence was the task of the Imperial

Government, which should also encourage the initiative of organized Australian defence, as it did do at Thursday Island and Albany, to say nothing of the Auxiliary Squadron. In 1885 the *Times* said—"A good deal has been done by the Australians, and with a little judicious assistance their infant fleet might be converted into a powerful local auxiliary to the Imperial Navy." The Home Government showed the way by fortifying the links in the chain of the sea-routes to all her Colonies, but England justly expects us to create Sebastopolis along our coasts, as advocated by Jervis, Tryon, Fairfax, Paisley, Clarke, Bowden-Smith, and Bridge, armed and defended by the military. Much has been said of raiding the Australian coasts, and levying blackmail upon the towns. Russian warfare is cruel enough—the Alma and Geke Tepe for instance; but here is what the French admiral Aube wrote in 1885—"The empire of the sea will belong to that nation of the two which has the most numerous ironclad fleet. Every power of attack and destruction will be employed against all England's littoral towns—fortified or unfortified—whether purely peace establishments or warlike, to burn them, to destroy them, or to pitilessly ransack them. In any future war the French will come down from the height of that clouded sentimentality which has created the monstrous association of words, 'the rights of war,' or *les droits de la guerre*, and the attack on every source of riches will be not only legitimate but obligatory on them." These be brave words, but, I trust, difficult to accomplish at Home or in the Colonies. But another Frenchman, who knew England well, warned his countrymen to respect the martial spirit of the British race, as "the drum sounds only to give orders when danger is at hand. Beware of that silent race, who raise their voices above the roar of

cannon, and put on their red coats only to celebrate *la fête au sang.*" Mr. Goschen the other day reminded foreigners that Great Britain lived in the heart of her Colonies, and that it was a dangerous fallacy to suppose that England was dead to her national and Colonial interests.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL GROWTH

ALL nations and colonies have national life, expansion, and growth like the natural growth of plants and animals. Nations have their birth,—just like the germination of seed, which in due course springs up into young plants; are cultivated by able statesmen, propagated by good State husbandmen, yet watered and manured by the experience of ages. They are not made all at once. They all spring from one original stock; from families into tribes, then into races, provinces, nations, and empires. The tree of old Adam gave forth many branches, from which, in the process of time, and through the law of population, the numerous seedlings struck root in other soils and climates, thus giving birth to new nations and the growth of empires. Such distinctly national trees grew and flourished with great fertility and race distinction. But like strong plants and vigorous animals, they required to be properly trained, propagated, and directed by wisdom, reason, dignity, and patriotism. If the national growth or tree is not carefully cultivated by the people and good government, the national tree will fall into decay, become nipped in the bud by misgovernment, apathy, neglect, indifference, non-ambition, the ills of luxury



COLONEL THE HON. FREDERICK SARGOOD, K.C.M.G., M.L.C.,
Ex-Minister of Defence, Victoria.

and ease, and the over-production of individual wealth. If the subjects of a State decay, so will the national power, aspiration, good government, and ennobling patriotism. When population increases, society and the masses must be subject to law and order, preserving the rights, privileges, and justice of the populative whole. The rise and growth of neighbouring States beget rivalry and envy, aggression and the love of conquest, hatred and war. Such is national human nature, the workings of which can be traced, not in sand, but in the eternal pages of history. The chief aim and object of rulers should be to rule in the interests of peace, for the national happiness and prosperity, and to study war no more; indeed, peace and the white-winged peacemaker have their victories more glorious than the victories of war. But all intelligent men know that nations lose their temper and wisdom, like men, and when once a nation gets upon the war-path or becomes committed to the attack, it is useless to cry "PEACE." Those who have read the rise and fall of the Roman Empire; the Persian, Hebrew, Egyptian, Carthaginian, Venetian, Spanish, Dutch and other nations, must have reflected upon the cause and decay of their national greatness. We have read how Napoleon shattered the Empire of Germany and split up the grand States of Italy, and how the last of universal conquests by the Louis and Napoleons were crushed by the genius of Marlborough and Wellington. After the defeats of the Spanish Armada and fleets, and of the Marshals of France, the national life of France and Spain decayed, whilst the national growth of England grew into the greatest maritime power upon earth. Germany crushed the power of Austria at Sadowa in 1866, that of France in 1870, and she again became Imperial by the genius of Moltke and Bismarck,

under the star of the Hohenzollern. Italy grew out of her pitiful disunion by the genius of Cavour, Garibaldi, and Victor Emmanuel, and became a solid and patriotic nation in 1871. The growth of the United States into a nation is phenomenal, whilst the more recent growth of Japan, a pagan power of the East, has been something marvellous in the growth of nations. During the last hundred years the world has seen nothing but progress and evolution, with the view to improve the blessings of civilization. The lions in the path of national growth force leaders and nations into war, which no human power can hold back. Arbitration, conferences, and standing armies have not yet ensured peace. The national growth of Australia will march on in spite of war, but the people must not expect to live on the fruits of peace and colonization without international strife, arising out of foreign envy and hostile temperament. There never was, nor never will be, the ideal of universal peace. It is the fond hope of all good men, but the dream is far off, in the face of new dangers in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. When a cause is considered just by a nation, there is always the chance of force being necessary to gain just ends. The fate of nations is in the hands of God, and we know not how Providence, in His all-wise power, works to advance or retard peoples and nations. He has given the world His written laws and commandments. He has made us a self-thinking and responsible people to Him. The fate of nations has taken place according to the all-powerful Creator. Nations in international wars and strife must use that human intelligence, wisdom, and understanding according to the nation's light. The golden age of peace, when the lion will lay down with the lamb, and the latter is seen grazing at the mouths of rusty guns, would

be hailed with glad tidings of great joy. But men and nations must be mysteriously changed before war will be no more. The twentieth century will never see this much-desired reign of universal love and peace. The "Jap," the Cossack, and the Frank are abroad upon the war-path. It is idle to shut one's eyes to the fact that the aim of the Dual Alliance is war, first against the British Colonies, and then against all Europe who oppose it. A weak defence, a stagnant policy, and disunion prevent a national growth. The growth of Australia means "the Pacific for Australia," and woe to the France, Russia, or Japan that opposes this Austral-Pacific doctrine! The conflict of opinion is often succeeded by the conflict of arms. Australia desires peace amongst all nations, but if some nation provoke war, and asks us to subordinate ourselves to them, then the spirit of the Australian natives will be like that of any other noble people—"Death before dishonour." Defence without a system is an evil, and the non-discussion of it only increases the evil. Defence is a national duty, even if the people are naturally averse to war.

The lessons of history must be taught and understood by the Australian people. They must not fancy that they live under perfect security in these days of mailed fleets and huge armies, all directed against the British, Colonial, and Imperial Empire. To hold our own against the formidable armed strengths of France and Russia is no light nor easy matter. Australia is woven up with the fate, the peace or warfare, of the British Empire, which has arrived at a point in history, for the fourth time, when her sea-power and foreign policy have been challenged by three great continental Powers. Australia owes everything—its discovery, its settlement, its colonization, and development—to Old England, to her

sons and capital. She is one of the British oak branches transplanted from the Clyde, Thames, and Shannon, which has here taken vigorous root in the seven colonies of Australia. They are rapidly growing in life, strength, race feeling, trade interest, expansion, federal and national development. These Colonies have been created by the love of adventure and colonization, by that race which has conquered in every clime. The sea-going and discovering spirit of Captain Cook and other navigators of the Royal Navy paved the way for an Australian nation, and its influence in the Southern Pacific.

We have never yet had to fight, like colonists at the Cape, Canada, or in New Zealand, for the integrity of our rich and glorious possessions, but it is beyond human ken when we shall have to fight to preserve the great inheritance bequeathed to us by our Anglo-Saxon fathers—and that, too, with all our heart, strength, and disciplined might. The “long wash” or coast-line of the Australasian shore must never be left open to foreign invasion. With Chatham let us say, that whilst “an enemy landed upon my country, never will I lay down my arms—never, never, never!” Against her will, with or without England, wealthy Australia will be always subject to invasion.

The national growth of Australasia may be checked by hostile invasion. It will be one of the pains and penalties of our national aspiration, expansion, and civilization. It will be the incidence of her national growth and power in the Pacific. Our rough island continent is now brought into the trade, conflict, and practical politics of European and Asiatic powers. It will always be a continent worth fighting for, superior to the riches of Central Africa, the “wealth of Orient and of Ind.” Every day proves the fresh riches, wealth, progress—

and continuous progression—of the Australian Colonies. Their growth is yet infantile, and her manifold resources are practically untouched. They have all the resources of a powerful nation within their bosom ; and with the manufacture of iron, the creation of a mercantile marine, the construction of war-ships ; with a smokeless powder, ammunition, and small-arms factories, we possess internally all those atoms, units, and factors which go to make a mighty, identical, life-giving, and powerful nation of the Pacific. Despite the blunders of statesmen and the narrow-mindedness of the leading press, Australia is growing and advancing by leaps and bounds, jumping on from point to point, like “the fairy-tales of science and the long results of time.” National and Federal defence belongs to national duty—the duty of population, and the patriotism of free-born men. Those who fail to see and believe in this doctrine are anti-British and non-Australian in spirit, and should seek to eke out their allotted span under some other flag. The patriotism of State defence is holy, and it lays down its life for home, peace, empire, and good government. It is the duty of the subject to defend the States from foes within and without. A large number of foreigners are mixed up with the population and the local mercantile marine. They cannot think, feel, and reason like “oor ain folk,” and therefore cannot act or vote with that Anglo-Australian patriotism which they should have. Patriotism is the *beau ideal* of a nation in arms to defend itself. It also makes the difference between a civilized and savage State. It is the duty of governments not only to maintain law and order at home, but they must be able to protect the subjects abroad, as a government in the execution of national life. With the people, government is the higher organization of that life and vitality. No

nation can exist if ordered, or is subordinated, by another State, and force is sometimes necessary to gain just ends. Buyers, traders, workers, sellers, merchants and shippers, all must have State protection against foreign nations. The conflict of opinion in international affairs is often succeeded by a force of arms. It is curious how wars grow with the defence of national spirit, and in matters arising out of trade, life, expansion, and Colonial aspiration. The wars of the mother country arose out of the national growth, laws of expansion, and colonization. England paved the way for the expansion of the race in Australia. It cost the colonists, from the time of Governor Philip to the date of responsible government, nothing for administration. The Australian Squadron is a drop in the bucket in the cost of Imperial defence. Self-defence applies to colonies as well as to nations and individuals. All subjects should hold themselves ready to defend the land of their birth or adopted country with their whole heart, mind, and strength. He is a poor and contemptible subject that objects to take his share in Colonial defence for the good and integrity of the State, in fact he is not a man worthy of belonging to a free-born people. This sentiment should be infused into every Australian youth by school-teacher, parent, grammar-school master, and university professor. It should form the very soul and essence of Australian education and nationality. This patriotic sentiment should animate the school- and drill-ground, all manly sports, public meetings, platform speeches, and all social circles graced by the sons and daughters of the Anglo-Saxon-Celtic race, which has built up the grandest nation in all history. The people of each Colony must be true to each other, and the glorious Empire to which we all belong. *It is national growth par excellence.*

When the two Royal Princes visited Australia, the late Prince Albert Victor asked a typical young Colonial, "What are you? Are you a Britisher?" "No," replied the youth; "I am an Australian!" "This," remarked the Prince, "is how nationality springs up—with the land of birth and love of country." I like to hear the young Anglo-Saxon-Celts telling people that they are Australians, but it does not follow that because they were born in Melbourne or Wellington that they are not Britishers. I love to see the growth of Australian nationality under the Crown, and beating time to the peaceful strides of Empire and Colonial progression. There is a happy ring in the sound of British and Australian unity, and which daily resounds over five continents. The growth of empire and commerce goes on, yet not without its natural perils and dangers. The Empire is being bound together in its rapid growth and development with links of steel, whilst the drum-roll of martial England is only seriously "heard when danger is near."

Mr. Chamberlain has stated that the relations between Great Britain and her autonomous Colonies were critical, that the security of the Imperial rule over those Colonies would depend upon the temper and tone with which coming difficult problems were approached. The Colonies had grown into vigorous peoples, with every element of national life, and were capable of taking rank as nations. However, as the possibility of separation from the mother country increased, the desire for separation happily lessened and the spirit of patriotism widened.

Lord Hampden said in Sydney—"There was a genius for trade in the British race. British people, wherever they go, show a desire to develop the resources of the country, and in every way to develop the wealth of the country in which they reside. Following upon that is

the determination of England to keep what she has got, and to cover her ocean-going commerce with a fighting fleet, and this has made the Empire what it is. The last twenty-five years has been an anxious time in Great Britain, for as the power has gradually passed to the people at large, there has been a feeling on the part of some that the Government would show a disinclination to provide the necessary military and naval organization for the defence of the shipping and commerce."

Professor Seeley says of our national growth and Imperial defence—"Another prejudice is that the Colonies are involved by their connection with the mother country in all the accidental quarrels with European States in which England may engage, and in which the Colonies have no real interest or concern. Let us only examine carefully the European wars in which England has been engaged since the seventeenth century. We shall find, first, that they have not risen in the casual, accidental way supposed, but out of large, permanent causes ; secondly—and this is most important—that the great permanent cause has been the Colonial Empire itself. On the historical point I must refer you to what I have said elsewhere. The great eighteenth-century wars of England, I assert, were mainly Colonial, Imperial struggles. Apart from the Empire we have scarcely any interests ; it can scarcely be said that England has any European policy in which the Colonies are not concerned. When we have fought it has been for colonies or trade, and trade is only colonies under another name. Now, what have the Colonies and the mother country in common ? Between them there is ever flowing a wave of trade, and also a wave of population. These require to be carefully watched. Suppose war should come and interrupt trade ; what disasters might follow both to England and

to the Colonies ! Therefore, the water-way should be guarded. In other words, we want Imperial defence. Again, there is a movement of population, one of the greatest, most important movements ever witnessed. In the Colonies there is land for all our people ; in England there are hands ready to do all the work which the Colonies may need. But in this great displacement what room for error, mismanagement, confusion ! ”

CHAPTER III

ANGLO-COLONIAL EXPANSION

COLONIAL expansion is the outcrop of our naval supremacy and sea-power, which enabled the little empire of Elizabeth to expand into the mighty empire of Queen Victoria. And with the valour of our modern sons it will continue to go on and expand in two worlds, carrying with it the instincts of liberty, freedom, organization, and adventure. The Empire may be made up of Crown or self-governing Colonies, protectorates, dependencies, or spheres of influence, but the same spirit of freedom and progress goes marching on, with a never-ending growth and unseen finality. This is true of the smallest as well as of the greatest colony. It is true of the Cape and Natal, of Victoria and Queensland, of New Zealand and gallant little West Australia. The only "lame ducks" in the race of progress are Tasmania and South Australia. Japan will shortly be a rival of Australia in the East, whilst she has not yet formed for herself seamen nor a mercantile marine. The Pacific offers a great field for Anglo-Australian trade expansion, and under the guns of the Royal Navy they should take every advantage of time and opportunity before Russia and Germany sneak into its trade centres with the cheap-made wares of Central Europe and the Caspian. The Russian



THE RIGHT HON. J. CHAMBERLAIN,

Landon Steven, Company, Photo.

Volunteer fleet is already a factor to be dealt with. Let us digest the tables of Hayter and Coghlan, to say nothing of Mulhall, since 1851, and we see at a glance the almost fabulous records of comparative progress made up to 1895. It is the old story of British Colonial expansion and elastic institutions which our sea-power made, for which we all should thank the mother country, and remain true to the old flag "for ever and ever." Under every sky and distant zone the Anglo-Saxon Colonies live and thrive—in Canada, at the polar north, in Australia, and in the tropical south. The rise of Manitoba and the development of Vancouver are emblems of our national growth and power. Fortified Esquimault and the fertile shores of Vancouver reflect the national expansion of fortified Sydney and the as fertile shores of New Zealand, Melbourne, Port Adelaide, Townsville, Brisbane, Hobart, Newcastle, Port Albany, Port Louis, Colombo, Bombay, Rangoon, Aden, Table Bay, Hong Kong, Singapore, Halifax, Quebec—in fact, all over the world the Union Jack throws its folds to the winds, and these flag-poles only denote "the pillars or sea-gates of a dominion on an ocean which promises to be the next field of developing civilization." We have crossed the American, African, and Indian continents with iron rails, and have cabled the Atlantic, Indian, and soon the Pacific oceans, thus binding the race closer and closer.

"The great feature of Australia," says Miss Shaw, in the *Times*, "is its wealth." Since 1851 the output of gold is valued at £360,000,000; the annual average wool-clip at £27,000,000; the fruit crop at £3,000,000; honey, poultry, and eggs at £3,500,000; butter at £7,000,000; farm crops at £22,000,000; the meat export trade at £1,200,000; whilst the total export trade in 1891

amounted to £144,000,000. These figures go to prove that Australians certainly are a live, colonizing, hard-working, and commercial people." After reviewing the ocean lines of communication, Miss Shaw compares the union and expansion of empire to the gradual spinning of the lines of a web, "from rib to rib, as a spider completes her work;" and again, "the expansion of Great Britain has made the Empire; it is for *the expansion of the Colonies to consolidate it.*" I hope there will be a general awakening of the young Australian mind to the benefits and advantages to be derived from being connected with such an Empire. They have only, like Montaigne, "to think, pause, reflect, and understand"; read the works of Creasy, Hallam, Macaulay, Froude, and Seeley in the right direction, and I am sure they will rejoice in the name of Anglo-Australian. Miss Shaw regards the Colonies of the Empire as units, the United Kingdom as their big natural market to absorb the raw material which is their wealth—"there is nothing which we do not make, and they do not grow." The expansion of British trade means the extension of the Colonial "big market," and the increase of Australian exports, thus making the Anglo-Australian "economic movements to rise or fall in unison." England contributes capital to develop Australian production, and there are 12,000,000 British subjects in all the Colonies. The supply of capital and population seems inexhaustible. Such interests are identical, as the tide of commerce is increasing and continuous. This lady also writes—"There will be always something for which we possess special aptitude, and the increase of wealth and population in mutual markets will stimulate the value of exchange. This is the view which is justified by large conceptions alike

of self-interest and patriotism." The tonnage of two P. and O. steamers of to-day are equal to the whole tonnage of the fleet with which Drake and Hawkins commanded the sea. Colonial expansion weaves "the woof and warp of a united Empire; and it is possible that intercolonial shipping shall be scarcely less numerous than the shipping which now carries the freight between Great Britain and the Colonies, and the ships of our increased Merchant Navy shall ply like ceaseless shuttles from port to port, weaving round British territory such bonds as friction cannot wear nor convulsion snap. Let us encourage the carrying of trade for the sake of maintaining our naval supremacy. It made us ; it keeps us ; without it the Empire could not exist for a day. It gives scope to our sea-faring population and energies of the nation. The force of expansion and consolidation should work automatically together ;" and in concluding a grand oration upon Colonial expansion the gifted Miss Shaw said—" When we pause and think for a moment of all that the system has produced, it seems incredible that the word 'separation' can be heard. Who is there born beneath the flag so blind to his advantage that he would accept a part when he may have the whole of such a birthright? Second only in value to the robust love of liberty in our history, has been the inspiring conception of the dignity of union, and we may look forward with confidence to the expansion of the Colonies to prove that the fullest measure of one will but strengthen and affirm the other, so long as the first principles of unity are recognized to be liberty and prosperity within the Union." But Mr. Williams, in his great book, *Made in Germany*, warns the British people to defeat the commercial war made by Germany upon British trade since 1871.

In support of Miss Shaw, Sir Charles Warren says—“The Colonies should now pull and trade together, and enhance the greatness of the Empire.” Mr. J. Huddart says—“What is wanted now-a-days is courage. The British Empire was not built up by pessimists, but by its native courage.” Mr. Duncan Gillies says—“There are no freer countries on the face of the earth than the Colonies. Sometimes one hears the word ‘separation.’ It is not the voice of the people.” “I was born a Britisher,” said the late Sir John Macdonald of Canada, “and I will die one under the old flag.” Listen to what the Canadian Press says. It is so different to what we read in the average Australian Press. The *Ottawa Citizen* says—“Canadians enjoy a freedom, a system of laws and good institutions, a firm and orderly Government, such as the Americans do not know. We are the faithful subjects of, and bear loyal allegiance to, her Majesty, and will strengthen the links that girdle the world with her possessions. Our desire is to bind ourselves more closely to those islands that are the seat of sovereignty in the most enlightened, civilized, renowned, and glorious Empire the world has ever seen. England may be sometimes alone in the world. It is natural that her greatness should provoke envy. But should she have to face a world in arms, her flag will be upheld by devoted subjects, or will go down drenched in Canadian blood.” This should also be the Australian sentiment. Mr. Lecky, the historian, says of our national growth—“If we turned to our self-governing Colonies, we must see how valuable it was in an age in which international jealousies were so rife, that there should be vast and rapidly-growing portions of the globe that were not only at peace with us but at one with us; how unspeakably important it was to the future of the world that the

English race through the ages that were to come should cling as closely as possible together. It was not impossible to conceive circumstances in which the destruction of some of our great industries would make it utterly impossible for our present population to live upon British soil, and that the possession of vast undeveloped territories under the British flag and in the hands of the British race might become a matter of transcendent importance. Much was due to our insular position and our command of the sea, which gave Englishmen in the competition of all nations a peculiar power both of conquering and holding distant dependencies. We had largely employed our redundant energies in exploring, conquering, civilizing, and governing distant and half-savage races. We had allowed an unusual latitude to local knowledge and to local wishes. We had endeavoured in our new dependencies to secure life and property, and contract, and personal freedom, and in later days religious liberty. But for the rest we had allowed our settlements to develop much as they pleased, and had given a wide latitude to the different governors. It was wonderful in the history of the British Empire how large a part of the Colonies was due to the independent action of individual adventurers or groups of emigrants, or of commercial companies, almost wholly unsupported by the Government at home. An empire so built up was not likely to exhibit much symmetry and unity of plan, but it was certain to be pervaded in all its parts by a spirit of enterprise and self-reliance, and it would probably be particularly fertile in men not only of energy but of resource, capable of dealing with strange conditions and unforeseen exigencies."

Mr. Dyers' lecture in Melbourne, upon "Australia and the Asian-Pacific," unfolded many interesting facts

respecting trade relations in the Far East. He said the extent of market in the East was immeasurable, and the time will come when there will be a large demand for British and Australian products, and that “the value of the East—or of those countries on the south and east of Asia known as the East—as an outlet for our products may be broadly gauged by—(1) the enormous population, (2) the absence of any products such as we can grow and supply so largely, and (3) the keen attention with which its markets are regarded by Great Britain, Europe, and America.” Mr. Holt S. Hallett, a distinguished contributor to the *Nineteenth Century*, says—“China, Japan, and Siam, together with our Asian possessions, contain more than *half the population of the world*—nine times more inhabitants than are contained in the whole of our non-Asian dominions. They are our largest, richest, and most promising markets. If we lose our markets in the Far East, the United Kingdom—deprived of its largest areas of commerce—would dwindle into a second-rate Power.”

The population of the Asian-Pacific is set down at 520,000,000, most of which are likely consumers of Anglo-Australian products. Australians have been neglecting those markets, though the Victoria and South Australian Governments sent agents who did nothing in the face of Japanese activity and national ambition to be the Great Britain of the East. Mr. Dyers concludes, after three years' travel, that 20,000,000 persons are ready to consume Australasian fruits, butter, meats, wines, wool, hides, etc., by the aid of well-directed thought and study of the markets. The greatness of the Asian-Pacific trade lies in the future, which only requires to be *creative*. The same fleets that now exist in the Pacific will be able to protect

the subject, property invested, and mercantile marine invested in the developing trade. This is only one feature of Australasian trade relations with the East and across the waters of the vast Pacific. Australasia will soon become the greatest exporter of the Southern hemisphere, if its merchants, shippers, and statesmen are wise, and succeed like Britishers in commanding the trans-Pacific markets. Our political and commercial destiny is clearly pointed out, and we must take advantage of it. It should have been done fifty years ago, as an American statesman, in 1852, pointed out—
“Henceforth, European commerce, politics, thoughts, and activity, although actually gaining force, and European connections, although actually becoming more intimate, will, nevertheless, relatively sink in importance; while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world’s great hereafter.”

The islands of the South and West are no longer only known to missionaries, but are seats of valuable trade which no foreigner should be allowed to take out of our hands. What are the conditions of the Polynesian and Asian-Pacific to-day, compared to what they were in 1850? Commerce and civilization have advanced by leaps and bounds, but are nothing to what they will be fifty years hence. Part of the Australian policy must be to pioneer and legislate for posterity. We can also do so by a joint Imperial and Federal defence. The Empire does not want to go to war, but to be left alone in the undisturbed possession of her Empire and expanding commerce, the very essence of our national greatness and existence. Why then should any foreign Power—unless through jealousy—whose maritime trade was not threatened, try to wrest

from England and her Colonies that sea-power so necessary for our life and independence? What is the cost of defence, compared to the defeat of England and the loss of her several Colonies? Let us guard against such a calamity with all our racial might, wisdom, and understanding. Foreign nations must be made to understand that the expansion of British trade and commerce is not to be trifled with. Hence the great Anglo-Colonial naval and military awakening for Federal defence. So much progress has been made with this new patriotic sentiment that I note that the War Office and Lord Wolseley have invited the Colonies to form more Volunteer Reserve Corps, in anticipation of new dangers, which will no doubt strike at the root of our sea-power and national greatness. The French and German colonial parties have a special policy against England's commerce and Colonial expansion, apart from Russian dangers, but Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy proves that the old British spirit is still alive. Lord Wolseley asserts that the British nation was never better prepared for war, and Mr. Balfour declares that the hatred of France and Germany has compelled England to increase the defences and give further protection to the whole Empire.

The British and Colonial Empires belong to each other—in fact, one is not national without the other. Nations are made of many States, and the peculiar feature of the British Empire is that it consists of a series of units—the United Kingdom, India, and the Colonies. Its frontiers are not confined to the United Kingdom, but to the three-mile limit of foreign countries. It is a scattered Empire—won by the Navy, created by the Anglo-Saxon and Celt, expanded by the adventurous genius of its sons, and which must be protected by the

Navy. The history of England tells the tale that the United Kingdom would be nothing without its Colonies. England, powerful and defiant after Agincourt and the Armada, reaped the benefit of her victories. After the defeat of the Armada, the Englishman aspired to know more of those seas which bore Columbus and Marco Polo, and from whence the Spanish galleons came to be captured by English ships off the Canaries. The pages of Froude denote the national aspiration for trade and colonies. Our naval captains sailed into every sea and captured colonies and El Dorados upon every daring opportunity. Our Colonies to-day are just what the British spirit, capital, enterprise, colonization, and population made them. Only for the blundering of Lord North and the inefficiency of the Admiralty, the United States would have been British to-day—an American nation under the Crown. Lord North was the man to make this terrible and unfortunate split in the British-Colonial camp. The Americans rightly resented taxation without representation, but when Washington gained the day they should have carried on government as we now do in Australia and Canada, and not repeated the disintegration ideas of the colonies of Greece and Rome. Unity was strength, but they adopted union to the disunion of their race and empire. So long as Australia is self-governing, there is no desire for an Australian Republic upon socialistic lines. The British Empire being made up of colonies and sea-girt isles, they all belong to a common race and empire, all resting on each other for safety and defence.

The Colonies, with the rest of the Empire, are beginning to feel that the naval defence of the Empire is an Imperial question, and that all living under the British flag in the United Kingdom, or beyond the seas, should

contribute their share towards the cost and support of the Royal Navy, now growing to huge proportions, owing to Anglo-Colonial expansion and the hostile intent of foreign Powers. The British tax-payer, however willing, has no right to bear the taxation alone, when his children in the Colonies are growing daily more wealthy and powerful. The Navy protects British commerce to the extent of £970,000,000, including £143,000,000 belonging to the self-governing Colonies, or one-seventh of the whole commerce of the Empire. The Navy now costs £20,000,000 for maintenance, engineering, and ship construction, but the self-governing Colonies only contribute towards this sum—in some Colonies with a grudge—only £268,000, or one seventy-fifth part of the whole, the remaining seventy-four seventy-fifths, or £19,732,000, being paid by the home tax-payer. The Colonies are slowly realizing, in the face of foreign danger and aggression, that they have been a little careless, selfish, unjust, and unpatriotic in the consideration of naval-colonial defence. The Cape population has promptly acknowledged the fact, upon conversion by Admiral Sir Vesey Hamilton and the Navy League, by adding two men-of-war to the Imperial Navy, without the Australian Auxiliary Squadron conditions. Canada is also expected to contribute its quota to the support of the Navy. India should do more than it is doing. Australia was the first to acknowledge its patriotic duty when the late Admiral Sir George Tryon commanded on the station, but its quota is now regarded as a flea-bite, considering its great wealth, commerce, and revenues. The lion in the path of extra contribution is “no taxation without representation”—a glorious principle. The lion will exist until the problem of Imperial or Federal British Government shall be

solved. The only way out of the present difficulty, until the question is solved, is the presentation of a certain number of war-ships, upon the lines of those presented by the Cape and South African Colonies. So long as the Navy holds the sea, the Colonies need not be alarmed about invasion. The Australian Colonies are a proud part of the Imperial Empire, second only in trade and wealth to India. The past and present progress of Australasia is nothing to what it will be in the future. The imports and exports between the United Kingdom and her Colonies are greater than that with foreign countries. They totalize £50,000,000 for imports and £60,000,000 for exports. The imports from home ports showed 32 per cent., 54 per cent. of inter-colonial imports, and 14 per cent. from other countries. The proportion exported to England amounted to 42 per cent., to other Colonies 44 per cent., and 16 per cent. to other countries. The population may be set down at 4,200,000. The annual gold production was about £2,000,000, whilst the pastoral and agricultural wealth was something fabulous. £11,000,000 were deposited in the Savings Banks, and in the Banks £60,000,000. With such Australasian results, the reader can fancy to himself what will be the size of Australasian trade in ten, fifteen, twenty, fifty, and a hundred years hence, when the land gets settled and developed like the United States and Europe. It is useless to argue the question further, as the calculation will be something stupendous. Australian statesmen must be far-reaching and legislative enough to realize, design, and protect this hidden and future wealth. They must rise above log-rolling and the next General Election results. They must rise to the level of statesmen, and not delegates in Parliament. The naval defence of the Colonies should rise above the din and

discord of political party. It should be the tenet of all shades of class and party to hold one opinion with regard to upholding the sea-power of England, which must be largely assisted by the Colonies, whose trade, commerce, and national life are so closely blended with that of mighty England, the mother of happy and prosperous nations. It is far better to contribute to the Royal Navy, as the cheapest and best way of protecting Australian seas, shores, and harbours, rather than expect to create an independent yet half-disciplined and badly-armed fleet. Misfortune would follow the evils of a divided and unworkable command. The Admiralty is the best judge of how to beat the foe at sea ; when and where to resist and defeat any hostile naval concentration. General Goodenough, in the *Army Book*, fails to grasp the naval idea when he says—"It has thus been laid down that while the Imperial fortresses, as well as the principal coaling stations, may become the object of serious attack, the case is wholly different as regards the majority of the Colonies. In their case no great military object, exerting an influence on the course of a war, would be obtained by their capture whilst the Navy was in command of the sea ; any attempt at occupation or territorial aggression must be made by a squadron accompanied by transports carrying a land force with all its necessary equipment, and starting from a European port ; an expedition of this class could hardly be prepared without exciting notice, and it would be the special object of the Navy to frustrate such attempts. It is therefore not likely that any serious attempt at occupation could be successfully carried out by an enemy.¹ At the same time, naval superiority could not entirely prevent the action

¹ Steam and electricity are changing this idea.—AUTHOR,

of fast cruisers of considerable coal endurance. Such vessels might be able for some months to keep the seas, and might make brief raids upon unprotected ports to obtain requisitions of coal, money, or supplies. Ships of war of this class, however, carry comparatively little ammunition, and would hesitate about expending ammunition on bombardment at a distance from their base of supplies, as there would be the possibility of their being obliged to fight one of H.M. ships."

CHAPTER IV

THE AUSTRALASIAN NATIONAL POLICY

THE national policy of these Colonies is simply to develop their manifold resources, live in peace with all nations, buy and sell in every market, securing the trade of the Pacific, enjoy the blessings of free government, and join the mother country in all things pertaining to the expansion and defence of trade, commerce, and the Colonies. There will be no real national policy until Federation is a fact, and the policy of united Australasia is formulated through its statesmen in Federal Council assembled. Parliament means the congregation of all the wisdom, learning, and practical intelligence of a nation. It should be a body of well-educated and high-cultured gentlemen, breathing the very national wisdom of the people. I look forward to a high and intelligent national policy and system of government by party and the people when Federation is a fact.

The Australian national policy has never been properly defined. It is slowly and surely developing. Whatever is the desire for Australian nationality, it will be always under the Crown. A few thoughtless and mad-brained politicians only speak of socialism and republicanism. The labour vote sends the most rabid of orators into the

Parliaments by mistake, whilst others hold questionable meetings of the loafers of society—men who will not work at any time. The Australian boys are proud of being natives of the soil, and of being descended from the heroes of Crecy, Waterloo, the Nile and Trafalgar, of the Armada, and Anglo-Saxon liberty and freedom. They hold in wondrous admiration the names of Milton, Shakespeare, Hampden, Addison, Chatham, Pitt, Canning, Wilberforce, Brougham, Newton, Faraday, Macaulay, Byron, Burns, Moore, Tennyson, Nelson, Marlborough, Wellington, and Lord Clyde. The Australian national policy will be, to have their own federal institutions, one law, one fiscal system, trade with all countries, supremacy in the Pacific, the building up and expansion of a great nation upon the good old base lines of the British, and not of the American, Constitution. From New Guinea to Cape Leewin, from Port Darwin to Port Jackson, all future legislation must have a national breadth and life-giving development. This national life is forcing itself upon the people by leaps and bounds. It is animating every industry, every station, every agricultural district, every large movement, every home and parlour, and every topic that affects British interests. It is forcing ahead Federal defence with the view to give Australasia a better voice in the councils of Westminster and of Europe. Race sentiment binds the Colonies with the mother country with silken cords, and in the years to come, when steam and electricity will have shortened the distance between, the young Australian will be proud of his British birthright and exclaim, “I am an Anglo-Australian.” This is how the nationality will spring up.

It would seem that some foreign nations mean to burst up our Colonial Empire, and imitate our Colonial

greatness. Our Colonial Empire is like the American giant, it is always expanding, and will never reach its full growth. "My boys" of *Punch* and "the young eagles of the West" would keep up the old spirit of enterprise and adventure in the Pacific, if they had a Federal Navy and a mercantile marine. The do-nothing policy of Gladstone, Morley, Derby, Ripon, and Rosebery is unsuited to the race in the Australian Colonies. That of Mr. Chamberlain is more suited to their tastes and ambition. They would resent any alteration of the Pacific map arising out of European map alteration. The thousand isles of Oceana are the heritage of geographical Australia. For sixty years have British missionaries laboured—like Livingstone—in the Pacific. We want the Pacific power to be an Australian power. Sir J. B. Thurston of Fiji has been a devoted administrator of the Islands. As Mr. Gillies of Victoria once said—"If the adjacent isles of the Pacific be portioned out amongst the foreign Powers of Europe, the day will come when they will be conquered by Australians by force of arms." Foreign Powers see that the British Colonies, united and free, give a preponderating power to England in the councils of Europe. Republican France is always a menace to English progress, and several times since 1878 has she tried to annex New Hebrides. Rapa is no exchange for Havanna Harbour. Lord Derby will never be forgiven "for winking one eye" whilst friendly Germany annexed part of New Guinea. A Granville must no longer play into the hands of a Waddington or the Kaiser. The Australian Rachel weeps no more for her children. The want of British balancing power in Europe is given by the growth and expansion of our Colonial and sea-power. Bismarck laughed at the idea of Derby and Granville being influenced by the Cape and



H.E. SIR JOHN B. THURSTON, K.C.M.G.,
Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner of the Pacific,

Bull, Photo.

Australia—in fact, Downing Street has to attend to Colonial wishes without Colonial representation. The days of apathy, neglect, huge blunders, and gigantic misconceptions are over, whilst England and the Colonies live for, and will die for, each other. Foreign officers no longer must study our ports on the pretence of shooting ducks, mending their anchors, nor go out fishing as the Russians did. Whilst Admiral Knorr danced in Sydney he sent out ships to annex more Pacific islands, and whilst French ships get overhauled, the officers are designing the best way to capture Sydney. Canada thinks with us. How could we carry on trade with China, Japan, India, and Canada, if foreign Powers show their teeth and challenge our right of way in the Pacific?

The Austral-Pacific naturally belongs to Australia, and its trade to the Empire in general. The geographical position of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Auckland, and Wellington demands that Australia should be the supreme Power in the Southern Pacific. The island continent of Australia is so situated by Nature that its future population will command all the islands in the Pacific, the Timor seas, and the Asian-Pacific. The Pacific is the happy trading-ground of the sons of Australia, who will regard it as such against the world. When this island continent develops into a great maritime nation, its trade will rival that of other Powers. Australia is not only a producer, but a manufacturer like Japan and the United States. At present she can produce all kinds of fruits, grain, farm and station produce, silver, gold, corn, and wine. She has within her bosom every mineral and food resource wanted in peace or war by a great nation. When her iron ores are utilized properly, she will not become isolated in the

time of war. If the Colonial farmer was not so regardless of hard work and the study of markets, the grain merchants would not send to San Francisco for wheat cargoes, to the Cape for maize, nor to Mauritius and Java for sugar, for we can grow and produce anything necessary for food, raiment, and defence. Trade with all the Pacific nations will be her future aim. She will steer her argosies beyond the Southern islands ; sell her wares and produce in Indian ports, the harbours of Ceylon, the treaty ports of China and Japan, the golden gates of San Francisco and Vancouver, the now unfrequented ports of South American republics, and she will vie with the ships of the mother country and Europe to secure a large slice of trade for Australia. She recognizes the rise of Japanese trade and commerce, and the vast subsidized efforts of France and Germany to oust British trade in all waters. Australia will awake to the trade dangers of the Siberian railway, the advantages of the Canadian Pacific railway, together with the future maritime influences of the Panama Canal. Now is the day and hour for Australia to be up and doing with her ships, capital, and sons, to join hands with Mr. Chamberlain and secure universal trade for the whole Imperial Empire.

The spirit of Cook and Anson is not dead in the Pacific, as trade is following their flags with tremendous activity ; yet if Australian seamen, merchants, shippers, and the mercantile marine be not ever watchful and enterprising, the chances are that foreigners will "fool" Australians out of the trade and sea-power. Foreign agents and shippers are covering the whole Pacific and the Colonies with the cheap goods of Europe and underselling the British manufacturer, especially in iron goods. They are crowding into free-trade and free-port Sydney

from all Protectionist countries, and the warehouses are full of merchandise made in France or Germany. In a short time there will be met the cheap-made goods of Japan and Russia. Both British and Australian merchants must not rest upon past trade traditions and be satisfied. They must be up and doing every day in the race to secure the commerce of the Colonies and the Pacific for the English-speaking race. The blood and capital of our forefathers spent in voyage and discovery must not be forgotten by Australian merchants, traders, seamen, and steamship owners. Messrs. Burns, Waterhouse, and Huddart have been the pioneers of large steamers and schooners up to date, but the merchants of Sydney and Melbourne, indeed of the United Kingdom, should not allow foreigners to cut them out of the Austral-Pacific trade. The commercial and uncommercial British traveller is not the successful adventurer of a by-gone age, and he will degenerate very much if he allows the Marseilles, Hamburg, Antwerp, Moscow, or Kobe gentlemen to monopolize the trade and commerce of the Pacific. Let the Sydney schooners and merchant steamers visit every port and cruise into every Pacific water. Let them go further and sell the products and merchandise of Australia in the ports of Japan, India, China, the Straits, Java, Ceylon, and South America, and thus help on Australian commerce upon national lines. There is plenty of idle gold and silver in the Colonial coffers. Let it be put into safe investment in Colonial-built ships, into payable industries, and then go forth into the broad Pacific for trade, with the benediction of Heaven upon the young sailors of Australia. The creation of an Australian navy, mercantile marine, and a sea-faring population is urgently wanted to promote our national growth, and hold our true position in the

Pacific. Australia and not Japan must become the greatest Pacific Power, but not unless Colonial statesmen show a greater legislative and ruling life energy. At present, Japanese statesmanship is more than a example to all the Colonial Parliaments put together. Australians are not mean enough to let the British tax-payer pull all the burning chestnuts out of the fire for them, as, growing into manhood and wealth, they are now well able to assist the Royal Navy with both ships and men. The Colonies in a Federal spirit began their gratitude to the old land by contributing to the Auxiliary Squadron, and when Federation takes place the united people will follow the wake of their kith and kin at the Cape by presenting several men-of-war to the Admiralty for general defence of the Empire. A great number of Colonial youths in town and country are "rusting" and increasing the ranks of the unemployed, for the want of something exciting and practical, other than riding bucking horses, herding jumbucks, cutting-out Herefords, hunting kangaroos, wheat farming, sugar planting, winze driving, and leading a monotonous life upon the parched plain or back-block townships. In families of from four to seven sons, some of them want another life to that of their parents in squatting, farming, trading, or timber getting. The army and navy open up a new choice of avocation in life for the adventurous Colonial. If a Colonial Navy, under the British Admiral on the station, was created, many noble and patriotic youths in the bush would enter for the navy, and qualify themselves for a naval or mercantile marine life. Australia should encourage its boys for "a life on the ocean wave, a home on the rolling deep." Colonial sons have shone in everything excepting a taste for a sea-faring life. Why? Because there are no war-ships, no training-ships,

no training squadron, and no mercantile marine owned by Colonial capitalists. They only want the chance and opportunity to distinguish themselves for the command of an Imperial war-ship, a *Wool Clipper*, an *Arawah*, an *Orient*, or an *Arcadia*. Such posts should make thousands of bush boys enter the navy and trading-ships.

'Time was when the Roman gloried in the name of a Roman, and the sons of Attica in the name of Greece. Because they ruled the world in power, science, literature, art, and national government—all that is dear to man and country. In the days of Cromwell and Palmerston it was dangerous for a foreigner to insult the Britisher abroad. Blake said he was not a statesman, but objected to being "fooled" by any foreigner. Shakespeare first told the world of the greatness of the English name and fame. The naval sons of Elizabeth taught all continental Powers to respect the name of England. The defeat of the Armada gave us sea-power and national life aspiration.

The warriors of the age of Queen Anne spread the name and fame of the Britisher to climes beyond the Cape and the Indies. Those were the days when Frank and Spaniard in meeting our flag had to *obey*. The victories of Nelson and Wellington, added to those of Marlborough, Hawkins, and Drake, gained a prestige for the nation acknowledged by all mankind. The British arms have conquered in all parts of the earth, and their drum-roll been heard in every clime on land or sea. For five hundred years the British Navy has been master of the sea, and maintained the universal command of ocean. Its sea-power enabled us to conquer the East and West Indies, the Cape, in the Crimea, Egypt, America, Persia, China, Africa, and Europe. But it is long since the days of Trafalgar, Waterloo, Sebastopol, Lucknow, and Tel-el-Kebir; but confidence in the

ability of the Royal Navy to maintain that command of the sea which secures to us the unity and integrity of empire still remains. By gun and sword we won our Empire, and by those two things, together with the valour of British sons, we must defend it to the death. Some people place no faith in race feeling, patriotism, and sentiment. National sentiment is a real live thing, and when allied to the armed discipline of a nation, sentiment is not to be despised. It tells the national pulse, intelligence, unity, and heroic resolution. The sentiment of the British nation has kept in check the tyrants and armies of Europe, which respect the British Empire in arms. One word from a Pitt, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, or Salisbury was enough.

The glory of the British race and Empire does not only depend upon the martial valour and commercial success of its sons, but upon its civil and religious liberty, given to all its subjects irrespective of creed or colour. Its greatness dates from the soil of Runnymede and the printing-press of Caxton ; and, as Creasy, Hallam, Brougham, and Macaulay tell us, from the barons of King John, the fields of Naseby and Chalgrove Field, the Bill of Rights, the Revolution of 1688, and the Reform Bill of 1832. The whole together made our poet write—

“ ‘Tis a glorious charter, deny it who can,
That’s breathed in the name of an English man.”

This greatness and dignity of name extends to all her Majesty’s subjects—Jew, Gentile, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Hindoo, Mahomedan, or Pagan—in Canada, India, Africa, the Cape, the United Kingdom, or Australia. Our glorious charter ennobled the race and nation, lifted it up to the highest point of manliness,

and made our Empire the envy of the world. It is said that the late Czar once said to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, on leaving Denmark—" You are going to happy England, and I to my prison of Gatschina." The world has seen the fall of kingdoms and sovereigns, but the British Empire is still young, prosperous, flourishing, and *happy*. But this state of glorious empire—British, Colonial, or Imperial—can only continue by the renewed valour of her sailors and soldiers, the enterprise of her merchants, confidence between capital and labour, together with the virtues of good government, wise legislation, and the working together of all portions and populations of her sea-scattered Empire. Though distance sighs between her maritime frontiers, there must still be a dashing, raging, and sparkling under-current of race love and affection between, like the silvery sea which dances between Dover and Gibraltar, between Ireland and Canada, between the Cape, India, Australia, and the thousand isles of the Austral-Pacific, or, as Byron says, those sparkling seas "between Athos and Ida."

CHAPTER V

THE INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN POLITICS AND AGGRESSION

IT is necessary to consider this question, and place a few political truths before the public, because it opens the mind to the dangers which threaten the Australian Colonies, and calls aloud for unity, caution, and Federal defence. Colonial statesmen in the future must look beyond their own ship-rails, beautiful harbours, magnificent public buildings, and go in for the higher and more robust statesmanship. The Australian legislator must consider the influence of foreign politics in relation to the Austral-Asian-Pacific. I hope to keep this Federal spirit all through this book, so that the public mind will endeavour to soar higher than the building of a low-level culvert, the subject of inter-colonial taxation, or the reduction of a meritorious Civil servant's salary. Colonists should begin to know the difference between local and Federal legislation, and foreign aggression in the Pacific means the defence of Australian interests. Foreign aggression in the Pacific has been on the move since 1870. I do not regard the holding of any island by a foreign Power prior to that date as anything like foreign aggression. The French occupation of New Caledonia was one of the prices paid for their alliance in the Crimea. The Bismarck colonial policy set in,

which stimulated both French and British to an earth hunger in Africa and in the Pacific. Sir Thomas McIlwraith tried to checkmate Germany in New Guinea. He annexed all non-Dutch New Guinea, but Derby and Granville knuckled down to Germany, as they did in Africa. This Downing Street crime against Australian aspiration, patriotism, right, and justice will never be forgotten in the Colonies, as New Guinea is geographically Australasian. By recognizing Germany in New Guinea and the adjacent islands, she practically became a Pacific Power. Australians were indifferent to the French in the Society group of islands, but not so amongst the islands of Melanesia and Polynesia. France has long been sneaking into New Hebrides and the South Sea Islands, robbing us of our trade, and watching her chance to annex Havanna Harbour for the purposes of future aggression. It is bad enough for France to have a naval and military base at Noumea, without having a second Brest amongst the islands, as a port to fit out and prey upon all Australian shipping in the Pacific. British shipping suffered enough in the last war from French cruisers hailing from Port Louis. We do not regard Germany in Samoa or the United States in Hawaii with a jealous eye, as they should be the natural allies and race friends of the British Empire. But the unexpected sometimes happens. No danger can be anticipated from these places, so distant from Australian ports. But the close alliance of France and Russia endangers the sea-power of England and Australia in the Pacific. Russia has designs upon New Zealand, and France upon far Northern Queensland. Germany actually wanted Fiji and a part of North-western Australia. A French annexation of New Hebrides would force the Colonies to arms, and a desire

to conquer it by force. Tasmania, Thursday Island, and West Australia are most aggressive points in war. Russia wants a Coolgardie. But the real foreign aggression in the Pacific will be and now is commercial, and from heavily-subsidized foreign mail steamers. French, German, American, and Japanese merchant cruisers go in and out of our ports with the privileges of a P. and O. or Orient liner. The secret of the Pacific is to secure its trade and commerce for the English-speaking race before it falls into the hands of our well-known foes. Russia will soon have her overland railway constructed through Siberia to Corea and Vladivostock. Germany, by using Australian ports, is striving hard to open up trade and political influence in the Southern Hemisphere. France is rapidly competing with us for trade in our own Colonial ports, with Sydney and Noumea as bases. She also imposes a high protective tariff upon Anglo-Australian goods entering Noumea and the ports of her Indo-Chinese territory, where a restless state of affairs has arisen out of trade rivalry. When the Siberian railway is completed Russian goods will be launched upon all ports of the North and South Pacific. The Japanese nation is an industrial and wealth-producing empire, like that of Great Britain itself. It is pushing trade and political influence that will be felt in competition with Anglo-Australian merchants. The "Japs" copy and apply all the best trade and manufacturing principles from Western nations, and in expanding trade by treaties and commercial enterprise her goods and wares will be found in every developed British market in the East. The United States will no doubt extend the Monroe doctrine to Hawaii, Samoa, and the Spanish Republics. The British have now reason to fear United States influence in the Pacific,

as the tricks of election are used for war purposes. But we regard Mr. Smith of New York and Mr. Smith of Glasgow as cousins pure and simple. We cling to each other, and drown Cleveland speeches in loving-cups and "common-sense." The opening of the Panama Canal will introduce a deluge of foreign trade competition in the Austral-Pacific, which should arouse the mercantile energy of London and Liverpool, and also that of the shippers and merchants of Sydney or Auckland. The true secret of securing the trade of the Pacific is to be up and doing, taking the policy of Mr. Chamberlain as our guide. It is the old, old story of British adventure and enterprise which made England and her Colonies the great mercantile and colonizing nation that she is. But this trade rivalry will create foreign envy and perhaps war. Trade follows the flag, which must be protected.

Australia's relations with foreign Powers in the wide Pacific are well worth studying, in the interests of war or peace. These are naturally bound up with the fate of the Empire. A Russian scare, an Armenian horror, the Egyptian or Eastern questions, the movements of fleets and armies, the situation in the Far East, or a speech by President Cleveland upon the Mouroe doctrine, largely influences public opinion in the Colonies. Peace is dear to the heart of Australia. Peace is its noble and constant aspiration. It has everything to gain by peace, like the policy of England. So intent are the people upon peace that it cultivates peace, harmony, and good-will toward men. She opens her ports and warehouses to the goods of all protective nations on free and equal lines. Could anything be fairer? In every Colonial home foreigners find a warm welcome, whilst the sign-board names over our doors and warehouses are as

numerous as those of the Anglo-Saxon. But if the conflict of opinion with foreign nations resolved itself into a conflict of arms, foreigners would soon know that "young Colonials" were English yet. A war with France, Germany, or the United States would be regarded as highly criminal. Such an event would be bitterly received in the Colonies. The cheap Asiatic labourer, mixing with the immigrants from the Clyde, Mersey, Avon, Liffey, Thames, Shannon, or the Wear, leaves a nasty taste in the artisan mouth, and friendly relations might some day be strained between the Colonies, Japan, and China. Foreign annexation of islands within the Austral-Pacific is against our policy. The action of Congress over the Venezuelan question has made Australians doubt if "blood is thicker than water," and in future they will regard the United States as a nation whose rifles are likely to go off prior to a President's election, or for some sudden idea of a war with England, in "the madness of a moment." But the real enemies of Australia in the Pacific will be Russia and Japan. Mr. Balfour relies upon British enterprise rising superior to that of these two Powers. Russia has a greedy eye as her traders expand themselves. She would soon have a slice of Australia if the Colonies were not covered by the Union Jack. The tone of the Japanese Press during the late war with China was strongly hostile to England. It even wrote of annexing Australia and other islands—in fact, warning England, like a Moscow editor.

Spain, Holland, France, and Germany are Australian neighbours. The European situation always influences the British Colonies, as the nations are generally in a state of war, or rumours of war. Australians being such great exporters of varied produce, look every day to the

produce, money, and share markets. Their rise and fall influence the homes and towns of the Colonies as much as the Exchanges or Bourses of Europe, for well we know that continental politics are full of alarms and trade disturbance. This feeling denotes painful reflections and restless anticipations. The fall of a fraction in the price of wool, a penny in the price of butter, wheat, meat, hides, tallow, and such-like, means sad losses to the producer and exporter. War, therefore—being an influencer of prices—and the loss of whole cargoes by *Alabamas*, deeply interest Australia, especially when that produce has to traverse over long sea lines, subject to be destroyed at any moment. The people know the fleets must be at sea in the time of war, and that for some months, at any rate, they would have to defend the ports, harbours, coal stations, and property. The long peace of settlement, the silence of the forest primeval, and the progress of the country would be stopped by the sound of war alarms from Europe, especially when they saw that the mother country and her scattered fleets would have a long, hard, and sanguinary fight to maintain the integrity of the command of the sea. With that secured, both England and her Colonies are safe from invasion. So keenly do the Australians feel for the welfare of the Empire, that they have expended millions upon coastal and harbour defence, and upon their several armies and naval brigades. They sent a fair-sized contingent to the Soudan in 1885, and at the close of the war the same men volunteered for expected active service in Afghanistan. Several corps also volunteered for service in Matabeleland, in admiration of the policy of Mr. Rhodes in federating Africa. The consideration of the European situation is daily, and at every bold advance of Russia and bouncing language of France, the

Australian expects that England will play a master-stroke, at which the educated boy is delighted.

The Far Eastern question is a fresher danger to the life and independence of Australia and her future trade in the Pacific than the public is aware of. We saw the steady advance of Russia towards Herat and the Pamirs, the encroachments of France in what they term Indo-China, the sneaking regard for New Hebrides and Madagascar, and the placing of our Indian Empire between two fires—that of France and Russia ; but two years ago we were not prepared for the rise of such a clever and victorious naval and military power as Japan, within two weeks' sail of Australian shores. The presence of Russian and Japanese hostile ports within short steaming and striking distance of the Austral-Pacific has increased the naval responsibility of British fleets and admirals on this and other stations ; in fact, Australia is now face to face with those two Powers in trade rivalry, naval expansion and danger, and continuous alarms of war, Pacific aggression, and Australian encroachment. Australian statesmen are apt to bury their heads in the sand, like the ostrich, at these new signs of danger, or steal away from them, in watery mist, like the cuttlefish, as nothing has been done to meet the new dangers. All our wars arise out of trade and Colonial expansion, and Major-General Hutton, C.B., when he spoke of war, said he knew that the national expansion of Australia, being so inseparable from trade, could not go on in every generation without a “brush” with some foreign Power over the conflict of rival trade and commerce. It is useless to shut our eyes to this truism of history and philosophic possibility. We must look far ahead into the hidden future of Eastern diplomacy, and the conflict of ambitious nations. The



F.M. LORD ROBERTS,^{V.C.}, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., ETC.,
Commanding the Forces in Ireland

Lafayette, Photo.

large island continent of Australia and its Anglo-Saxon population cannot be subordinated to any single Power or combination of Powers. If we were separated from the mother country foreign aggression in the Pacific would face Australia all the same, with the greater chances of the foreigner being successful. It is unwise to think that the progress of Australia will jog along without international strife and danger. Just fancy a Colonial Premier shouting seaward to a hostile admiral—"Go away! we don't want you here." The reply would be from quick-firing guns.

Lord Roberts, at Dublin, December 1895, said—"Little did we expect twelve months ago the sudden appearance of a military nation with a well-organized, equipped, and commanded navy and army, possessing quite remarkable fighting instincts. . . . The result of the relative positions of Japan and China are certain to be far-reaching. If, therefore, England and her Colonies intend to maintain the commercial superiority which she now possesses in the East, *she must be prepared for events more startling and unexpected than those which occurred during the late war.* . . . If England hopes to hold her own as a great Power and to retain her Colonial possessions, she must, cost what it will, be mistress of the seas, and have sufficient war-ships, with full crews to work them, well trained; she must also have an equipped and organized army, ready to be transferred to any point where it is required." Lord Roberts has also said (December 1895)—"The latest intelligence from the Far East has a direct bearing upon the news cabled several weeks ago of a probable alliance between Russia and Japan. The doom of British prestige in the Far East, which such a combination would signify, is now fully understood in this country, and the possibility has

aroused widespread alarm in the great trades which would be directly affected. The chief obstacle to such a diplomatic coup is, of course, public sentiment among the Japanese, who have regarded Russia as a friend of the Chinese rather than of themselves. The latest dispatches say the pro-Russian propaganda among the Japanese people is proving rapidly effective, and already a large section of the inhabitants of Tokio are demanding an agreement with Russia, as anti-English as may be. There is no doubt that a great game of diplomacy in the Far East is being carefully played, without regard to the more dramatic events in Turkey. It is also still more evident that war forms no part of the plans of the aggressors in this game. It is a deeper and more skilful game even than war, and it promises to prove more effectual for their aggrandizement, and the common object—the discomfiture of England."

Lieut. Dr. J. Miller Maguire, M.A., F.R.H.S., says—“The trans-Siberian railway to Vladivostock would be more serious to our trade and commerce in the Pacific if the railway was extended to Port Arthur. With France at Tonkin it would cut us off from the Yangtse-Kiang district, and Britishers would be serious losers.¹ England paid 15 per cent. of the whole Chinese revenue, and British interests had a right to be heard, as they were unassailable. She should have a strong army and navy, and general defence should be placed above party politics.”¹

With such formidable naval powers in the Asian and Austral-Pacific, we see the importance of a combined Anglo-Australian defence, and for guidance I reflect upon the words of Sir G. S. Clark, K.C.M.G.—“Strain every nerve to hold the vital commanding stations of the

¹ Australian trade would also be cut off.—AUTHOR.

Empire. Prepare the army for offensive operations across the seas. Make ready to defend, at short notice, against naval raiders such ports as will be needed in war. These, in order of importance, are the measures by which alone the national and colonial safety can be assured. Thus only can we hope to hand down to our successors, inviolate in territory and untarnished in honour, the magnificent inheritance which we have received from our fathers."

CHAPTER VI

FOREIGN DESIGNS AGAINST AUSTRALASIA

NAPOLEON and his statesmen knew that England could be hit hard by an attack upon her Colonies, and to-day the Dual Alliance hopes to crush the British Empire by capturing her Colonies and destroying her commerce—that is, if our modern Blakes and Nelsons will let them. Every new war-ship designed by France and Russia is directed against the British fleet and the Colonies. When Russian editors write like the following in Prince Mestchersky's newspaper, Federal defence is necessary—“If there is anything to be desired, it is that we on our part should so love Russia as never to forget to injure England whenever and wherever we can. As soon as we clearly comprehend this, and detest England with all the might of our national genius, then will our triumphant growth begin.”

The dangers now surrounding the Colonial Empire are numerous. I have already enumerated some of them. The Colonial policy of Mr. Chamberlain to develop the Colonies and Protectorates we now possess, and to expand British trade all over the world, has aroused the jealousy of foreign nations, which also regard with envy the position of England as the supreme naval power, according to the volumes of

Captain Mahan upon sea-power and the command of the sea. Mahan's naval literary productions have acted upon the foreign naval mind in a way similar to the works of George and Bellamy upon free-thinkers and socialists. It stirred the ambition of foreign statesmen and men, and created first an individual, and secondly a combined movement on the Continent to rob England of her sea-power and naval glory, said by some to have only commenced during the wars of the French Revolution. At any rate, the hesitation of nations to interfere in Armenian affairs, the European support of England in the Venezuelan affair against the Jingoes of the United States, and the as sudden French, German, Dutch, and Russian hostility to the action of Dr. Jameson in the Transvaal, were signs to draw England into some great row, so that her sea-power and varied fighting-power would only remain part of ancient history. Free-trade England and her Colonies allow foreign steamers to go in and out of all ports, and trade upon the same plane as our own people, and yet foreigners in their heart are not satisfied with British fair-play in trade and commerce. The foreigner having become ingrateful, and entering into a base concert of action against British interests, no wonder that the Press of England and her Colonies reminded them to beware of our Imperial power and might, and that if necessary the Queen's subjects were again ready to maintain that sea-power spoken of by Captain Mahan, and face the world in arms as our forefathers did before us. England can no longer trust the Queen's grandson, who, like Cleveland, was seemingly ready to go to war with England on a question as trumpery as that of Venezuela.

The following extracts from the London *Times* go to show the state of public opinion upon the commercial

aggression of foreigners upon our Colonial trade, and perfectly justifies the circular of Mr. Chamberlain, with the view to improve and increase trade between the United Kingdom and the Colonies :—

“It is a matter of common knowledge that the trade of the Colonies with the United Kingdom is not increasing in proportion to the trade which the Colonies are doing with foreign countries. In the case of some of the most important Colonies this disproportion is very marked. Taking only, in the case of Australasia, the comparatively recent period during which Mr. Chamberlain has asked for returns, it will be found that in 1881 the total external trade of Australasia with British possessions amounted to £57,340,763. In 1892 it was £60,952,541, showing an increase in round numbers of little more than three millions and a half. The foreign trade of Australasia in 1881 was £7,213,916, and in 1892 it had risen to £14,394,557, or very nearly double the figure of the earlier date. Had trade with the United Kingdom progressed to anything like the same extent, the effect would have been of the utmost importance to British industry. The increase, on an examination of the detailed returns, will be found to have gone almost entirely to the United States, Germany, France, and Belgium, and by so much has served to stimulate the competitive enterprise of those countries. In Canada, where twenty years ago the imports from Great Britain formed 55 per cent. of the entire imports of the Colony, the proportion has now sunk to 37 per cent., while in the same period the proportion of imports from the United States has risen from 35 per cent. to 46 per cent., and those from France and Germany have heavily increased.”

The volume of trade is growing enormously, but not

to what it should be in the direction of the home markets.

Compared with Mr. Coghlan's returns, the facts are not far wrong, yet I advise my readers to study the figures of Mr. Williams in *Made in Germany* :—

	1881.	1892.
Australasian Trade with—		
United Kingdom— Imports	£25,662,185	£26,066,951
Exports	24,342,422	30,719,670
British Possessions—Imports	3,078,195	2,491,759
Exports	4,257,961	1,674,161
Total Imperial	<u>£57,340,763</u>	<u>£60,952,541</u>
 Foreign Countries—		
Imports	£4,603,326	£6,004,151
Exports	2,610,589	8,390,406
Total Foreign	<u>£7,213,915</u>	<u>£14,394,557</u>

Taking the imports of Australasia as an indication of the increased competition to which British manufacturers are subjected, the following comparison is presented. These figures show remarkably little change—

	1881.	1892.
Imports from—		
United Kingdom	£25,662,185	£26,066,951 inc. £404,766
British Possessions	3,078,195	2,491,759 dec. 586,436
Foreign Countries	4,603,326	6,004,151 inc. 1,400,825

"Australia is essentially a producing country," says Admiral Bridge, "and her outward trade is in products that are the natural products of Australia—such as wool, coal, gold, silver, copper, and frozen meat. What is absolutely necessary to the existence of the great majority of the people in the Australian Colonies is fairly uninterrupted access to their markets. The chief—practically the only—market is in the mother country, and what Australia requires is to get her products

there. At any rate, she has to get them somewhere, and if she has another market the same thing applies. The home market has to be supplied from somewhere, and in time of war it will naturally be supplied from that area with which there is the safest line of communication. If, by reason of imperfect defence, the line of communication between Australia and her markets, wherever those markets may be, is not secured, the importers at the locality of the market will have to look elsewhere. There are other places which supply gold, wool, frozen meat, silver, and copper, and which are much nearer to the great importing countries, and which, therefore, must by necessity have a less precarious line of communication. If there is adequate defence on the Australian line, the British naval strength now is sufficient to make that line of communication just as secure as the lines of communication connecting with any other exporting country. Of course there is a slight increase of insecurity in any line owing to distance, but that is not very material."

A far-seeing policy is being initiated by Mr. Chamberlain. It is a grand British policy—one that will do good to the whole Empire, and Australia will be a large gainer. British capital and British immigrants are still wanted to develop the interior of continental Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, New Guinea, and the Pacific isles. I also hope that the Federal Parliament of Australia will at once second the efforts of Mr. Chamberlain in seeking to draw the Colonies and mother England closer together by race feeling and expanding trade. The policy of Mr. Rhodes in South Africa also means the expansion of race, trade, and prestige in the world's history. The two policies are far insights into posterity, and by securing the prosperity of posterity

England does her duty to race and Empire. Something had to be done to secure new markets for the workers at home, and for the mercantile exchange of all Colonial products, especially when France, Germany, and Russia were elbowing us out of the old markets, even those markets within the boundaries of our own Empire. The Australian Colonies are chock-full of foreign-made goods—made by the cheap labour of France and Germany. The tone of the British Press is unanimous respecting the policy of Chamberlain and Rhodes, two men whose genius towers high above that of contemporary statesmanship. This genuine Colonial policy will benefit the whole Empire, and if a foreign Power goes to war with the Empire, it is only fair that Australia, reaping part of the spoil of Colonial expansion and the benefits of naval defence, should also bear part of the dangers of empire, by sharing as far as possible in the cost, work, and duty of a strong and complete Federal defence. So sudden and destructive will war come now-a-days, that it will come, as Lord Salisbury said, "like a summer shower." One day war is expected with Russia; another day with France over Egypt or the Upper Nile; then with Portugal over the Zambesi; then with Germany over Samoa or the Transvaal; and with the United States over a swampy area the size of a Queensland farm. All these currents tell Australians in plain and forcible language to be ready, and have our Federal defence forces at the right place and time. Whilst socialists in Australia declaim against readiness, or, as they put it, "standing armies," for war, they never dream of the great security which the Imperial flag, name, fame, and moral power give to the integrity of the whole Empire. We have had that moral power of the nation in the world's reflection well tested of late. When Bismarck wanted

to go to war with France soon after the death of Frederick, it was England that stopped it by a few telegrams. When Russia wanted to "eat up" Turkey by the San Stefano Treaty in 1878, and when she wanted to capture Herat by a *coup-de-main* in 1885, the calling out of the Reserves made Moscow editors and dashing colonels in Asia back down. When France has kept up a continuous oratorical fire in both Press and Senate over Egypt, the firm answer of England said she would act alone, with the moral result that Egypt to-day is equal to the best-ruled parts of India. I know that England scuttled out of Afghanistan, the Soudan, the Transvaal, and let Germany into New Guinea, Damaraland, and Central Africa, to the detriment of our Colonial interests; and that Lord Wolseley was *too late* to save Gordon at Khartoum! But such things occurred during the Premiership of Mr. Gladstone. Lord Rosebery is responsible for the Russo-Chinese Treaty, and the advance of France upon British Africa. But Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain soon reminded the nation and Empire that the people were Anglo-Saxon and Nelsonic yet. Let us consider the dark clouds that overhang our British future. Let us see how the spirit of Pitt, Palmerston, Canning, and Beaconsfield arose as if from their graves, and reminded England of the brave days of old, when all Europe fought against the navies and armies of Great Britain, and she came out victorious against "the three corners of the world in arms."

Foreigners believed that the sword of England was blunt, that her guns were rusty, that Albion's sons had slept a hundred years, and that Britishers would fight no more, unless in little wars. What was the result of Cleveland's speech, Russia's double policy in China and Armenia, the defeat of the brave followers

of Dr. Jameson, the German Emperor's telegram to President Kruger, and the sayings of the reptile Press of the Continent? What was the moral fear and European dread of the arming of the red-coated soldiery and blue-jackets of England? Whilst other nations were excited, the cool, heroic, and martial discipline of the British nation became noble and manly. Whilst disdaining to move a Grenadier Guard or a *Majestic* towards the United States—the great daughter of a great motherland—her grand patriotic character was seen to advantage when Germany tried to interfere in the Colonial affairs of British South Africa. The British Cabinet treated the German Press and statecraft with silent contempt. The people hissed the German name for German treachery and bombastic interference in the Transvaal. The *Times* and the London journalists spoke out like a Black Prince or a William Shakespeare. The ill-timed invasion of Dr. Jameson was repudiated, but the Boers had to behave themselves as gentlemen. Fleets were concentrated at Zanzibar and at Delagoa Bay, and in a few days one of the most powerful Flying Squadrons the world had ever seen was equipped to meet any naval foe threatening the peace, prosperity, and expansion of the British Empire. The stock and share markets of every country fell, but those of London stood triumphantly still. The London financial barometer fell not during the cloudy political weather. This proved the moral power of the British Empire. England arose, half drew the rusty sword, sent forth her ships, threatened to mobilize her Reserves, Militia, and devoted Volunteers, and above all the din of preparation went forth a cablegram from the Premiers of Australia to Lord Salisbury as much as to say, "We are proud of the old land—we are

with it in peace or war!" Yes; England arose, defied the world in arms, and exclaimed—"Lo! I am mistress still!" Mr. Balfour was right in saying at Glasgow that "the British nation was a mighty host at home and in the Colonies." If the increased value of stocks and British securities gave confidence to Europe, why should not that confidence be generated in the minds of a few weak-kneed Australians? If ever a great and progressive nation like Australasia required a lesson in political history to remain true and loyal to the old land, this recent demonstration of the moral power and national prestige of England was surely sufficient. Had Germany gone to war with England in January 1886, she would have lost her new African colonies just as those foreign Powers who went to war with us during the last two hundred years lost their colonies in India, at the Cape, in the West Indies, and in America, and in every war up to that of the Peninsula, by the united deeds of Clive, Hughes, Wolfe, Rodney, Hood, Abercrombie, Craig, Nelson, Marlborough, and Wellington. The naval victories which culminated at Trafalgar permitted the British Navy to capture their recognized colonies beyond the Canaries one by one. This was the result of war made upon England by foreigners. If the British Navy is ever defeated, foreign nations would cut up and divide our Colonial spoil and independence amongst themselves with a light heart, but with tyrannizing government. European war with England made the Empire, and if war is declared against us our Navy is strong enough to punish Germany by the loss of her colonies. And if Australia had a Federal army and navy she could to a large extent help the Royal Navy in maintaining the necessary command of the sea.

In December 1895, Russia had 58,838 tons of war-

ships in the Pacific, as against 58,908 tons of British war-ships. For Russia to concentrate such a naval strength in Chino-Pacific waters is most alarming, and presents formidable opposition to Anglo-Colonial interests. The fleet of Admiral Buller is not so strong in speed and armament as the Russian fleet, unless the North Pacific fleet is added to it. The French tonnage of war-ships in Chinese seas amounts to 28,669 tons, the American ships, 18,553 tons, and the German ships to 23,076 tons.

The *China Herald* says these figures speak for themselves, and that the British fleet "is dangerously insufficient."

The Russian fleet consists of the ironclads *Nachimoff*, *Nicholas I.*, *Pamiat Azova*, and *Vladimir Monomach*; the armoured cruisers *Korniloff*, *Otvazny*, and *Gremastch*; the third-class cruiser *Rynda*, and the gun-boats *Gaidamak*, *Nayezdnik*, *Sivootch*, *Bobr*, *Kooreetz*, *Kreyzer*, *Mandjur*, and *Zabiyaka*. This totalizes sixteen ships, excluding twelve ships of the Volunteer fleet, all fast steamers and heavily armed.

The French fleet in the same waters consists of the ironclads *Bayard*, *Triumphante*, *Alger*, *Duguay-Trouin*, *Isly*, *Forfait*, *Aspic*, *Comete*, *Inconstant*, *Lion*, *Pluvier*, and *Vipere*, to say nothing of those in the Austral-Pacific.

The German fleet consists of the *Kaiser*, *Irene*, *Princess William*, *Arcona*, *Marie*, and *Kormoran*, excluding three third-class cruisers in the South Seas.

The American war-ships in Chinese waters consist of the *Olympia*, *Charleston*, *Concord*, *Detroit*, *Yorktown*, *Machias*, *Petrel*, and *Monocacy*.

But the most powerful fleet of all, at the end of 1896, will be that of Japan, with its hundred war-ships and a

large number of steamers, easily converted in its seaports into armed merchant cruisers. Surely these fleets mean the strengthening of the British Navy in the Austral-Pacific and China seas. As I revise these proofs I find that Russia is sending more war-ships out to the Pacific. For what purpose?



H.E. THE LATE RIGHT HON. SIR ROBERT W. DUFF, P.C., K.C.M.G.,
Late Governor of New South Wales.

Elliott & Fry, Photo.

CHAPTER VII

SEA-POWER AND AUSTRALASIAN DEFENCE

"In the strength of the British Navy lay the strongest possibility of peace in Europe. The British Navy stood first in the factors of peace in Europe."—CAPT. MAHAN.

THE command of the sea by the Royal Navy is dear to the heart of every Australian. In its maintenance rests, to a large extent, the non-invasion of Australasia. It is part and parcel of Federal defence. It is to secure this power that compels England to build a navy strong enough to defeat any three Powers of Europe. I am afraid that the new naval policy of 1896—1900 will be to have the Navy strong enough to defeat the fleets of France, Russia, and Germany, the latter being our most treacherous friend. Sea-power is the secret of general British supremacy in the world. Without it the United Kingdom would rank like Denmark, Portugal, and Holland, as a fourth-rate Power. The naval genius of our sea-kings in all ages has crippled all foreign naval powers, and enabled us to keep India, retain the largest share of Africa and America, conquer the West Indies and the Cape, colonize Australasia, and annex a thousand isles of Oceana. The writings of Froude, Alison, James, Seeley, Colomb, and Mahan (especially the latter gallant American officer) have

proved the secret of England's greatness, apart from the great moral power arising out of her manly freedom, civil and religious liberty. Whilst she fought for the command of the sea, she reflected the light of freedom, and the rays of liberty amongst all civilized nations. Her Howards, Drakes, Blakes, Jervises, Hoods, Ansons, and Cooks carried with them into distant seas right trusty swords, tempered with the spirit of liberty and moderation. Freedom and sea-power blended well together, as I hope and devoutly trust it will better blend the sacred flames of commerce and union between mother England and her Colonies. Whilst our naval heroes fought for this sea-power in the brave days of old, the poets Campbell, Dibdin, and Byron sung of it, and the historians of two centuries have immortalized it in Homeric brilliancy. But all history since the first wars proves that nations not only became great but maintained that greatness by having *command of the sea*. The greatest writers of military history state that success in war belongs to that nation which holds *the sea-power*. The early history of the Levantine nations proves that nations rose and fell according to the changes of naval warfare and final victory at sea. Neither Hannibal nor Napoleon would ever have crossed the Alps if they had had command of the sea.

The value of sea-power is almost unknown to the average Colonial politician. Thousands of young Australians get sadly confused if they are asked, What is sea-power? What great victories brought about the Colonial Empire? Who were the Black Prince, Marlborough, Moore, Wellington, Nelson, Napier, McDonnell, or Gough, to say nothing of Field-Marshals Lord Clyde, Roberts, and Wolseley? What object did they fight for? What was the result of the defeats of the Spanish

Armada, the Grande Monarque, and Napoleon ? What benefits did England derive from the victories of Camperdown, the Nile, St. Vincent, and Trafalgar ? That our naval victories in the West Indies, Indian Ocean, and off the American coast won for England the command of the sea would be simply idle thought and nonsensical reason to the back-blocksman or the denizen of Wooloomooloo, there can be no doubt. But the day must come when young Australians must read, study history and the glorious traditions of race in the true and proper light of Britishers, born in bountiful Australia. If England lost its sea-power, then away must go the protection of our first lines of defence, and the wealth of the Colonies would draw down upon the seven Colonies all the aggression and sword-conquest of a still hostile and avaricious Europe. With or without England, Australasian prosperity, rich flocks and pastures, fertile corn lands, and "secrets of the sullen mine," will always incite a descent upon our shores. Labour members, with degenerate voice, may object to the logic of hard facts and national duty contained in this hook of mine, but they can only try to blind their gullible admirers with crooked wisdom, or, as Carlyle has it, with "mud volcano and unutterable gigability." I do not address my language to social dreamers nor to free-thought humbugs, but to loyal English, Irish, Scotch, and Australian men—true subjects, heroes, and pioneers of the Empire, who with other Britishers will hold on to *sea-power* with the united pull of Indian, Canadian, Africander, and New Zealander. The uncertainty of maintaining our command of the sea has always existed in our own naval history. Since the days of the Henrys and Edwards we maintained it against the French in the Straits of Dover and in the chops of the Channel.

In the West Indies, and along the Spanish Main, off the Canaries and the American coast the fate of naval fight frequently hung in the balance of victory. The history of naval wars in the West Indies points out that however brave, smart and powerful, the state of a modern Royal Navy may be, we must not despise the common enemy, nor rest upon the by-gone laurels of Trafalgar: A defeat of the Imperial Navy in European waters, or in the Chino-Japanese seas, would make the Colonies quake, and at once man their shore batteries and Federal navy, to form a strong and formidable Australian and second line of defenc . Two British naval defeats would upset the shippers of the Barcoo, the flock-masters of Queensland and South Australia, and the overweening local patriots of New Zealand. Warfare on land and sea in the West Indies went and came, as comes and goes the sea. The islands changed hands very often ; passed and repassed to several flags. It was only by the combined expedition of Rodney, Moore, and Abercombie, and the determined gallantry of our troops, that we won and *kept* the West Indies. The naval battles between Rodney and De Grasse in American waters, and between Hughes and Suffron in the Indian Ocean, off Ceylon and Mauritius, were touch-and-go affairs, often ending in what may be termed drawn battles, full of the deepest anxiety with regard to the longevity of the British Empire. In the days of Hood, Jervis, and Nelson "things went very well then," as the long naval wars produced good admirals, officers, and seamen, and the crews were so much accustomed to victory that French and Spanish ships, unless very numerous, ran away at the very sight of the Union Jack. But the uncertainty of naval victory and success at sea is ever present after rude change, naval

reform, new ships, and advanced science. During the wars of Napoleon, England rushed to arms twice by threats of invasion, despite the Navy having command of the sea.

Let us read the details of several landings of a hostile force upon a foreign shore. England has done it in the most of cases without much trouble, excepting at Aboukir and at Teneriffe. The Power holding the sea-power having cleared the sea for military expeditions, can easily land in an enemy's country. The French under Humbert landed with success in Ireland, but they speedily came to grief. Napoleon fortunately did not land in England, with his Boulogne army. He went to Germany and Russia instead, and Wellington having landed at Mondego Bay, smashed his armies in Spain and France. England, having command of the sea, crushed the great Napoleon. A British force landed in the United States, advanced upon and destroyed the public buildings of Washington. The New Orleans defeat was the result of non-intelligence. Sea-power enabled England after Waterloo to be the ocean carriers of the world. England, having command of the sea, was enabled to conquer in the Crimea, India, the Cape, Burmah, China, and New Zealand. Had she been at war with a great naval power during these war periods, her fleets would have had to destroy the opposing fleets before her commercial fleets could be safe at sea. The Russian ships were shut up in the Baltic and Black Sea ports. She had no powerful *Ruriks* or *Sokols* in those days. Had China managed to hold Port Arthur and sent out a dozen cruisers in 1860, the Allied force would have been much longer in Chusan. As Wolseley saw the formidable fleet of men-of-war and transports sail up the Yellow Sea

without impediment, no wonder he felt proud of his country as a naval Power. Experience proves that Great Britain, holding the sea-power, can land anywhere in Europe, not to meet one-million armies, but to keep them employed and carry ruthless war into parts of a coast where we should be least expected. But before this could be done the hostile naval power would have to disappear on the ocean. The first brunt of war would fall heavily upon our commerce, but in the end the fleets of England would come out of the ordeal with a long lease of sea-power. Landings upon the long coast-lines of Australasia could be effected by hostile ships slipping through the first lines of defence, or by defeating our fleets. If a landing took place, it could only be defeated by disciplined armies.

Mr. Spencer Wilkinson recently gave practical utterance in advocating naval increase to command the sea. He asked his fellow-Britishers to study deeply the foundations of our sea-power, and how their majestic Empire was built up. It was the natural calling of the present and future of the Empire, flowing from its national laws, conditions, and aspirations. History told that national freedom and greatness could only be obtained by conflict—the one Power beating the other. The proposal to abolish war when arbitration had failed, is just like the policy of non-intervention and general disarmament. States upon the war-path know no law-court settlements. Upon all crimes the State made war. He ridiculed the idea of De Moulinari for a *league of neutrals* to make war on the side of aggression, just as if it could be well judged. It would form a unique government of Europe, and proclaim the end of all nationality. “The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,” may come about in time, but not in these

days of foreign aggression and restless Europe. The Empire requires for its security complete command of the sea. A few hostile war-ships might make a large sea area unsafe for ship trading, and paralyze the coastal trade of an enemy's country. A navy is a costly item, and its ships are few. England depends upon the transport of troops and war material by the mercantile navy. An army to cross the seas must be conveyed in steamers of the *Westmeath* and *Campania* type ; and if a fleet of transports was caught at sea by a hostile force, the destruction of that army would be more sudden, awful, and complete than a Waterloo, Isandula, or Majuba defeat. My readers can fancy the embarkation of 6000 troops and their dispatch to some unknown place, if they were caught at sea, as the Chinese were at Yalu. The result would be the total obliteration of the 6000 troops and of the transports. A transport raked by a twelve-inch shell would be blown up in one act, without the use of a torpedo. And fancy a convoy of twelve Australian ships being caught off Corsica, the Canaries, or the Cape, going home or coming out, with many lives and much valuable merchandise on board ! If the convoy war-ships were defeated, the merchant steamers would be captured or destroyed. The enemy might go for the transports first and not the war-ships. The Royal Navy must have more than an equilibrium of war-ships to do its work properly, as it has to fight, blockade, and convoy. The building of ships and training of crews are a slow growth, but their destruction during war is swift and sudden. The potential command of the sea must be kept up at all cost and self-sacrifice. The law of insularity is both British and Australian—the secret of Australian existence and England's place in the

world. Being the mother and friend of liberty and freedom, we have always found allies, united to us by the moral force of justice, humanity, order, and fair trade and progress.

Foreign nations mean to wrest from us this glorious sea-power. Their new fleets are significant. The British naval strength, compared with that of the Dual Alliance, continues to be startling. I prefer to take the last (Nov. 1895) estimate of the Hon. T. A. Brassey. He says—"The moment does not, therefore, seem inopportune for reviewing the present and probable future strength of England, France, and Russia in armoured ships, and for endeavouring to form some conclusion as to the class of ship of which we most stand in need. . . . At the end of the year 1897 the position will be:—England: battleships, first class, twenty-seven; second class, twelve; third class, eleven. France: battleships, first class, fifteen; second class, thirteen; third class, three (?). Russia: battleships, first class, eight; second class, six. Total (France and Russia): twenty-three first class battleships, nineteen second class. At the end of 1898:—England: battleships, first class, twenty-nine; second class, twelve; third class, eleven. France: battleships, first class, seventeen; second class, thirteen. Russia: battleships, first class, eight; second class, seven. Total (France and Russia): twenty-five first-class battleships, twenty second class. During the next three years we shall add to our Navy eight battleships of the first class, while the French and Russians should complete eleven first-class and two second-class battleships. It cannot be said that our present strength in battleships is more than sufficient to maintain the command of the sea. It is therefore clear that a new programme of battleship



THE RIGHT HON. THOMAS LORD BRASSEY, K.C.B.,
Governor of Victoria.

London Stereopt. Company, Photo.

construction must be taken in hand during the next financial year, and pushed forward rapidly during the two ensuing years. In most modern and most powerful ships we have an overwhelming superiority, and there is no possibility of our losing our superiority in this respect before the close of the present century. Our next battleship programme should be confined to ships of a displacement of about 10,000 tons. The experience of our last great naval war seems to show that numbers have more influence than individual size and power in deciding the fate of an action. Victory will rest with that Power which has a reserve of fresh ships to fall back upon after its principal fleets have been in collision with the enemy. If we continue to build ships of enormous dimensions, we must do so at a sacrifice in point of numbers." The Hon. Mr. Brassey, at Sydney, stated that a war with France and Russia would be a tight one, and, if also with Germany, England would only have one war-ship more than the combined three Powers.

France, Russia, Germany, Japan, and the United States are *racing* to have fleets able to destroy our command of the sea. If these European Powers do not stop the building of war-ships to smash up the British Empire, then an ultimatum should be sent them by some modern Pitt, and if not attended to, British fleets should be sent to destroy them in foreign ports and dockyards, *à la* Copenhagen and the Basque Roads. As Admiral Napiér said—"Should they remain in port we must try to get at them; should they come out to sea, you know how to dispose of them." Foreign nations know that the nation holding sea-power has them politically and commercially under its influence. How? Because it is the sequence of sea-power, and in the hands of

Great Britain it had the moral effect of opening up savage lands to civilization, colonization, and the world's general good—the law and benefit of humanity—or our Empire would have gone back, and not forward. The British race has done this. Her laws are respected. She has abolished slavery, piracy, and unselfishly opened her ports to all nations. It placed upon her ocean patrol many little wars, varied diplomacy, conflicting interests, great perils, and tremendous responsibilities. Captain Mahan and Sir John Colomb have told the story of sea-power in the past, and I agree with Sir Charles Dilke, Admiral Vesey Hamilton, Lord Brassey, and others, who all seem to agree with the forcible conclusions of Mr. Spencer Wilkinson—"Thus they were led to the conclusion, from which there was no escape, that Great Britain was so placed that she must either be the first of nations and lead mankind, or must utterly decay and perish. The career of Great Britain was not over; new trials were in store for her; the sphere of her action and the conflict of forces in which her lot was cast were in our day larger, greater, grander than ever before; and if this nation was to fulfil her high calling during the next century she would need the devotion and the duty of all her sons and daughters." It is with great satisfaction that I see the spirit of the Colonies rising up side by side with Britishers all over the world, to maintain this sea-power which made the Empire and protected the development of Australia.

Mr. Arnold Foster writes—"Whether any direct attack would be made upon Australia would no doubt depend upon the course of the war and the degree of success obtained by an adversary. That the amount of damage inflicted would be limited only by the power to inflict it is beyond doubt. During the last Russian

alarm, Russian officers had definite instructions to attack Australian cities. But a bombardment at the present time, if conducted by a single ship, is not in itself a matter greatly to be feared. Magazines are limited, and the amount of destruction caused by shell-fire over a large area is not serious. But the power to bombard implies the mastery of the sea, and if France possessed this mastery for a week, matters would be very serious for Australian trade. It must not be forgotten that German and French mail steamers actually carry their guns and ammunition as ballast; they can be transformed into effective war-ships at any time. With our own so-called mercantile cruisers the facts are otherwise. In ten months out of twelve most of them are thousands of miles away from the dépôt where their guns and ammunition are stored. They would hardly be effective by the time the war was over. It is greatly to be desired that every merchant ship which is relied on to render service in time of war should carry her guns and her filled shell on board as ballast, together with a commission unsigned and in a sealed packet, which any British consul might open and sign on an emergency. The great French lines running to Melbourne and Sydney undoubtedly constitute a real danger. There is *no British ship south of the line* which is armed and equipped, and which is capable of overhauling the Messageries steamers. The amount of mischief these might do before caught is infinite. Nor must it be forgotten that the French are doing their best to throttle the Australian trade by arresting it half-way. It is not as widely known as it ought to be that the French naval establishments in Madagascar have of late been greatly strengthened, and, what is still more serious, French officers have taken military possession of the

Commero Islands in the Mozambique Channel, and from that point threaten both our Indian and our Australian trade. This is no false alarm. Now we should have to deal not with privateers, but with splendidly-built and splendidly-manned ships of war, operating from a central position, and having for their base a spacious and well-defended harbour. But, after all, it is neither on the Australian coasts nor in the Indian Ocean that the effect of a failure in our naval protection would be most promptly and severely felt. It is from the Cape de Verde Islands to London, up the French coast, and in the narrow waters of the Channel, that the assaults on the wealth and commerce of Australia would be most effectively made. Once let the French Navy gain even a partial mastery of the Channel, and in two days tens of millions will be jeopardized, and may be lost. It is not necessary to speculate upon the question of whether or not the danger as far as Australia is concerned is in any way aggravated by her political connection with the United Kingdom, or whether it would be lessened were Australia a separate State. If Australia were to be transformed into an independent Republic to-morrow, the danger which she would run in case of war between the United Kingdom and France would not be diminished to any appreciable degree."

Australia's position in the event of war depends upon the success of the Royal Navy at sea. The first brunt of battle will be severe, but in the long run she is safe under the Imperial flag. Every admiral commanding on the Australian station, whilst feeling confident in the success of his fleet at sea, has gravely pointed out the want of men in land fortifications, and the liability of the naval bases and harbour defences not being

strong enough. In the event of war the Colonies must be left *pro tem.* by the admirals and captains to look after themselves, whilst they would be at sea until the last hostile ship and Pacific base were finally captured or destroyed. Australia depends upon the home markets for the sale of her produce, and if that market was closed, Colonial trade would also be closed if British ships were defeated. Admiral Bridge has great confidence in the stability of his ships, the excellence of his crews, and in the results of a naval battle with a foreign Power, whose ships, men, and armament he knows as well as his own. He knows that a British fleet stands as good a chance to defeat the foe to-day as in the days of Drake, Hood, and Nelson ; but he regrets to see the people of the Colonies placing extreme reliance upon the successes of the Royal Navy at sea, without taking into consideration the chances of defeat, the weak state of harbour and military defence. Great commanders never risk a battle without considering the nature and plans of escape (if perchance defeated) towards the nearest and strongest port of refit, coaling, and fortress protection, to enable his ships to proceed to sea and try battle conclusions once more in the defence of the State. Lord Wolseley knows the value of the naval bulwarks of the Empire. He would rather retrench the Army than the Navy, which must be powerful and numerous enough, and on the other hand the Navy depends upon the United Kingdom and all the Colonial ports to have the forts and shore forces ready to protect a naval base, coaling station, and to defeat raiders or invaders when the Royal Navy is pressingly engaged elsewhere in carrying out the main object of defeating hostile fleets, protecting threatened Colonies, and in covering large mercantile fleets. The results to Australia

would be awful—something terrible—if England's naval power was crushed at sea. The Royal Navy cannot defend coastal forts and towns and be after the enemy at the same time. The understanding is that the Colonial naval and military forces defend the coast-line to a limit of three miles from the shore, and outside of that limit the admiral takes charge of hostilities; yet the Australian armies and the Royal Navy in war must work together with great courage, pleasure, high discipline, and effective effort when each are called upon by the ever-changing circumstances of war. Modern war will be more swift, rapid, short, and decisive than in Nelson's time, therefore success depends upon Australian preparedness made during peace. Short time there will be for musing or debate upon a Russian, French, or Japanese fleet in the offing, shelling and bombarding Sydney, Geelong, Newcastle, Townsville, Hobart, Port Adelaide, Suva, Freemantle, Auckland, or Wellington. The “too late” cry is the curse of the race sometimes, as England has been frequently caught napping, like Austria in 1866, France in 1870, and China in 1893. Woe betide that State or Colony which has not her naval and military forces thoroughly ready for war upon an hour's notice. Parliaments seldom think, in discussing the military estimates in the light of economics, of the numerous graves at Sebastopol and Scutari, of British heroes killed by disease and national unreadiness, and not by the bullet. It is *too late* to blot out every stain in any defence system when the enemy is able to thunder at our towns and ports, and only opposed to false defence, undisciplined yet highly patriotic men. I regard it as a crime on the part of any statesman of Australia to ignore the discipline and readiness of the army, its complete armament and war

preparation, during the piping times of peace, during the sensational reports about Coolgardie, a rise in the price of wool or wheat, or waiting "to see what apathetic Governments will do." Government, Parliament, and the People, in the interests of self-preservation and national duty, must educate themselves up to the standard of Federal defence, or they will be isolated or dismembered by the foe.

The maintenance of sea-power by England is a paramount duty which she owes to her Colonies, her commerce, her children, and to herself. To keep the sea-power is the high-road of British wisdom, prudence, and safety. Lord Brassey says—"It is said, if we increase our Navy, that our rivals will follow suit. It is the most craven argument that can possibly be addressed to the meaner instincts of the British tax-payer. To accept it and act upon it is to toll the knell of the British Empire. That Empire rests upon sea-power, and a Frenchman has said—not an Englishman—*L'océan ne comporte qu'un seul maître.*" Sir John Colomb says—"We can preserve no trade-route in waters where the enemy can assemble a naval force. We cannot drive off hostile cruisers if they are backed up by a battle fleet. We secured our trade only when our cruisers mastered the trade-routes backed up by a battle fleet, which destroyed the enemy." The late Sir G. Phipps wrote—"The wars of the last thirty years prove that the Reserves win. Naval Reserves consist of men, coal, and means for re-fitting ships." Earl Spencer says—"We desire to live in peace with our neighbours, but the best policy was to maintain a powerful Navy. It was now strong, but a great deal more had to be done." Sir C. Dilke says—"The elements of national catastrophe were present in existing circumstances, and British

naval superiority should be as the ratio of five to three ships." Major-General Tulloch says—"We lost some West Indian Islands, and only regained them when we secured command of the sea. During seven years' war with France she took 3000 British ships into Bourbon, and only, in 1810, were we able to capture Bourbon and Mauritius, which stopped commerce destroying. All this shows what would happen if war broke out. Australian Governments have ignored the warning dispatches of the War Office, but we should form skeleton regiments which could be rapidly filled up in the time of war. I urge this to be done without delay in all the Colonies." Every Power knows that their colonial possessions are at the mercy of that nation which holds the *sea-power*. If England cannot hold that power her Empire is at an end, and her existence will be at the feet of her victorious foes. This is the true meaning of the strategic value of sea-power. To secure its priceless value, from the start to the end of a war, is the constant occupation of our naval policy. Lords Wolseley and Roberts both agree that the Navy and not the Army is the first line of defence for England and her Colonies.

CHAPTER VIII

THE DEFENCE OF THE AUSTRAL-PACIFIC TRADE-ROUTES

IT is ten years ago since I warned the Colonies in the *Queensland Review* to prepare Federal defence in anticipation of foreign aggression in the Pacific, and "not to bask under the sunshine of Imperial protection on the cheap," but to try and ease off the burden of the British tax-payer to maintain command of the sea. In 1886 I pointed out the internal danger of disjointed forces, a uniform railway gauge, and a Federal system of defence. I suggested the creation of a new Federal capital in the interior to suit the distance and convenience of all Colonies, and to keep down the rival jealousies of Melbourne and Sydney, as Berlin, Washington, Vienna, Madrid, Paris, and Ottawa are capitals having their origin as Federal, political, or governmental capitals. Such ports as Auckland, Sydney, and Melbourne must be covered by a military force, but the military base and centre of army administration should not be within the grasp of a large Armada and combined invasion. The true solution of the Federal capital question should be a new capital in the interior. It might displease the property owners of two large cities, but Australia would reap the future benefits. Sydney would become the Liverpool, and

Melbourne, the New York of Australia. The manner in which Australians rushed to arms in 1885, and in 1896, proves to me that every man will rush to arms and do his race duty without compulsion. At a meeting of Australian-Irishmen in the Town Hall, Sydney, Irishmen repudiated the cablegram of Mr. Redmond, and when another Irishman suggested "not to form an Irish regiment to fight for England," and called for "three cheers for America," his countrymen shouted out "Go to America," and resented the disloyalty by giving thundering cheers for General Hutton, C.B., as the Queen's A.D.C. and Imperial Officer. A Colony that does not provide for its own defence increases the Imperial responsibility. The Colonies must be ever watchful, for it was the Russian intention, in 1885, to capture Auckland and the Mauritius. There must be no finality to Federal defence—no standing still, but an ever forward improvement in perfecting Federal defence by land and sea.

The naval strategy of the Pacific and the naval events of the Far East must compel us to fortify Port Darwin, and extend the railway system in that direction. The two keys and coaling stations of Australia are Thursday Island and Port Albany. I regret that New Zealand fails to see how union in Australia is strength. Distance should lend enchantment, and not isolation, from the comity of colonies. New Zealand is the only place not safe from invasion, raids, or bombardments. Mr. Seddon, by his neglect of naval and coast defence, has been guilty of a crime against patriotism. I trust that his Colony will insist upon entering Australian and New Zealand Federal defence. Off New Zealand and Hobart will be many naval fights in the next great war, and outlying ports and naval stations must be defended.



MAJOR KENNETH HUTCHESON, STAFF OFFICER,
Commanding the Northern District of Queensland.

Wiley, Photo.

"I was much struck," said the late Sir George Tryon, "with the importance of Albany on the west and Thursday Island on the north. The Albany harbour is not large yet convenient, and is capable of extension and improvement. The inward and outward steam trade of the Colonies pass it, and it cannot fail to become a port of great military and commercial importance. These remarks apply with equal force to Thursday Island. During my visits the coal stored for vessels simply invited an enemy to come and help himself, and that at our very threshold in both directions, so that he would arrive in Sydney or Melbourne with full bunkers, and full of mischief. If these ports were occupied by an enemy, being so defensible, it would cost much to expel him. The population of Albany is sparse, and the defences are in the hands of a few Volunteers. At Thursday Island thirty steamers pass each month, but the population chiefly consists of natives and other coloured people. The ports at the extremity of West Australia and Queensland obtain far less protection from cruising squadrons than do the central ports. The importance of these ports has only sprang into existence in quite recent years. The Australian trade passes quite close to them, and they are ports of supply, refuge, and defence, and their value will increase with the growth of Australia. They have been the subject of serious consideration. Albany can be sufficiently protected for the hour, and as years roll on, more and more doubtless will be done. The position of Thursday Island and that of Torres Straits are sure to command attention, as their great geographical and strategical importance will force them into consideration. There are no other points of equal importance from the above point of view in the whole Australian littoral." Since the above was

written, Albany and Thursday Island have been fortified by the War Office, and garrisoned by Colonial artillery.

The Hon. John Douglas says that there are good guns at Thursday Island, but only 35 men to man them. A naval captain reported of Glenelg Fort, S.A., that the guns were in good order, but that he saw no garrison. Referring to the joint duties of the navy and military, he agreed with the last three rear-admirals on the station. Sir George said "that Melbourne and Sydney were able to look after themselves during the absence of a squadron, but for general defence the two forces are required, each with its special mission, and aiding each other. The duty of the first is to defy attack, to welcome the coming friend, and afford him a safe harbour; the latter to chase and capture the enemy on the wide sea, or, if driven home by superior force, to join in the harbour defence." All the Premiers, including Sir Robert Stout of New Zealand, agreed upon the present ships of the squadron. Sir A. Stuart, Mr. Dalley, and Sir S. W. Griffith were well pleased with the extra defence scheme, which now, in 1896, wants increasing with the growth of the Colonies, and considering the new dangers of the Pacific. Sir Samuel recognized the fact that the wealth and importance of Australasia could be safe from hostile attack with a sacrifice of money for defence purposes, which he regarded by way of insurance. It should be our pride as self-governing Colonies to obtain and establish for it an Auxiliary Squadron, Australasia being an integral part of the Empire. He also approved of the erection of an arsenal and dockyards, and also the admission of cadets and seamen on board the ships.

A vast amount of Australasian wealth and human lives are at sea. The trade is increasing, and any severe

loss of life, ships, and cargoes would be felt throughout the Colonies. Mercantile failures would be enormous, and ruin would strike into every Colonial home. Here, again, we see the necessity of the Australian forces working in concert of action with the Imperial forces. The trade-routes of Australia radiate like all the points of the compass. The sentiment of race, trade, and sea-power alone should federate the Colonies with the mother country closer and closer, yet the whole consummation requires some golden links to make them both safe from foreign attack in any sea or shoreland. The whole island continent is in danger from the want of a true system of Federal defence, both naval and military, Colonial and Imperial. As the Empire is made up of units, those units should be entwined around each other like a true-lovers' knot. A French naval officer, Lamotte-Piquet, said—"The surest means, in my opinion, to conquer the English is to attack them in their commerce." Admiral Aube and the Moscow editors have a firm belief in this primary and harassing mode of war against Anglo-Colonial shipping. Captain Mahan does not believe in solely acting to destroy our much-scattered mercantile marine upon every ocean, as the main strength of the Royal Navy must be destroyed by a foreign Power, "and such control of the sea can only be wrung from a powerful navy by fighting and overcoming it." Continual preying upon mercantile marine, as the *United Service Gazette* admits, will not bring the Empire to its knees, yet if it is not protected it will bring sad loss of life, suffering, and commercial wealth to the British people, especially in the Australian Colonies, where such losses will be specially felt. Commerce-destroying cruisers could not remain long at sea without being caught, even by our slow "lame

ducks" of the Navy. "Commerce destroying," says the able *Gazette*, "through control of a strategic centre by a great fleet, depends upon concentration of force. Regarded as a primary, not as a secondary operation, the former is, as specially demonstrated by Captain Mahan, condemned, the latter justified by the experience of centuries." This view of the question means that the Royal Navy must be strong enough—three to one over any other navy—to fight the foe in line of battle, blockade his ports, chase every commerce-destroying cruiser that escapes to sea, and shadow every enemy's port in a neutral harbour. If our trade-routes are well covered at sea, the percentage loss will not be great. The opening of our trade-routes has a deal to do with Australia in the time of war, and every facility should be given Admiral Bridge to keep his ships in order and his crews healthy on the Australian station.

Trade-routes on the ocean highway are our sea-lines of communication, and they must be kept open and rendered safe just as much as the long lines of military roads from Cairo to the Upper Nile, from the Indus to Cabool or Chitral, or from the Gold Coast to Coomassie during war. There are three main routes to Australia from the United Kingdom and Europe, i. e. *via* the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Canadian-Pacific railway. To keep these routes open for our mercantile marine and cable information is a primary Australian as well as home question. The Colonies during war would suffer much from being cut off from Europe and the West. The loss of sea-power would be more felt in Australia than in India or Canada. The Colonies have great resources, but they are anything but all developed, nor is the population large enough to carry out the defence of ten thousand miles of shore. A glance at our

imports proves that the Colonies cannot go on smoothly if the trade-routes are cut by the enemy. It will never do for any Pacific cable to be owned or directed by foreigners, nor laid, unless across British instead of French or United States territory, sea rocks, or coral islands. It is to Australia's interest that the cables of the Pacific and Indian oceans be protected during war. Cables from the Cape and Falkland Islands are wanted to keep our admirals and generals in touch with the movements of cruisers and flying squadrons. British naval captains will no doubt shadow, follow up, destroy, or blockade the enemy's ships. The French and American cables in the Pacific demand that the Canadian line be laid now. Neither Captain Mahan nor Lord Beresford are sure that a complete blockade of an enemy's coast can be done in these days of steam and exact navigation. If only one *Rurik* or *Dupuy du Lome* escaped, much commerce and ship value would be destroyed at sea before such smart, well-armed, and new *Alabamas* could be captured or sunk. A stern chase is a long one, and not systematic enough for the defence of our ships and trade-routes. The consideration of this question from an Australian point of view is serious, and inclines the Colonial people to present more war-ships to the British Navy in order that her fleets should be numerous and powerful enough to protect the long and strong lines of ocean communication between Great Britain and her Colonies, strangely scattered, but still regarded as the natural and national frontier of the great maritime Empire of Queen Victoria. In every phase of the question we see fresh Australasian responsibilities during a European or Far Eastern war. Australia must take more than a passive interest in the sea-power and in her trade-routes than she does. We must impress upon the people and legislators the

importance and largeness of their interests involved during war, or even during a war scare. Foreign nations must be told, even at the cannon's mouth, to take their hands off our Colonial Empire. However much we desire peace—the best policy—we will draw the sword and fit out flying squadrons when necessary. The expansion of our Colonial Empire must go on from point to point irrespective of a German Emperor, foreign statesmen, envy or jealousy. The British race has a destiny to work out, and it will work it out, for our race energy, trade, and colonization never stop in peace or war. To accomplish this the home people and "our cubs" in the Colonies have resolved "to pull together" in protecting trade-routes and interests beyond the seas, in spite of fate. Unstatesman-like minds can call this *Jingoism* if they like, but it is perfectly true. It is the British way in which they have managed things since the Armada. The Colonies are bound up with the Empire to sell their products in England, to develop her manifold resources, find work and food for the population, and make her public works pay to cover the London loans. She must soon find trade for her shipping, send her commercial travellers into every port and sea in the Pacific, and hold their own in fair and just competition with Jap, Frenchman, Russian, or German. In this national push and beyond-sea energy the State must protect her ships, subjects, and merchandise, which cannot be done without a numerous navy and a good army to back it up. Trade often precedes the flag, but some one must carry it. Japan means to carry her flag to foreign parts to make room for her overgrown population and bounding industries. But she is united, strong, federated, and flushed with victory. Australia is not in that position yet, and Australian statesmen and merchants must wake

up and take object lessons in national life and energy from the hitherto despised "Japs." We should no more mock at the "Japs" than at the great Nile monument at Cairo. Captain Mahan and Admiral Colomb both preach the true doctrine that governments during peace should assist private enterprise, industry, trade energy, and promote national growth by seeking gain and commercial influence beyond the seas, in places where they do not naturally exist. The collective national energy of the people must not be fettered nor checked by fear, reproach, nor by general stay-at-homes. A government can make or unmake a nation's sea-power and trade energy in working out "a peaceful energy upon which alone," says Mahan, "it cannot be too often insisted that a thoroughly strong navy can be based." And again he says—"For war the influence of a government will be felt in the most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, commensurate with the size and growth of its shipping and its important connective interests." We see this demonstrated by foreign Powers every day, even to the heavy subsidy of ocean main lines of steamers.

The development of an Australian mercantile marine has not yet been felt, as youthful ambition in this direction has not yet animated the brain of the bushman, nor the money-holders of Australia. The subject has been taken up in slow-going Sydney, but stands a good chance of being neglected by half-hearted committees. There is everything in favour of establishing such a national marine, to be owned and manned by Australians. We have the men and the money—the first idle for something to do, and the latter idle in the banks. We have also any amount of hard wood and durable timbers, and the iron ore to build and engine the ships. A

mercantile marine would give fresh life and labour to a large number of the population, skilled and unskilled, and I hope that training-ships for both officers and men, for the navy also, will soon be seen in the harbours of New Zealand and Australia. A mercantile marine will also establish lots of ship-building yards, foundries, and engineering shops upon a large scale, to compete with prices at home. These are matters which Parliaments, Marine Boards, Chambers of Commerce, and ship-owners should take up and bring to maturity. This is a movement on the part of Captain Taylor, R.N., which will have a deal to do with the discipline and *personnel* of a Federal navy and for coast defence. But I am afraid that the monied classes of Sydney, which have all to lose, will not move in the matter, as they are so selfish, grasping, unpatriotic, and unspeculative as local citizens. When a British coterie propose to do a thing, they do it without shelving a thing for twenty-five years, like federation, irrigation, and local government. Anything naval or military in Sydney—the naval base—is looked upon with almost contempt by the traders, shopkeepers, and advertisers. They have no idea of what a bombardment or money levy means, and that a defence journal like the *Defence News* should be supported.

But let training-ships be formed at once. Splendid docks exist in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, and New Zealand. The coasts and harbours are well lighted, and the shipping returns are wonderful. Training-ships will create a taste in comatose youth for a life on the Pacific wave, or a home on the rolling deep. A maritime life will suit their love of adventure when “our boys” get the chance. It will encourage a race of deep-sea fishers, hardy seamen, a naval reserve force for harbour defence, or to refill the decks of men-of-war at

sea, defending trade-routes, commerce, and capturing "raiders." The trade risk at sea is now large, but nothing to what it will be in the days to come. This trade belongs to and affects every man, woman, and child in the Colonies, and the trade-routes must be protected. The loss of one-half of its carrying and mercantile value must hit every section of Federal Australia. The loss will fall upon producers, farmers, squatters, miners, workers, importers, exporters, hawkers, companies, and every class of labour. Fancy a hundred ships going down by shot and shell, with valuable hulls, and cargoes of wool, meat, wheat, sugar, hides, tallow, silver, gold, tin, copper, butter, fruit, etc., on board, to say nothing of bullion and precious lives. I will not pursue the question further. It should be the aim of every Home and Colonial merchant, of every Imperial and Australian statesman, to protect British trade and tonnage from the French and German merchants, who, having learnt the lessons of trade in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Sydney, and Melbourne offices, turn them to account in favour of their own nations, and rob us of our national and legitimate trade. This is the result of employing foreign clerks in British and Colonial offices, who spy and undermine our commerce in the silence of four or five languages. Foreign nations take care to protect their own manufactures, whilst they send their iron, butter, cattle, and beet-root into free-trade England. It is said that the Russian, German, and French crops are largely sold in England, and as the governments get the most of the soil production in the shape of taxation, their profits out of England are used to build war-ships to destroy our Colonial Empire.

A glance at the shipping registers proves the magnitude of the interests involved along the main sea-routes, and

the great necessity for creating a progressive maritime policy throughout the Pacific. It is a pity to see so much Colonial trade now being carried in foreign bottoms by hostile merchant cruisers built and running as merchant steamers, but really as the fastest-armed cruisers afloat on this side of the line, such as the *Messageries Maritimes*, the North German Lloyd, the A. and A., and the Russian Volunteer fleet. If the Admiralty desire Admiral Bridge to capture them, my Lords must send him out a few powerfully-armed twenty-three-knot cruiser destroyers, as the present foreign merchant cruisers could run away from the *Australien* or the *Kaiser William*. I have yet to learn if our Chinese fleet cruisers can overtake the new, smart, and fast ships of the Russian Volunteer fleet. The *Orlando*, cruisers of the *Katoomba* type, and torpedo-catchers of the *Boomerang* type, were good in their day, but on the Australian station they have become obsolete ; in short, the Imperial and Federal naval defence of Australia requires forty torpedo-boats of the *Desperate* and *Express* type, capable of steaming *thirty-two knots* per hour, with an armoured battle-ship of the *Majestic* class, for a "mosquito" fleet wants a rally-ship at sea.

Here is a useful table respecting distances and trade-routes connected with Australian commerce—routes which must be protected during war—

DISTANCES OF OCEAN AND COAST MAIL ROUTES.

				MILES.
Sydney to Melbourne	576
Melbourne to Glenelg	480
Glenelg to King George's Sound	1010
King George's Sound to Perth	350
Perth to Galle	3100
Sydney to Torres Straits	1740
Torres Straits to Timor	1115

	MILES.
Timor to Sourabaya ...	700
Sourabaya to Batavia	370
Batavia to Galle ...	1070
Sydney to Noumea ...	1100
,, " Saigon ...	4000
,, " Vladivostock ...	5200
Perth to King George's Sound	350
King George's Sound to Adelaide	1020
Adelaide to Melbourne	505
Melbourne to Sydney	560
Sydney to Brisbane, Cape Moreton	503
Brisbane to Maryborough	180
Maryborough to Bundaberg	192
Maryborongh to Gladstone	77
Gladstone to Rockhampton	98
Rockhampton to Mackay	190
Mackay to Bowen	105
Bowen to Townsville	106
Townsville to Cardwell	82
Cardwell to Cooktown	72
Cardwell to the Endeavour River	110
Cooktown to Somerset	558
Somerset to Norman Mouth	545
Somerset to Thursday Island	33
Thursday Island to Port Darwin	730

It will be thus seen that some foreign ports are dangerously near and within easy steaming distance of Australia. The ocean steam liners go and come, and time their arrival in any port with railway-time precision. The railway distance between Brisbane and Sydney is 503 miles, from Sydney to Melbourne 576 miles, and from Melbourne to Adelaide 450 miles. In Queensland the railway system extends along the coast from Brisbane to Rockhampton, *via* Gympie, Maryborough, Bundaberg, and Gladstone. This will improve inter-colonial defence, as well as protecting the coast from raiders. I hope that a Federal railway will soon be made from Adelaide to Perth, in Western Australia.

The great Australian coast-line is only defended by eleven men-of-war, and the boundaries of the naval

station are gigantic, viz. on the north from the meridian of 95° east, by the parallel of the tenth degree of south latitude to 130° east longitude, thence northward on that meridian to the parallel of 2° north latitude, and thence on that parallel to the meridian of 136° east longitude, thence north to 12° north latitude, and along that parallel to 160° west longitude; on the west by the meridian of 95° east; on the south by the Antarctic Circle; and on the east by the meridian of 160° west.

"I believe," says Admiral Bridge, "that the Navy is strong enough—of course on the assumption that it is properly distributed, and prepared for prompt action—to protect our ocean trade quite as efficiently as it was protected in all former wars. It is an historical fact that in most of our great naval wars the naval protection given to our trade has been so efficient that the trade has not only not suffered, but has, on the whole, largely increased. But, although the Navy is quite in a position to do all this, it cannot guarantee the safety of every individual merchant-ship. There will undoubtedly be some losses, just as there were in the most favourable times of warfare. But the loss will be but a small percentage of the whole. At the same time, we cannot guarantee the safety against injury of every individual town or small island, but the safety of every individual town or small island can be practically guaranteed if, in addition to the naval defences already in existence, the people of the various places insist upon the local authorities giving them properly-organized land defences, in the view that naval officers take them, representing, so to speak, the side of the assailants, because it must be by or under the convoy of a foreign navy that any attack on British territory would be made. This does not necessarily mean tremendous fortifications. It does

not necessarily mean putting down submarine mines to block the harbour, not only against the enemy, but against our own ships, but it means a suitable number of properly-organized fighting men. This is what we English naval officers, if we had to go for a foreign place, would dread a great deal more than gigantic forts and submarine mines. The submarine mines and forts, of course, have their value, but they are of very little importance compared with that of a properly-organized force of human beings. This does not mean that you must have enormous numbers of men. It simply means that there should be such a number, that to give an enemy any hope of succeeding if he attacked the place, would require him to come with a force so large that he would be easily discovered."

The trade-routes in the days of naval war connected with India, China, and Australia endanger our independence, and inflict upon us a humiliating peace by the hostile foreigner. The merchants of Australia should trade to every port, and Colonial governments have agents abroad extending trade and commerce. Our trade-routes from Australia extend direct to China, Japan, Hong Kong, Ceylon, Bombay, Calcutta, Java, Singapore, Manilla, the Cape, Mauritius, Samoa, New Caledonia, all the South Sea Islands, Hawaii, San Francisco, Vancouver, New York, Boston, Callao, and even Vladivostock, to say nothing of the United Kingdom and Europe. It will be seen that the commercial wealth of Australia is upon every sea, and being carried under the British flag the risk of the Colonies in any great war is bound to be great if hostile cruisers manage to escape out of harbour to sea; and recent naval manœuvres, with smart cruisers and torpedo-boat catchers, have proved that an imprisoned cruiser can

run the most vigilant blockade. It has been tested again and again during the operations of foreign naval fleets, as well as by those of the Royal Navy. Foreign cruisers can keep the sea without coaling for a long distance, thus making their radius of action and destructive power much larger and more formidable than a *Sumpter* or *Alabama*. Several great naval Powers have cruisers that could leave the Baltic or Atlantic ports with sufficient coal to steam into the South Atlantic to prey upon our Anglo-Australian ships, and then to deceive British cruisers as to their sphere of operations by steering into the Indian and Pacific oceans; and then by steaming along the great trade-routes they would be able, before being captured or destroyed, to burn and sink our mercantile marine to the extent of millions. The first three months of hostile cruisers at sea would be the worst, upon the assumption that British ships of war must act more as a strong fleet than as detached squadrons, or as single cruisers. It is also right that most of our ships would be engaged in blockade work, or trying to meet and bring into action the entire naval strength of the enemy at sea. Raiding would be constant. There is still a great sailing-ship trade with all parts of the world by Australia, and her trade-routes bear her wonderful wealth across 16,000 miles of ocean. Since the stoppage of Black Ball and Green liners, caused by the gigantic advances of steam and economic engineering, 80 per cent. of the trade has been carried on by steam floating palaces and warehouses. The P. and O. liners, to meet the growth of trade since 1875, discarded its old passenger mail-steamers for the more comfortable, stately, and seventeen-knot ships, carrying both passengers and cargo. Every year increases the shortness of voyage,

carrying capacity, coal endurance, and unequalled navigation. The same remarks apply to the Orient, British India, the Port line, the Canadian-Australian, the A. and A. line; the lines of Burns, Philip & Co., Huddart Parker, and Howard Smith; to say nothing of the foreign lines of steamers, such as the Messageries Maritimes, the North German Lloyds, the E. and A. Steamship Company, the China Navigation Company, the Japan Mail Line, etc. The cost and splendid mercantile service of these lines plough every sea, and as Colonial exports and imports increase, the floating capital at sea will always be an enormous risk and source of danger. The destruction of such ocean liners, with passengers and cargo, during war may be realized. The captain of a foreign cruiser would have no conscience in destroying such "floating palaces," especially if his crew was not numerous enough to put a prize crew on board of it. Let us hope that Anglo-Australian lines of ocean traders can be converted into powerful merchant cruisers in twenty-four hours—that good armaments, and disciplined crews with plenty of dash will be found ready to defend themselves from hostile cruisers and sea-going torpedo-boats.

"The great pity is," says Admiral Bridge, "that there are not more artillery troops. There is a widespread feeling in these Colonies that the late great increase in the Imperial Navy renders military defence unnecessary. Such an idea has got into the minds of many people. I have said over and over again, that the Navy, however efficient, cannot absolutely protect a country against all attacks. The Imperial Navy now is so strong that if we only make proper use of it, if we only manage it properly—not do as was done by the Government of a former day in the war of American Independence, who

managed it badly—I am persuaded that the Navy is so strong that no possible combination of foreigners could convey an expedition to any part of her Majesty's dominions, and conquer it—not even a West Indian island. If they were even to succeed, by a sudden raid, in seizing a portion of territory, the Navy is so strong now that if we chose to prevent them they could not occupy it for any length of time." This shows too much confidence. Again he says—"In reality, no strength of fortification would defend any country from naval attack unless it has a sufficient military force to combat an assailant wherever appearing. It cannot be too often repeated to people in various parts of the British Empire that, although considerable additions have been made to the British Navy in recent years, there still exists ample reason for maintaining an efficient military service ashore. Misunderstanding on this point is deplorable."



GENERAL SIR HENRY W. NORMAN, G.C.M.G.,
Late Governor of Queensland.

Berauds, Photo.

CHAPTER IX

IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL DEFENCE

“ Britishers, up ; make ready your rifles ;
Who can tell what a day may bring forth ?
Patch up all quarrels, and stick at no trifles—
Let the world see what your loyalty’s worth ;
Loyalty !—Selfishness, cowardice, terror
Stoutly will multiply loyalty’s sum,
When, to astonish presumption and error,
Soon the shout rises—The foes are come.”—TUPPER.

BEFORE leaving Queensland, Sir Henry Norman said of Anglo-Colonial defence, that he “ regarded it as an absolute certainty that before all those present were dead, Australia would have to resist an attack. It was impossible, in the present state of the world, for a great, prosperous, and growing country like this, with, comparatively speaking, no army and no navy, to expect immunity in the event of war. He was sure the manhood of England, Ireland, and Scotland, and especially the manhood of Londoners, would induce them to take up arms to resist any such attack, and that they would not submit tamely. Trained troops were required, and, as a consequence, money must be spent liberally and well. Without England, Australia was powerless ; but England, with the Colonies united, might possibly stand against the world as she did before. It was not

to be supposed that England would be alone in the world."

Before deciding upon the composition of the army, let us devote a little attention to the nature of the necessary Imperial defence. Like many more Australian national questions, it is ill understood. Let me try to make it understood by my readers. I shall divide it into (1) naval or external defence, (2) harbour and coast defence, (3) military defence, and (4) the ulterior lines of defence. Our first line of defence is that of the Royal Navy, assisted as far as possible by a Federal Navy. If the Navy destroys all hostile ships and fleets at sea, the defence of Australia is secured, and the only danger will be from raiders. The sphere of naval action is large and far-reaching. The naval battles to decide England's sea supremacy may not take place off Sydney, Cape Moreton, Thursday Island, King George's Sound, Port Darwin, Hobart, Port Phillip, or Auckland, as they might be in the Chinese seas, Indian Ocean, off the Cape, the Canaries; off Gibraltar, Malta, Lemnos, Alexandria, Brest, Toulon, Corsica, Cornwall, Dover, the Bermudas, Halifax, Kiel, or Cronstadt. It is beyond human ken when the time and where the place will be. It may be that history will be repeated off the Nile, St. Vincent, and Cape Trafalgar. We have seen proof that naval England is yet fit and ready to defend her Colonial and Imperial interests all over the world, and her sons can still exclaim, "Lo! I am mistress still," and "English yet." We have already noticed the Suez and alternative trade-routes, and we have to deal first with naval or external defence. We have also to deal with the foreign naval Powers who might some day—I hope never—become hostile to the Austral-Pacific. The possible enemies of the Anglo-Saxon, in these days

of disloyalty without shame and foreign treachery without a blush, we may guess to be France, Russia, Germany, and, perhaps, Japan and the United States. Worse things happen under the cloak of friendship, reader, "than thou art aware of," over Boer bounce and Mosquito coasts.

The naval defence of Australasian waters is not up to what it should be. We have had good admirals, officers, crews, and the auxiliary ships added to the Imperial squadron, but I venture to state, without disrespect to any officer or seaman, that the flag-ship, cruisers, gun-boats, and torpedo-boats are now behind in armament, strength, and knot-speed compared with several Russian and French ships in Chino-Austral waters. Since the *Orlando* first arrived upon the station, and since the building of the *Ringaroomas* and *Boomerangs*, naval construction has advanced, armour plates are "Harveyized"; guns are lighter and more effective in short range; boilers are now greater generators of steam, and more economic in coal consumption, thus increasing the radius of action; and broadside guns have been converted into quick-firers. The Lee-Metford has supplanted the Henry-Martini rifle, and such-like. When the fleet of eight ships is under steam in half a gale the "lame ducks" or "slow coaches" only permit of recording a speed of from seven to ten knots per hour—a speed that would prove useless in active war. If the *Orlando* or *Katoomba* gave chase to the *Armand Behic* or the *Rurik*, the "lame ducks" would be left to the powerful armaments of fast cruisers that could "steer rings round them, and enclose them in a circle of fire." The crews are as well drilled, disciplined, and manœuvred as any in her Majesty's Navy, and Admiral Bridge has infused a splendid spirit into his fleet, though the demands of Island patrol and port

visiting fall heavy upon him. A fine mutual spirit exists between the crews and the people of the seven Colonies, exclusive of trips to Norfolk Island, Samoa, Noumea, and the Islands. The naval service is highly popular on the broad station. The Admiral has a fine Admiralty House, in Sydney, but he is seldom at home, as he believes with Nelson, Jervis, and Collingwood that "British sailors are made at sea." Gunnery practice in several bays and naval manœuvres during every voyage take place, whilst battle tactics and the naval strategy of the Pacific are always thought of by the captains of the fleet. The command is anything but an idle one, as the ships are always on the move. I dare say that the Admiral knows the movements of every foreign ship, and has well-matured plans ready to meet any naval danger arising out of restless Europe. To show how the mother country protects her trade-routes and Colonies by naval fleets the following Imperial fleets are in Colonial waters, corrected up to October 1896.

(a) *Battle Ship.* (b) *First Class Cruiser.* (c) *Second Class Cruiser.* (d) *Third Class Cruiser.* (e) *Gunboat.* (f) *Gun-vessel.*
 (g) *Special Service Vessel.* (h) *Sailing Sloop.* (i) *Screw Sloop.* (j) *Screw Storeship.* (k) *Torpedo Vessel.* (l) *Despatch Vessel.* (m) *Floating Battery.* (n) *Depôt Ship.* (o) *Receiving Ship.* (p) *Coast Defence Ship.* (q) *Stern Wheel Steel Vessel.* (r) *Troop Ship.* (s) *Surveying Vessel.*

AUSTRALIA : Rear-Admiral C. A. G. Bridge.

Boomerang (c)	Orlando (b)	Royalist (d)
Goldfinch (e)	Pylades (d)	Wallaroo (d)
Karrakatta (e)	Rapid (d)	Dart (s)
Katoomba (d)	Ringarooma (d)	Penguin (s)
Lizard (e)	Ringdove (e)	Waterwitch (s)
Mildura (d)		

CHINA : Vice-Admiral Alex. Buller, C.B., Commodore G. T. K. Boyes.

Æolus (c)	Mercury (c)	Undaunted (b)
Alacrity (l)	Peacock (c)	Narcissus (c)
Archer (d)	Pigmy (e)	Immortalité (e)
Centurion (a)	Plover (e)	Tyne (j)
Daphne (i)	Porpoise (d)	Pique (d)
Edgar (b)	Rattler (e)	Rainbow (d)
Esk (e)	Redpole (c)	Tamar (j)
Firebrand (c)	Spartan (c)	Humber (n)
Linnet (f)	Swift (f)	

THE CAPE AND WEST COAST OF AFRICA : Rear-Admiral H. H. Rawson, C.B.

Alecto (g)	Mosquito (q)	St. George (b)
Barrosa (d)	Penelope (p)	Sparrow (c)
Blonde (d)	Philomel (d)	Swallow (i)
Herald (q)	Phœbe (d)	Thrush (c)
Magpie (e)	Racoons (d)	Widgeon (c)

THE PACIFIC : Rear-Admiral H. F. Stephenson, C.B.

Hyacinth (d)	Satellite (d)	Icarus (c)
Liffey (n)	Wild Swan (i)	Immortalité (b)
Pheasant (e)	Comus (c)	

NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES : Vice-Admiral J. E. Erskine, Commodore Don.

Buzzard (i)	Pelican (i)	Urgent (n)
Crescent (b)	Tartar (d)	Cordelia (c)
Magicienne (d)	Tourmaline (l)	Rambler (c)
Mohawk (d)	Terror (m)	Pallas (d)
Partridge (e)		

S. E. COAST OF AMERICA : Captain C. E. Gissing.

Acorn (i)	Active (c)	Retribution (c)
Barracouta (d)	Beagle (i)	Basilisk (c)

EAST INDIES : Rear-Admiral E. C. Drummond.

Bonaventure (c)	Magdala (p)	Sphinx (g)
Brisk (d)	Marathon (d)	Pigeon (d)
Cossack (d)	Plassy (e)	Redbreast (c)
Lapwing (e)		

FLYING SQUADRON : Rear-Admiral A. T. Dale, C.B.

Royal Oak (<i>a</i>)	Theseus (<i>b</i>)	Handy (<i>k</i>)
Revenge (<i>a</i>)	Charybdis (<i>c</i>)	Hail (<i>k</i>)
Gibraltar (<i>b</i>)	Hermione (<i>c</i>)	Havoc (<i>k</i>)

And six other torpedo-catchers.

The above fleets look formidable, but naval officers are under-rating the strength of two Powers, and the unexpected third one. The British Navy Admiral Bridge considers strong enough to hopelessly ruin any enemy's attempt at conquest, and to give reasonable protection to our vast ocean trade. Still, it would not be strong enough to guarantee every port in the British Empire against attacks which might be of sufficient magnitude to cause intense damage and misery. To give reasonable security against such attacks every place should be provided with sufficient trained soldiers to beat off an enemy. Our Navy is strong enough to prevent any large hostile expedition slipping through its fingers, but not to furnish an absolute barrier to all raids within twenty-four hours.

The following is the list of British merchant steamers subsidized and held in reserve to act as armed cruisers or transports in the event of war. Some of them are well known in the Colonies. I hope they carry their armament, 50 per cent. of trained crews, and can run away from or defend themselves from the 20-knot ships of France, Russia, Japan, and Germany. There are also numerous steam-ships on the Admiralty list complying with Admiralty conditions, and suitable for carrying armament, but with which no contracts have been made with the owners, such as the ships of the Orient, British India, and Donald Currie lines. The *Ophir* was specially designed as a merchant cruiser, and in the Austral-Pacific there are fast steamers which could

easily be utilized for war purposes, but we have no $21\frac{1}{2}$ -knot cruisers like the *Campania*, nor $20\frac{1}{2}$ -knot cruisers like the *Teutonic*. The list of subsidized steamers *outside* the Australian trade-routes and naval station is the *Campania*, *Lucania*, *Majestic*, *Teutonic*, *Umbris*, *Etruria*, *Servia*, *Germanic*, *Aurania*, *Britannic*, and *Gallia*; most of them steaming only 17 knots. The Australian trade steamers are those of the P. and O. and the Canadian-Pacific Railway Company, viz.—

P. and O.	TONS.	KNOTS.
Australia	6901	18
Himalaya	6898	18
Victoria	6300	$15\frac{1}{4}$
Britannia	6300	$15\frac{1}{2}$
Oceana	6300	$15\frac{1}{4}$
Arcadia	6300	$15\frac{1}{4}$
Valetta	4911	$14\frac{1}{2}$
Massilia	4908	$14\frac{1}{2}$
Ballarat	4752	$14\frac{1}{2}$
Parramatta	4795	$14\frac{1}{2}$
Carthage	5013	14
Rome	5013	14

too slow

The Canadian-Pacific ships are all 17 knots and 5900 tons, *i.e.* the *Empresses* (1), *India* (2), *China*, and (3) *Japan*. The *Lucania* can steam 22 knots, the *New York* 19·97 knots, the *Paris* 20·05 knots, the *Furst Bismarck* 19·68 knots, *La Touraine* 19 $\frac{1}{2}$ knots. The fastest steamer on the Australian line was the *Victoria*, and on the Cape line, the *Scot*. The *Ormuz* lands her mails in Sydney in thirty-two days, as did the *Ophir* and *Oruba*. The *Australia*'s mails are delivered in thirty-one days, as also were those of the *Oceana*, whilst the *Himalaya* delivered them in thirty-two days. The speed of the fastest French liner on the Australian route is 20 knots, the fastest German liner is 19 $\frac{3}{4}$ knots. The speed of first-class foreign merchant cruisers trading to Australia averages about 20 knots. The speed of the new P. and O. *Caledonia* is 18

knots. The cargo steamers *Georgic*, *Gaelic*, and *Westmeath*, of over 10,000 tons, could each carry a complete brigade, or the three ships a complete division of troops, with guns, stores, horses, transport, staff, etc. But a Hamburg line has a transport of 13,000.

Yet there is a great *but* connected with our fleet—it is too weak to meet the continual increase of naval strength of Russia, Japan, and France within striking distance of Australia. It is true that in calculating the combined strength of France and Russia in the North and South Pacific, the British fleets in China, Australia, and the North Pacific could also combine for a grand glorious "1st of June" battle, but such a combination to meet combination would be associated with a deal of anxious risk and difficulty, provided the war-ships of the Dual Alliance left Chinese waters and sailed for Australia. Of course Admiral Buller, C.B., would soon be after the escaped fleet with his best ships, leaving Commodore Boyes to look after Chinese waters. The ships of Admiral Buller and Admiral Bridge would have the same object in view, *i.e.* to meet the dual fleet in battle at sea, to get at them in some port of call or coaling, or if they adopted commerce-destroying tactics, to follow them to capture or destruction. Neither the China nor Australian fleets have torpedo-boats of the *Sokol* or *Forban* type—29 or 30·50 knots speed—and the active pursuit of the enemy's fast ships would be crippled by many cruisers of less knot speed. Let the reader consult my tables of the naval strength of the fleets likely to be permanent in the Pacific, and Australians will find that they should further consider an increase of the Australian Squadron, or the creation of a Federal Navy under the orders of the admiral on the station. It might be that a heavy naval battle took place in Chinese waters, and that

Hong Kong was under bombardment. In this case the fleets of Admirals Bridge, Drummond, and Stephenson might be compelled to rush to the rescue of Hong Kong, and, perhaps, Calcutta or Singapore, for a successful hostile fleet must never be allowed to rule the waves in the East. Australians, to bring about the total defeat of the Dual Alliance combination, would waive all points of agreement with regard to the territorial limits of the *Karrakattus* and *Milduras*, as the defeat of the foe in Chinese waters would bring about the non-invasion of the Colonies all the same. The "lame ducks" would be left behind. I am glad to note that the Right Hon. Mr. Goschen means to improve the power and speed of the war-ships and merchant-cruisers in Eastern waters.

Sir George Tryon laid this naval strategy clearly before the Premiers on board the *Nelson*, in April, 1886. The nearness of huge forces to each other, and the use of the telegraph, tended to precipitate decisions, and to render wars more probable than before. When nations preach peace they all prepare for war, and it is not possible "to pose contented, unarmed, in an ever-increasing, envy-provoking condition." In naval strategy, when the focus of war is pointed out, the main fleet strength will be near that focus,—the dangerous zone at sea,—to prevent the effects of war being felt beyond that focus. The more scattered the interests to be defended, the more desirable it is to circumscribe the field of operations and the consequences of war. If we scattered the naval ships in the Pacific to try and be everywhere, the naval defence would be weak at all points, and an inferior enemy's force would be able to take the mighty initiative, and to appear strong at any selected points. He would not select a point too strong for attack, nor too distant from his own base. The admiral must get near his enemy to

frustrate his designs ; the further away you are from him, the less likely you are to meet, hinder, and defeat him. It will thus follow that any force whose action was limited and designed for a special object and a special sea, and of great value, does not fall into line with the main naval force, but is a necessary adjunct to it ; for no matter how superior the force, skilled the fleet movements, vigilant our naval officers, *history might repeat itself*. The foe might escape touch or notice, and be some time before his objective was known and designs penetrated. The Australian fleet might follow him at twenty knots—the convoy speed is nine knots—but his power of mischief at sea would be great. The difficulties of a pursuing squadron are also great compared “with one carrying into effect a well-designed, pre-arranged scheme,” the conditions of which must not be overlooked. As winds, currents, and tides no longer direct fleet movements, the power to avoid notice is greater to-day than in Nelson’s time. Ships a thousand miles away on a Monday, are now near you on a Thursday. Admiral Tryon said that “modern blockades under steam conditions were unreliable, and the days of convoys were gone.” I hardly think so ; whilst admitting it possible for an enemy’s ships to run the blockade and steer for the open sea to distant seas and trade-routes as the *Alabama* did, and for a time burn and destroy our shipping ; and also not forgetting the strategic principle that the further a focus is from the position, the less advantage it is as a station for a naval force, as it depends on its having seen the enemy coming to it, and on his having escaped the notice of others. Besides, should the foe go elsewhere in strength, the further off the position is, the less likely is a force occupying it to be able to act in combination with its

friends. Unprotected places of wealth and importance provoke enterprise on the part of a foe, and that they must frustrate. The home tax-payer should not bear the whole cost of defence, which exists in every distant sea, and multiplies with each cycle. Batteries have only a short range seaward. The actions of our warships at sea would deny Colonial waters as a cruising ground, and cover places undefended by local forts or military forces. If we had no men-of-war, the Colonies would be isolated in the time of war; but if we had a strong squadron in the Pacific, the public would know that whilst defeating the naval force of the enemy the ports and harbours would be secure, and if necessary to gain the common object, the two forces should be able to unite. To benefit the navy, armed depôts should exist on the great lines of trade and commerce. With our fleets in every neighbouring sea, the enemy must be discomfited and the Colonies assisted in defence. The Colonial and Imperial forces should be able to work harmoniously and obtain the full effect of the value of naval defence, associated as it is with discipline, instruction, practice, and directed by one responsible head, the Admiral of the station. Without this the position would be a source of weakness. A knowledge of the arts and implements of war and how to use them would be maintained in modern war. The scientific use of guns and appliances on board a man-of-war to-day implies highly-trained crews, and the crews of Colonial navies must be federated, so as to secure a perfect, special, and disciplined system of training, as adopted in the Imperial Navy. Colonial boys should be trained as seamen before they went to sea in men-of-war, where they practically learn the art of sea warfare. If they served for twelve years, they could re-engage for ten

years more, and then receive a pension. A Naval Militia should well serve the naval forces of Australasia.

I have described the army we want, and pointed out the war-ships we want, in other pages. Not only must the Imperial Navy be at once strengthened in these seas, but a Federal fleet of sea-going torpedo-boat destroyers of thirty or thirty-two knots should be built without delay. These Colonies have no frontiers save those imposed by nature. If an enemy appeared he must come from over the sea, and he must be met by ships of equally opposing strength, ready to fight in line at sea, or to assist in coastal defence, with large coal-carrying capacity, radius of action, and powerful quick-firing armament. In all cases a Federal fleet must co-operate with her Majesty's Navy in Pacific warfare, even beyond the limits of the station, wherever the enemy may be. All Australian naval operations should be designed from an Imperial aspect, with the defence of the Colonies kept in the foreground. The existence of forts and coaling depôts along the trade-routes must be protected, sufficient ships provided to do the police duties of the sea, and to sail at short notice to any point where British and Australian interests are threatened. The whole British Navy would be engaged in watching and fighting hostile ships and fleets all over the world. If a hostile fleet left Europe it would be followed by a large naval force, and we see in such a case the value of ocean forts, a naval base, and military defences. Fleets must be kept close together, and fit to cope with any powers of foreign naval concentration. Every nation in modern times has to pay heavily for self-defence. So must Australia, to hold her own. I do not feel the naval defence of Australia so safe as some admirals think. Admiral Bridge is one of our most intelligent

admirals ; has had opportunities given him to know all that is going on in the naval world ; has initiated several naval schemes of manœuvre and "neutral belts" at home and in cruising with his ships on his station ; keeps his crews at sea to make them sailors ; exercises his ships at sea and not in the harbour ; and should the Russian or French fleet descend upon our shores, he will try to dispose of them in Nelsonic or Dundonald fashion. But his fleet is weak, and it requires more emergency vessels than surveying gun-boats and slow-going cruisers, especially when some Pacific ships of the Dual Alliance have a twenty-knot speed. I do not look on any of our subsidized merchant cruisers in Pacific waters as fit to run away from or give chase to some foreign cruisers, such as the smart steamers of the German, French, or Russian Volunteer type. I have stated that the Imperial Australian fleet—with the auxiliary *Wallaroo* type of cruisers—should consist of a powerful second-class battle-ship, a first-class cruiser of the *Crescent* or *Blake* type, four larger vessels of the *Venus* or *Ringarooma* type (with better speed and ventilation), the present survey gun-boats, and four torpedo-boat destroyers of the new *Thrasher* or *Desperate* types. This may be a large order, but it is a necessary one, not only considering the present aspect of foreign aggression in the Austral-Pacific, but considering the growing importance of the Pacific in trade, and its likelihood of being, in the hidden future, the scene of great naval and military operations, in which the destiny of the British race might be changed. To blockade hostile ships in their own ports requires three British ships to one foreign, and should a cruiser or sea-going torpedo-boat destroyer elude the blockade, where are the spare ships to run down the escaped cruisers, and protect the Asian-

Austral-Pacific trade? It may be also necessary for the Imperial Navy to land a body of Royal Marine Artillery at Garden Island, Port Albany, and Thursday Island during war. The flag-ship *Orlundo* ought to go home to be refitted with new boilers of the Belleville type, and to be re-armed with more modern guns. The slow-steaming ships should be replaced with twenty-knot cruisers, with the steam blowing off. A new flag-ship of the *Blake* type should be sent out, or better still, a fast ironclad of 10,000 tons displacement, with guns equal to anything carried on the Russian ships in the Pacific. Forty sea-going torpedo-catchers should be at once procured for distribution amongst inter-colonial or Federal ports, manned by the best men of the Federal Navy. This would entail a number of gunnery and torpedo lieutenants, and be an extra cost. To keep the admirals well posted up in time of war, more signal and telegraph stations are wanted on the north-western coasts, whilst overland lines of railway, combined with immigrant settlements, should be speedily constructed towards Port Darwin and the Gulf of Carpentaria, for the land and sea forces must work together to defeat the common foe. I do not believe that Australia is little liable to raiding, aggression, or invasion without the navy destroying the hostile armada, carrying troops of all arms. If the Russian fleet left Port Arthur for Hong Kong, they might steer for Australia instead. When the fleet did not go to Hong Kong, we can fancy the confusion in the minds of three station admirals as to its true destination and objective point. Would it be New Zealand, Hobart, Sydney, Newcastle, Guam, or Melbourne? There's the rub! And while trying to discover this hostile armada, it might successfully sink every ship spoken at sea, and thus elude the cruisers or

eyes of our three fleets. When Admiral Knavekoff and Admiral Linois were off Sydney, Admiral Bridge might be off Thursday Island or at Auckland, and Admiral Buller at Port Albany, in search of them. When once a fleet gets to sea undiscovered, it is difficult to pick it up before it has destroyed much. Men-of-war and transports can time their movements with such precision over long sea distances, that evading and invading are possible; therefore Australia must consider all its lines and schemes of defence as vulnerable. Sydney is the naval base of the Imperial fleet, and Garden Island must certainly be protected by the Federal naval and military forces.

I was glad to note that Admiral Bridge has been carrying out practical naval and tactical exercises *en voyage* to Hobart, in Jervis Bay, Norfolk Bay, and off the coast of New Zealand, to say nothing of charting out the dangerous shoals of the South Sea Islands. Scouting and signalling forms part of fleet drill, which gives energy and practice to the officers and men of cruisers, especially in the Pacific; an ocean of magnificent distances. Naval evolutions and pains taken for the search and discovery of an assumed hostile fleet are of daily event, designed for use under conditions more nearly approximating those of actual war. Scouting and look-out ships rapidly reduce the main size of a fleet, and get out of active operating touch with the admiral, who cannot have *smart linking ships* to spare for commerce protection. The educational value of such tactics is priceless, as they tend to make officers study the relative advantages of alternative plans, embracing a large ocean area, and help to perfect the crews in naval fighting organization. Captain Mahan says that England beat the French and Spaniards because they drilled their

crews in harbour; but when we come to consider the relative value of drill and discipline in the Colonial naval brigade systems of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, and Adelaide, the men of the Naval Brigade have no chance of perfecting themselves in harbour defence or in the coastal offence, for the want of money, drill, and ships. They either have none, or they are pitifully laid up.

The defence of Garden Island in Sydney Harbour is within the range of heavy gun, shell, and howitzer fire from the South Head offing. Nor is it beyond the shadow of a doubt that the undermanned fortifications and submarine mines of Sydney could keep a daring enemy out if he had four ships of the *Rurik* type. Our naval captains on the station have an idea that they could capture Sydney somehow. I also know how they could do it, but it would be indiscreet to state how in these pages. The last tactical coastal schemes witnessed by the writer left an unfavourable impression upon the expert mind. Heavier projectiles and smokeless powder are wanted, better range-finders, more powerful electric lights, a better E.C. and observation mines system is wanted, and the friendly Channel requires some ingenious way of temporarily blocking it. The North Head wants fortifications, whilst guard and inner torpedo-boats should be numerous, to say nothing of having ten thirty-knot *Havocks* ready to go out to attack and torpedo the enemy's ships in the act of bombardment or trying to force Sydney Heads. I have hope, in the event of an attack upon Sydney to rob the banks and destroy the naval and military bases, that harbour naval defence will be in the hands of the captain in charge, whose dispositions will no doubt tend very much to sink the daring battle cruisers.

Garden Island is one of the finest naval stores, ordnance



The Head-quarters and Naval Base of the Australian Fleet, Garden Island, Sydney Harbour, with Admiralty House and North Sydney in the background.

Hopwell, Photo.

and re-fitting establishments south of the line. Captain Castle, R.N., is very proud of it, and it is quite a treat to go over the place. It proves that keeping a fleet at sea in fighting trim is not all beer and skittles, when we reflect upon this great and fully-equipped naval head-quarters of the fleet. In order to make Sydney as a naval base more complete, there are three splendid docks and an engineering establishment that can repair any man-of-war sailing into port. French and German men-of-war use these docks for repair and general overhauling. Lord Brassey's latest opinion on our naval position is that "it is much more satisfactory to rely for your naval position, not so much on an enormous unproductive expenditure in times of peace, as on the enormous reserve resources which you possess arising out of your magnificent position of marvellous energy and enterprise as the greatest of peaceful Powers by sea. The establishments brought into existence to produce the splendid ocean greyhounds do very much to knit the Empire. These vessels have given the occasion for the organization and establishment of fine industrial works, so that when the need arises you may apply the whole concentrated energies to the construction of vessels of war."

The demand for Australian coal to supply the coaling stations of the Imperial Navy during war would be enormous, employing a large number of steam colliers and seamen. These coal steamers would be sure to be captured if possible at sea by the enemy. Their capture would reduce our power, and increase the enemy's powers of naval offence. It is evident they must be convoyed by men-of-war as far as Mauritius, Falkland Island, St. Helena, Ascension, Ceylon, the Cape, Albany, Thursday Island, Fiji, New Hebrides, Samoa, etc. Australian

trade during war would penetrate all seas with war stores and provisions on board for the use of troops and fleets. If ships were stuck up in the Red Sea for the want of coal, Australian and New Zealand ships would be required to carry it there. A large supply of coal should always be stored for naval use at the Cape, Aden, and the Falklands. Coal is as good as gold to the navy and armed merchant cruisers of war, and Australia is the coal supplier of the Southern oceans. War with the Dual Alliance would give our coal trade a fresh impetus, and help to balance the stagnation of trade in some other exports. England will have a large cruising fleet protecting the trade-route, stationed on a line of action from the Canaries to the West Indies and South American coast, blocking the entrance of an enemy in or out of the Southern seas. A fleet will no doubt block the exit of the Red Sea if a hostile force commands the Suez Canal. Such war-ships as the *Blake*, *Blenheim*, *Powerful*, and *Terrible* are the ships to clear the trade-route to Australia from Europe. Several merchant cruisers, well armed, could be added to such a fleet, to act as convoys to merchant ships, working as a single unit and sailing in indented line ahead. Convoy work will depend upon the nature of hostile attack, the water area to be protected, and the amount of protecting naval force, which might be weakened if the main British fleets failed to capture every cruiser escaping out of a blockaded port in Europe. The command of the sea must exist, to permit of military over-sea operations.



H.M.S. *Océan*, Flagship of the Australian Fleet.
Rear-Admiral C. A. G. Bridge; Captain P. W. Fisher, R.N., Flag-Captain.

Hornby, Photo.

CHAPTER X

THE NAVAL DEFENCE OF AUSTRALASIA

“The possession of fortified stations adds little to the naval power of any country, unless accompanied by a corresponding addition to a movable naval force.”—ADMIRAL BRIDGE.

IT may be said that the mother country takes charge of the immediate defence of the United Kingdom, India, and her valuable Colonies by the use of her Imperial fleets in every sea, and by virtue of her naval conquests and command of the sea. I need not repeat the logic of events relative as to how we won our Colonial Empire by conquering the sea-power of the ocean, and that we must maintain it, if the Empire is to live, with all the naval strength of the British race at home and in the Colonies. The first line of Australian defence is the Navy. The whole system of Australian naval strategy is interwoven with the keeping within touch and offensive power of the neighbouring fleets. The ships of the Royal Navy are an over-spreading network of sea defence over the whole globe, all working and moving together, and directed by one head—the Admiralty of England. The Colonies owe everything to the Royal Navy. But for the naval arm, Australia would have been foreign instead of British soil. It is right that we should take a double

interest in the Navy, and feel proud of it as Anglo-Australians. I am pleased to note that wherever the Admiral, his officers, men, and ships appear, they are received with unbounded patriotism and heart-felt enthusiasm in the ports of every Colony. "The only danger," said Admiral Bowden-Smith, "to the officers and men was that they might be *killed with kindness* instead of the bullet." Admiral Bridge, who is always cruising like Rodney, Jervis, and Collingwood—at sea—frequently acknowledges the kindness and hospitality of the people. The Royal Navy, wherever its ships anchor, reminds the colonist of home and England. It is the only martial connecting link between Australia and the United Kingdom.

It is true that the first safety of the Colonies lies in the fleet of Admiral Bridge. Australians must expect the Navy to be far from harbour, and suffering heavy losses, during the first phases of the war. France and Russia are no friends of England in peace or war, and when war is declared their captains will rapidly carry out the uncivilized tactics of Aube and Skobeloff—to mercilessly "burn, ravish, pillage, and destroy" fortified and unfortified towns. The visits of stray cruisers of 11,000 tons with plenty of coal capacity will prove dangerous ships along the Australian and New Zealand littoral. They will rob the wharves and steamers of coal, compel the miners to work without consulting unions, land in small ports, get hold of the mayors and bank managers, and demand a ransom under threats of murder and bombardment. In the event of a naval disaster, the military forces would be kept under close drill, discipline, and readiness. I agree with General Edwards, and not with many professional naval and military officers, that a foreign "descent upon the distant shores of

Australia is not an impossible undertaking.' The unexpected always happens in war, and by all that is manly and patriotic let Australasia be ready on the day of test, trial, and battle. When we see Sir George Dibbs sounding an alarm and calling the ex-brave around him—obeying my Lord Viscount and not Hutton, *you know*—I do not despair of true Federal defence upon a sound military system, forming a rallying-point around “the banner of our pride.” And when we strike, so strike that the enemy may beware of us in the Colonies. Lord Napier of Magdala said—“When you hit, hit hard; follow them up; give them no breathing time in pursuit, nor in efforts for fresh concentration.” We must be prepared to act on the offensive, as England cannot well send large expeditions to the Pacific and India during war in Europe. We must take upon ourselves *the mighty initiative*. “When,” said Lord Lawrence, “did we succeed when we did not go upon the initiative?” General Brackenbury knows well that Australasia will not act on the purely defensive without delivering the lucky counter-blow, and “leave others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her.” Captain Mahan also says—“Do not tell me that England, with her naval superiority and immense Colonial resources, is going to be content to act on the defensive.” It all depends upon war progress and the call of national duty. War depends upon many things. The counter-stroke is everything. The Navy is our shield, and a movable army is our counter-stroke. Therefore “defence and not defiance” may be true in sentiment, but it is false in war. I again repeat the value of the “offensive-defence.”

Mahan’s *Influence of Sea Power on History* proves that Spain and Holland felt the loss of their sea-power,

which from their position made them the chief carriers of Europe, from the Baltic to the Levant. The Dutch war of 1653-54 with England in eighteen months stopped their shipping trade, the sources of revenue became exhausted, factories closed, the unemployed grew furious, the State was full of beggars, the Zee was a forest of useless masts, grass grew in the streets, and houses were to let. A sad peace saved them from ruin. The loss of sea-power would sink England to the level of Holland, whilst the loss of naval power at home would discontinue prosperity in the Colonies. This is a great argument for the race at home and abroad to *federate*—FEDERATE! The Colonies should therefore help the mother country all they can to maintain command of the sea—there must be *no* chance of losing it, or grass might grow in Sydney and Wellington, as General Sir J. B. Edwards assumed. Australia has a deep interest in the safety of the Aden, Hong Kong, Ceylon, Mauritius, and Suez Canal routes. How? Because France will fortify Obok and ports in Madagascar, within steam and striking distance of our Cape and Red Sea routes. Saigon menaces the trade-route between the Yellow Sea, Japan, and India. Hong Kong and Singapore are the outposts of Australia in protecting her commerce *en voyage* to Java, the Philippines, Borneo, the Straits Settlements, Formosa, etc. If Russia held Port Arthur, and France got New Hebrides, they would dominate the Pacific trade by their Cronstadts and Cherbourgs. Japan in Formosa leaves a nasty taste in the mouth, as it is a splendid naval base for Japan, if the ambitious Japs contemplate a *coup-de-main* against Australia. Foreign colonies in the Pacific would soon be captured by the British, of which fact European rulers are well aware. But such conquests cannot be effected unless Federal defence leans upon each

Colony, and the Colonies lean upon Imperial defence. All these formidable chains of fortified posts on the ocean directly protect our best Australian interests, and the people fail to know it; indeed, the defence battle of these distant possessions may be fought out in European waters.

IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL SHIPS IN AUSTRALIAN WATERS.

		Tons.	H.P.	Men.	Guns.	Class.
ORLANDO	...	5600	8800	458	12	<i>b</i>
ROYALIST	...	1450	1510	160	12	<i>d</i>
PENGUIN	...	1130	1100	75	8	<i>s</i>
PYLADES	...	1420	1450	109	14	<i>d</i>
RAPID	...	1420	1230	161	12	<i>d</i>
DART	...	470	250	55	2	<i>s</i>
RINGDOVE	...	850	1200	75	6	<i>c</i>
GOLDFINCH	...	850	1200	75	6	<i>c</i>
LIZARD	...	715	1000	73	6	<i>c</i>
WATERWITCH	...	620	450	50	<i>nil</i>	<i>s</i>
MILDURA	...	2575	7500	218	8	<i>d</i>
RINGAROOMA	...					
KATOOMBA	...					
WALLAROO	...					
TAURANGA	...					
BOOMERANG	...	735	4500	—	2	<i>e</i>
KARRAKATTA	...	735	4500	86	2	<i>e</i>

NEW SOUTH WALES.

AVERNUS} Second-class torpedo-boats, 18 knots, 40 torpedoes.
ACHERON} No Q.F. guns.

QUEENSLAND.

GAYUNDAH, steel twin-screw gun-vessel, 360 tons, 400 h.p.; length 115 ft., beam 25 ft., draught 10 ft. 6 in. *Armament*—1 8-in. 11½-ton B.L. gun, 1 6-in. 4-ton B.L. gun, 2 3-pdr. Q.F. guns, 2 M. guns. Built on Tyne, 1884.

PALUMA, steel twin-screw gun-vessel, 360 tons, 400 h.p.; length 115 ft., beam 25 ft., draught 10 ft., speed 10 knots. *Armament*—1 8-in. 11½-ton B.L.R. gun, 1 6-in. 4-ton B.L.R. gun, 1 3-pdr. Q.F. gun, 4 M. guns.

OTTER, steel twin-screw armed tender, 290 tons, 470 h.p. *Armament*—1 64-pdr. M.L.R. gun.

The BONITO, STINGAREE, PUMBA, DOLPHIN, and BREAM are iron twin-screw armed barges, 450 tons, 400 h.p., armed with 1 gun each.

MIDGE, picket steam pinnace. *Armament*—2 M. guns.

MOSQUITO, second-class steel torpedo-boat. *Armament*—1 M. gun.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

PROTECTOR, twin-screw, steel cruiser, 920 tons, 1840 indicated h.p.; length 188 ft., beam 30 ft., draught 12 ft. 6 in., speed 14 knots. *Armament*—1 8-inch 11½-ton B. L. R. gun; 7 6-inch 4-ton do.; 4 3-pdr. Hotchkiss Q. F. guns; 5 Gatling machine guns; 10 14-in. Whitehead torpedoes; 200 Martini-Henry rifles, and 100 breech-loading revolvers; 100 cutlasses; 30 boarding pikes; 1 electric search-light. Launched 1884.

VICTORIA.

CERBERUS, armour-plated twin-screw, iron turret ship, 3480 tons, 1660 h.p. (250 nominal). *Armament*—4 10-in. 18-ton M. L. R. guns, 2 6-pdr. Q. F. guns, 4 4-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt machine guns. *Crew*—52 permanent, 83 naval brigade.

NELSON, wooden frigate, screw, 2730 tons. *Armament*—2 7-in. 4½-ton M. L. R. guns on carriage slide; 14 64-pdr. truck guns; 2 4·7 Q. F., 2 19-pdr. Q. F., 2 6-pdr. Q. F. guns; 2 12½-pdr. and 2 9-pdr. B. L. guns; 2 ·45 Gatling field-guns. *Crew*—30 permanent, 100 naval brigade.

VICTORIA, twin-screw steel gun-boat, 530 tons; indicated h.p. 800; compound engines; speed, 12 knots. Length 140 ft., beam 27 ft., draught of water 11 ft. *Armament*—2 2-barrel and 2 4-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt machine guns; 1 8-in. 12½-ton and 1 6-in. 4-ton B. L. gun. Launched 1883. *Crew*—15 permanent, 45 naval brigade.

ALBERT, twin-screw steel gun-boat, 350 tons; indicated h.p. 400; compound engines; speed 10 knots. Length 115 ft., beam 25 ft., draught of water 10 ft. *Armament*—1 8-in. 12-ton and 1 6-in. 4-ton B. L. gun (projectile, 180 lbs.; muzzle velocity, 2025; penetration, 14·7 in. iron); 2 2-barrel and 2 4-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt machine guns. *Crew*—15 permanent, 30 naval brigade.

BATMAN, twin-screw, Harbour Trust hopper-barge, iron, 387 tons, 350 h.p.; 1 6-in. 4-ton B. L. R. gun, 2 2-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt machine guns. Built at Portsmouth 1883.

FAWKNER, twin-screw, Harbour Trust hopper-barge, iron, 387 tons, 350 h.p.; 1 6-in. 4-ton B. L. R. gun, 2 2-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt machine guns. Built at Portsmouth.

GANNET twin-screw, Harbour Trust tug-boat, 346 tons, 500 h.p.; 1 6-in. 4-ton B. L. gun, 2 ·45 Gatling guns. Built at Portsmouth 1883.

LADY LOCH, Customs steamer, 346 tons, 500 h.p.; 1 6-in. B. L. gun, and 2 1-in. Nordenfeldt guns.

COUNTESS OF HOPETOUN, first-class steel torpedo-boat; 120 tons, 1180 h.p., carrying 3 14-in. Mark IV. Fiume torpedoes and 2 2-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt machine guns.

CHILDESS, first-class steel torpedo-boat, 60 tons; speed, 20 knots; indicated h.p. 800. Length 113 ft., beam 12 ft. 6 in., draught of water 5 ft. 6 in. Carrying 3 15-inch and 3 14-inch Fiume torpedoes, and 2 1-pdr. Hotchkiss Q.F. guns. Coal storage, 10 tons. Built at Chiswick; launched 1884. *Crew*—7 permanent, 7 naval brigade.

NEPEAN and LONSDALE, galvanized steel, 12 tons, 150 h.p.; second-class torpedo-boats, each carrying 4 14-inch Mark IV. Fiume torpedoes; speed, 17 knots. *Crew*—2 permanent, 7 naval brigade.

COMMISSIONER, torpedo-launch, fitted with Spar torpedoes and dropping gear for 2 14-in. R.L. torpedoes.

CUSTOMS, No. 1, torpedo-launch, fitted with Spar torpedoes and dropping gear for 2 14-in. R.L. torpedoes.

GORDON, torpedo-launch, 12 tons, 140 h.p.; 4 14-in. Mark IV. Fiume torpedoes, 3 2-barrel 1-in. Nordenfeldt M.L. guns.

Since compilation I learn that Victoria is selling her useless boats, and the Colonies are taking no further steps to procure ships to improve their harbour and coastal defence. Why? Because they ape to wait upon Federation!

THE NAVAL STRENGTH OF AUSTRALASIA.

The following is the naval strength of the defence forces in 1890-91, prior to the rude change of retrenchment—

Permanent	331
Militia and P. P.	707
Volunteers	1712
					<hr/>
					2750
					<hr/>
New South Wales	561
Victoria	619
New Zealand	1318
South Australia	150
Queensland	300
Tasmania and West Australia	no returns	
					<hr/>
Total for 1890					2948
					<hr/>

THE FEDERAL NAVAL STRENGTH OF AUSTRALASIA.

New South Wales	850
Victoria	850
New Zealand	1000
Queensland	600
South Australia	600
West Australia	250
Tasmania	600
Fiji	250
New Guinea	50
				<hr/>
				5050
				<hr/>

THE ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE.

Head-quarters: Garden Island.

A force of ex-naval seamen, marines, and artificers might be formed at Garden Island, Brisbane, and Melbourne, as a Reserve for the Royal Navy, to the extent of 700 in peace time, and 1000 in war time.

With regard to Thursday Island, it is not strong enough, though kept in splendid condition. The port has not a local torpedo-boat defence. "Albany," said Admiral Bridge, "is the most important strategical position. You have only to glance at the chart to become thoroughly convinced of that. It must be an important base for the ships protecting the trade coming to Australia and New Zealand, and going from Australia. All the forts, as you know, are completed. They are admirably kept, as I consider all the Australian defences are. Necessarily they have only a small permanent force, but so far as they go they are very smart fellows indeed. In fact, the permanent artillery throughout Australia is a magnificent body," but they are too few to defend the two keys of Australia.

I am almost afraid to expose the weakness and almost uselessness of the mosquito fleets of the Colonies. I am

ashamed of their strength, armament, and unfitness to meet a hostile modern cruiser and torpedo fleet. The *Protector* of South Australia and the *Cerberus* of Victoria are the only serviceable ships to help Admiral Bridge or face modern fire. All the others are either too slow, behind in armament, or recently rendered obsolete. I decline to recognize mud-barges and pilot-boats as men-of-war under any circumstances. It would be criminal to send them under modern naval fire, unless specially protected. It is a shame that the Naval Brigades have been almost disbanded in several Colonies, I believe upon military advice. Colonial navies are more wanted than Colonial armies, as they should be able to assume the offensive-defence against port attacks and raiders off the coast. A Federal Navy should have ships built or provided to be able to go to sea coastward, to seek out hostile raiders at anchor in some bay or coaling station, or hovering off an Australian harbour in blockade fashion. If a cruiser fleet of six ships were off a large port, the Federal Navy should have sufficient *Ardents* and *Expresses* to go out and blow them up. More money should be spent upon a Federal sea-going torpedo fleet, so as to sink hostile ships outside instead of inside Australian harbours. Such a torpedo fleet should act hand and glove, in concert of action, with harbour or coastal fortifications, the big guns of which would cover them from the fire of the heavy guns of the foe. The rôle of such torpedo-ships should not belong to the inner but the outer defence or attack. Torpedo-boats of the *Avernus* type, or gun-boats of the *Paluma* type, are only fit for bay or harbour defence, on the look-out for ships successful in passing the forts, submarine mines, and the friendly Channel, so as to be able to give them the *coup-de-grâce*, like the *Khorsing*.

The future Federal fleet of Australasia, considering the existence of the Imperial and Auxiliary fleets, should be devoted to a sea-going torpedo flotilla, to suit the requirements of harbour and naval brigade defence. The rôle of torpedo-boats in harbour defence is to damage the bombarding fleets beyond headlands and ports, yet within the three-mile limit and heavy gun-range fire. The Japs made good use of their torpedo flotilla, but if the Chinese had had more boats, and shown the same dash and intrepidity in acting on the offensive, they might have destroyed several Japanese war-ships. Englishmen would have done it, at any rate. At Pembroke, in 1895, torpedo-boats caught all vessels they chased, but four, which got into a fortified harbour.

It would be very satisfactory if a hostile cruiser like the *Rurik* or *Dupuy de Lome* could be sent sky-high off Sydney Heads or Port Phillip Heads at early dawn of morning, by one of our Colonial torpedo-boats. For the same object in view, the Brennan torpedo might be largely adopted along our coasts. The Holme light has been used to great advantage in coast defence. The torpedo flotilla, when a couple of raiders took shelter for the night in a quiet bay or under the lee of a headland, should be able to go out in search of them at anchor, like the *Ad. Lynch*, and when so found to destroy them without themselves being destroyed or captured. The thirty-knot torpedo-boat must be a good sea-boat, but he heavier armed than at present, for they must use guns as well as torpedoes in naval warfare. The Admiral Fane signal drum, and the Battenberg collapsible cone proved excellent signal codes, and the Federal fleet should have them. The Minister for War and Council for Defence must face the music of opposition in the Federal Parliament by demanding the said

number of torpedo-boats of the *Thrasher* or *Express* type.

The *personnel* of the Federal Navy will most likely consist of 3500 officers and men, including the instructional staff, petty officers, engineers, stokers, artisans, artificers, boys, and A.B. seamen. The quick-firing guns and torpedoes will absorb many hands, apart from those engaged in smart steering and navigation. If this number are well selected—upon the rate of militia pay—it should be sufficient for every port worthy of Federal defence. The torpedo flotilla might prove a school for boys for the Imperial-Australian Navy. I hope that training-ships for officers and men to supply the Federal Navy, the fisheries, and the mercantile marine will be promptly established. The naval force should be clothed, armed, scientifically educated, drilled, disciplined, and manœuvred by the State. I think that most of the vessels of the Federal Navy could be built in the Colonies, the armament only to be supplied upon application by the Admiralty. The period of service should be ten years for the Federal Naval Force, six years for the Volunteer Reserves (to be paid at Volunteer military rates), with a strong Naval Brigade of Royal and Colonial Naval Reserves, paid at the rate of £3 per year for twenty half-day parades. If a member of the naval force serves his country for twenty-one years, then he should receive a pension, and claim the right to serve in the Civil Service.

The virtual abolition of the Victorian Navy, and its splendid body of naval defenders, was a double crime against patriotism. It will always be a blot upon the Ministry of Mr. Turner. Some day he may want "the Boys of the old Brigade." I warned him in the *Defence Review* about the fatal mistake of killing his naval

brigade, for he knew not what it was to disband and destroy a grand naval organization, upon the assumption that he could revive it whenever he liked. Men do not care to be treated like dogs, and nothing but a hostile fleet in sight will make Melbourne and Sydney seamen ever forget their shocking bad treatment of 1895. A glance at the Victorian fleet is not edifying enough. It is now unsuitable for defence work. Port Phillip Heads wants a defence fleet of ten sea-going torpedo-boat destroyers, for the same offensive-defence operations as those wanted for Moreton Bay, Sydney or Newcastle, Hobart or Port Albany, Thursday Island or King George's Sound, all under a fortress-covering fire. Military commandants must not depend too much upon forts and submarine mines in naval attacks, for they must work in conjunction with naval harbour defence—"none are twain without the other." Admiral Bridge is deeply concerned about the defence of the naval base, coaling ports, and harbours of refuge during war. His duty will be to get near or alongside the enemy's ships as Nelson did, but if he gets a ship crippled in action, that ship would make for the nearest port, when his Excellency would expect the local military forces to protect it during repairs. His Excellency Lord Brassey also says—

"First among the many important results to be derived from Federation was a more effectual organization for the purposes of defence. Under existing financial conditions they must assume that the efforts of Australian Governments in matters of defence would be directed chiefly to coast and harbour defence; but even for local defence every arm which was required in an effective *corps d'armée* must be represented in the Australasian forces. They wanted mounted men, in-

fantry, artillery, and submarine miners, and any vessels which were maintained for harbour defence must be efficiently manned by naval brigades. The mere enumeration of these forces was sufficient to show that for the purpose of effective instruction and for organization far more could be accomplished by united than by separate efforts. Federation was also of immense importance for the development of inter-colonial trade."

By all means let there be a Federal Navy, almost wholly composed of thirty-knot *Ardents* and *Desperates*, under an Imperial commodore, gunnery and torpedo officers and instructors. A large number of merchant seamen, Naval Reserve men, and hundreds of young Australians would join such a volunteer fleet, not only as "a jolly lark," but from noble motives of patriotism. It is useless to say that the boys of Australia have no love for the sea, like Canadians and the "Yankees." If not, create a mercantile marine. This would give them a chance to enrol themselves in defence of Queen, country, and Empire—their mothers, sisters, sweethearts, and wives. Seamen cannot be made upon a declaration of war, nor are they made in harbours but at sea, like the children of Nelson—Bowden-Smith and Bridges. Imperial naval officers, as they look upon the Sydney Naval Brigade, do so with regret, to see such a fine and splendid body of men drilled as soldiers, and dragging obsolete ordnance behind them at the public reviews. "How," said Captain Arbuthnot, late of the *Orlando*, "can you expect men to be highly-disciplined sailors when they have no guard-boats nor drill-ships?" The New South Wales Naval Brigade is a highly-disciplined force on shore, equal to the crack infantry corps, but they are being badly dealt with for the want of sea-going torpedo-boats. In Queensland they have the *Paluma* and *Gayundah*, but the

brigade seldom uses them. The ports of Brisbane and Townsville prove that plenty of good men are available for a Queensland section of a Federal Navy. No part of Australasia is more exposed to raiding attacks or invasion than the islands and large ports of New Zealand, which alone require twenty torpedo-boats of the *Havoc* type. Tasmania must do something more than it does for Federal defence ; indeed, the local defence of Hobart is a crime against patriotism, especially as Hobart will be a theatre of naval warfare.

CHAPTER XI

CONCERNING FEDERAL DEFENCE

FEDERAL defence must take its birth, origin, and authority from the people by an Act of Parliament or Parliaments. It means the Federal unity and amalgamation of all the defence forces now existent in the seven Colonies of Australasia, *i. e.* New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia, including the detached colonies of Fiji, New Guinea, and the South Sea isles belonging to the Austral-Pacific. The present defence of Australia is divided into seven distinct commands, and no one force could enter with arms the territory of a neighbouring Colony. If an invader landed in Queensland no law exists to permit the troops of New South Wales to rush to the rescue of the Queensland army. If Colonel Gordon of South Australia was to invade Victoria with arms, he could if captured be regarded as another Dr. Jameson. I once induced Sir George R. Dibbs, the Premier of New South Wales, and Mr. Spiels, Premier of Victoria, to permit Colonel Otter and his Victorian Rangers to cross the Echuca-Moama Bridge into New South Wales, to hold a sham-fight near the Moama Court-house. The event touched the hearts of the border people. The day was a holiday. The sham-fight was

a success. The officers and men were banqueted, and the Rangers re-crossed the border bridge with a more Australian heart in them. Federal defence will consolidate everything into a more compact, better organized, drilled, armed, disciplined, economically conducted, and more effective force. It will have a national character, and give greater moral effect to the armed strength of England in the Pacific. It will be more mobile and more easily administered. Federal defence also means centralization with decentralization; the saddling of proper responsibility and authority upon the proper officers, holding staff and district commands. It also means the creation of a Federal Australian Navy, at the head of which should be an Imperial commodore, under his Excellency the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief upon the station. The Federal fleet could be manned by Australian officers, seamen, and marines—the whole Federal defence force to be directed by one Minister for War and one General Commanding-in-Chief, as in India and Canada.

A "war scare" always makes the Colonies up and doing in the matter of Federal defence. The scare of 1885, and the visit of a Russian cruiser squadron, advanced Colonial defence for a time. Then the strained relations with France, in 1884, brought about a Commandants Conference in Sydney, to draw up a Federal defence scheme, which, like Federation itself, was shelved without its being acted upon. The war between China and Japan revealed to us the fact that there were Powers not far away with fleets and armies of the most formidable character, and which were within striking distances of Port Darwin, Auckland, and Thursday Island. When Sir J. B. Edwards saw a powerful Chinese fleet floating before his windows at Hong Kong one day, he thought



MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHARLES H. SMITH, C.B., K.C.M.G.,
Commandant Victorian Defence Force.

that the Australian Colonies should accept that Chinese naval demonstration as an object lesson in Federal defence. The Press, people, and Parliament laughed at the idea, but when the Japanese power won the battles of Yalu and Ping-yen, those that scoffed at General Edwards lived to be afraid of that offensive Power. The Japanese power and organization are not to be laughed at, but such foreign armed strength is a factor in war to be dealt with seriously by Colonial Parliaments. Commandants have pointed such dangers out in reports and speeches, but their words of warning fell "as the idle wind, which none regardeth." Nothing will convince some legislators of the dangers of raiding and invasion until a shell strikes the Post Office tower in Sydney, or one explodes in King William Street, Adelaide. The Transvaal-cum-German difficulty put the Colonies again ready to face the danger, and when the hostile Powers of Europe, envious of our commercial prosperity, compelled the Salisbury Cabinet to fit out two new fleets, threaten to call out the Reserves and Militia and to mobilize the Volunteers, the race feeling and courage of Australians rose to the occasion by the cablegram sent by the Australian Premiers to the British Government.

General Sir J. B. Edwards, who made a general inspection of the disjointed forces of the Australian Colonies in 1889, made an elaborate report upon the necessity for Federal defence and a Federal army, for reasons which we have stated. Generals Owen, Tulloch, and Hutton have each given their opinions upon a Federal army, almost in support of the scheme of the heroic Royal Engineer of Central India fame, which is simply based upon the *mutual support* of the whole seven Colonies. For many years there was no "power to combine for the mutual support or federation of the forces."

The *desiderata* was that no Federal defence scheme was ever laid down. The realization of the importance of Federal defence policy was due to Sir Henry Parkes and Sir J. B. Edwards. They set the ball rolling in the face of foreign aggression upon the trade and colonies of the Empire. I cannot agree that Sir Henry was the champion of Federation, as he sacrificed "for party what was meant for mankind." Sir J. B. Edwards was surprised at seeing so much energy displayed in all the Colonies, including New Zealand, without thinking of defending the fruits of that energy and enterprise. Port Albany he regarded as the Brindisi, and Port Darwin as the San Francisco, of Australia. Australasia was destined to become the free, dominant power in the Southern Hemisphere, and would guide its future, if placed upon "a firm and durable base." It took ten years of agitation to get the auxiliary war-ships and the defences of Albany and Thursday Island to exist—the whole of which factors of defence have already become weak; so slow and dragging is inter-colonial legislation. Still, there is some Colonial excuse when no practical plan existed for mutual Imperial defence in London, indeed the combined working of the War Office with the Admiralty has yet to be solved in 1897. Foreign threats will force the race to do so. Civilians and the Navy League have done much to create a general defence of Empire. Sir J. B. Edwards writes that "for a fleet to take the offensive, it must have sufficient power to do so." The naval base and coaling stations must be secured, and commerce protected, yet the fleet must have power to seek and fight a hostile force at sea. Our Australian legislators should believe that true Federal defence lies in taking the offensive at sea. It is the great lesson which history teaches, yet Colonial Parliaments are blind

to it. The British capture of Port Louis stopped the loss of East Indiamen, because the French lost their naval base. This is why naval experts like Admirals Bridge and Sir John Colomb, and civilians like Messrs. Arnold-Forster and Wilkinson, have raised the voice of warning to beware of weak shore defences. The defences of Sydney, Melbourne, Lytton, Adelaide, Hobart, Wellington, Auckland, Dunedin, etc., are said to be sufficiently strong to resist bombardment. Some officers say Melbourne is impregnable, and General Hutton says that Admiral Colomb could not enter Sydney by "the back door." I doubt it, and Flag-Captain Fisher of the *Orlando* bears me out. An ex-Australian admiral once visited the South Australian forts. He reported that "the guns and forts were in splendid order, but he only counted five men of the garrison." No wonder that Admiral Bridge has made three or four speeches hinting that the Navy, to keep the sea-power perfectly, wants strong military protection to its territorial base and coaling stations. In the event of war I tremble for the fate of Port Darwin, Thursday Island, and Port Albany, as more men and guns are wanted in such primary naval outlook points. Admiral Bridge should not be tied to fight the foe in Australasian waters, as he might have occasion to form a junction "in section 23A" of the mapped ocean, with the China fleet, or "in section 408" with the Cape and East Indian fleets. To assail the adversary with sufficient naval power on this side of the line might enable Admiral Bridge to close with his enemy wherever he is to be found, even outside of Austral-Pacific waters. Our war-ships must not be tied down to any section of the naval jurisdiction, or an enemy's cruiser or fleet might escape. The Pacific cable will largely assist the Navy in this direction. Admiral Bridge says—"Referring to the disposition of the

Australian Squadron, it was commonly believed that the ships would be well employed in the defence of particular localities; but this was opposed to all well-understood naval strategy, and completely refuted nearly every page of British naval history. There is only one position in war-time for the British man-of-war to occupy, and that is in close proximity to the enemy's ships. The Australian Squadron could not be considered a social institution to steam from port to port, but had incomparably higher functions to perform. In past history badly-managed naval combinations had invariably been due to interference by shore-going people sufficiently influential to be effective in the wrong direction." No later than October 10th does Admiral Bridge say at Adelaide—"In my opinion, the times are such that it behoves every British subject, and especially those in a position like my own, to be anxiously on the look-out. Peace and quiet are most likely to be maintained if it is generally known that a vigilant look-out is being zealously kept. You can easily understand from that why it is that an Admiral regrets, indeed almost resents, any demands made upon the force under his orders which may have a tendency to interrupt or interfere with those exercises and duties, although practical acquaintance with which is the sole condition of naval efficiency. The present, at all events, are not the times when the British Navy can afford to devote more than a very limited portion of a year to mere amusement or festivity. When we have either dispelled the clouds which are looming in the near distance or have passed through a troublous period as triumphantly as our predecessors, then we may look forward to allowing ourselves the privilege of greater relaxation and more extended amusement."

It may be that Admiral Buller might want the loan

of the Australian fleet to smash up the combined fleets of two Powers in the Asian-Pacific, or Admiral Rawson may want "our admiral" to help him to capture or destroy a modern Suffren's fleet in the Bay of Bengal. On the other hand, should Admiral Bridge suddenly find himself face to face against great odds, he would be reinforced by the ships of the China, North Pacific, the Cape, or Indian fleets. The Canadian alternative route improved British sea-power in the Pacific and Far East, without using the Cape, Suez, or Cape Horn routes. It may come about that India might want 5000 Australians to help her on the Russian flank *via* the Red Sea, or that Australia might want an Indian army to help her if invaded. To do this our fleets must be strong and numerous.

The opinions of Major-General Tulloch, C.B., who knows Australia well, are strongly in favour of complete Federal defence, to defend the Empire which cost millions of lives and countless millions of money to build up. Had England not been successful in war there never would have been a United States nor an Australian confederation. The cost of the Colonies to the British taxpayer is the amount of the National Debt—and more, as the present generation pay every year £25,000,000 as interest—therefore the Southern Continent and islands have been presented free to the Australians. The stream of population will again find its way from the Atlantic to federated Australia, which will help to strengthen Federal and Imperial defence. History repeats that land hunger and trade is the cause of many wars. Let me review one of the General's lectures in Victoria. It was natural to expect that foreign nations should be envious of the success of British wealth and colonization. Russia has been sapping her possessions for years past in India and the East. He said the

defence of Australia commences in India. *Mastery* was no longer part of the Anglo-Australian policy, as it permitted Russian aggression to an alarming extent, as a Russia established on the Persian Gulf and at Port Arthur would make the future position of Australia intolerable. Public opinion in Russia believes England to be its only foe, and that "before settling accounts with Germany and Austria we must deal a deadly blow at the *Colonial power* of the proud ruler of the waves." Australia is a *colony*, and it will no doubt take the hint to be ready. Other Russian papers style our Empire as "*rovarry Albion*." These Press opinions may be taken as official. France is our natural enemy, but Press opinion is not so official as in Russia, and mob politicians play to the gallery. I should be sorry to see a war with France, as intelligent and respectable Frenchmen are affectionate towards England. But the French being an excitable race, and having a strong naval power, war might spring up suddenly. The General points out that the Russian Volunteer fleet trading to Siberia, if armed, was more powerful than two *Orlandos*. The naval and military authorities in London have warned Australian Governments that, whilst being responsible for coast protection and that of the sea-routes, they depended upon Australia for its own army defence. He regarded the present Imperial fleet as too weak to do its duty out here, to patrol the station and chase the French or German armed mail steamers, which "could walk away" from the *Orlando* or *Mildura* in all weathers. For service in Australia, larger, smarter, and heavier-armed cruisers were wanted at once. He did not think that the present Colonial fleets were of much use in war, and that a twenty-knot raider would not dare to go up the Brisbane or Fitzroy rivers. All I can say is that such a steam war-vessel would try, or be sunk.

The defect of the land forces was that they were disunited and under no Federal command, and he regretted the existence of private and political coteries and inter-colonial jealousies. The first regiment wanted was a Federal Garrison Artillery, which would supply all staff appointments, have most of its officers as efficient as those of the Imperial Artillery, permanently employed, and interchanging with those of the Royal Artillery. I would also apply the rule to the officers of all the permanent forces in my Federal defence scheme. The Federal Council has some power to create a Federal Garrison Artillery, but New South Wales politicians staying away from Hobart, rendered its authority null and void. The Commandants of the several Colonies have done their best to bring it about, but the want of a Federal Executive prevented united action. He was well pleased with the men, and their powers of discipline as citizen-soldiers. Foreign officers specially praised them, but he regretted the difficulty of getting the militia paid for a month's work, as in England. Too much drill-room parade did not encourage the necessary long camp and field training. Drill is mechanical, but camp life affects the mind, and gives birth to the martial instinct which directs in battle, doing the right thing under the most changing disturbances. All troops should have six weeks of camp life and field evolutions before going on active service. The General has confidence in the volunteer spirit of Australians, which would help to swell the armed strength, irrespective of the Reserves. He strongly pointed out the want of military intelligence amongst officers, and especially those of the Reserves, who might be suddenly called upon for service, advocating the German system—the *einjähriger*—providing a Reserve of two hundred instructed officers, ready to lead and command Reserve forces suddenly called out

for service. An enemy's base must be Saigou, Noumea, Vladivostock, Kobe, or Madagascar, but the General stated that the size, speed, and coal capacity of large transports and cruisers could ignore such hitherto known bases, by steaming round the Cape direct from a European base. The defeat of a landing force was not so sure an operation as when Abercrombie landed in Egypt under fire, or when the British landed in America, won the battle of Bladensburg, and marching upon Washington burned all the shipping and war stores. The attack upon New Orleans was a blunder. The Allies landed in the Crimea in the face of a large Russian army, near at hand. I agree with General Tulloch that the Navy is not numerous enough to watch all eventualities. Russia, in 1885, had arranged a well-planned raid against all the Australian capitals in the event of war, and Sir George Tryon could not have caught the Russians in time. The capture of Sydney and its naval base would be of more importance to a naval Power than Melbourne, and the danger was doubled when war first broke out. So weak are the land defences of the Colonies that more than one Commandant declined to be responsible for any disaster if it arose. Mobilization tables were printed with all the necessary instructions, but what are they for the defence of Australasia, according to the present divided and inadequate state of the defence forces? The defence situation in Tasmania and New Zealand is deplorable. The reduced state of the armies through retrenchment will hardly defeat raiders, or a land force, covered by cruisers, which at present has a fair chance of success. It is better to be ready for any emergency, but it is not always a wise policy to wait until they were attacked. He believed in outward defence where necessary, and taking war into the enemy's country, and not to wait until the foe came

to Australia. Plenty of trained men would volunteer "to go anywhere and do anything"—to India, Africa, or the Pacific. The absence of Australian Federation made the defence of the Empire more difficult. There were plenty of orators, but no statesmen like Rhodes or Macdonald. He advocated closer friendship and trade with the mother country. If Australians knew more about England, and England knew more about Australia, it would be to the best interests of race and the Colonies.

Major-General Hutton, C.B., A.D.C. of Sydney, during his three years' stay in New South Wales, has done wonders in reforming the New South Wales defence force, by improving its discipline, military instruction, its mounted troops, its artillery, its Reserves, its tactical schemes, its field training, also peace preparations to support the naval defence and defeat the invasion of a highly disciplined modern army. He did so under heavy opposition. General Hutton's ideas of Federal defence were well thought out to suit the Colonies. It could only be accomplished by inter-colonial co-operation, mutual support, and State ambition, for well he knew that wealthy nations seldom escape war. He regarded the ships of the Auxiliary Squadron, and the agreement to garrison the forts of Thursday Island and King George's Sound, as containing the germs of Federal defence. The guns were supplied by the Imperial Government, and the garrison by the Colonies. It is hyper-confidence for any naval or military officer to say that Australia cannot be invaded from a distant naval base. It would be unsafe to *bet* upon the impossibility, even though Noumea was 1000, Saigon 4000, and Vladivostock 5000 miles distant from Australia. In my opinion such voyages, with troops and transports under convoy, are not a difficult operation in naval strategy.

on the Pacific, if the British fleet fail to blockade or destroy the main hostile fleet. They had to guard their ports and harbours from raiders, and to prevent them from demanding indemnity from the mayors or "oldest inhabitants." Noumea is a sufficient base of operations and harbour of refuge for cruisers preying upon Australian commerce. Vladivostock is no longer a closed port, as steam ice-breakers can cut a passage for war-ships. I also think that battle-ships, first and second-class cruisers, with plenty of torpedo-boats, would be employed for the purposes of invasion, Russia having such a fleet already in the Pacific. General Hutton strongly insisted upon the military defence of Garden Island, as it was the great primary naval base in the Southern Ocean, upon which the navy relied for re-fit, coaling, and equipping ships of war. Melbourne and Sydney are splendidly defended—if they had more gunners—forming paramount harbours and ports of naval offence and defence. Military defence must be used to stop foreign invasion, render investment, life, and property secure in all the Colonies. "Sydney," says General Hutton, "being the naval base of the South Seas, makes it binding that they should cover it to maintain the operations of the British Navy, charged with holding the sea-power of the Pacific." Admiral Bowden-Smith said that "the most important port to the British Navy in Australian waters was Sydney. The reserve ammunition was stored there, and if the valuable plant at Garden Island was lost to them, the fighting power of the Navy would collapse. It was a great comfort to know that whilst the ships on the station were away cruising, the port of Sydney was absolutely secure. He regretted that there were not men enough to man the fleets in other colonies, but the guns were kept in good order." Part of Federal

defence must be to protect all coaling stations. Newcastle and Woolongong must also be well defended, including the coaling ports of New Zealand and Queensland. They should be open to replenish the coal bunkers of British ships, but shut to the ships of the foe. The fortified defence of river mouths will take place as industry and population increase. General Hutton repudiates the saying of some persons that "they did not want an army here, as they were so far from Europe, and they were not likely to be dragged into war." But England had colonized and civilized the whole world, and it is the duty of the War Office to defend her dependencies and territories, and to give security for the investment of British capital in the Colonies. Defence gave confidence to those who invested in Australian loans and Colonial stocks. It was also necessary to have Federal defence, as it cultivated a strong mutual and national sympathy, understanding, and good race feeling, not necessarily aggressive. It fostered the love of country, laws, order, personal sacrifice, and improved the mental and physical system of the people; these were the virtues of the noble people who made the name of England great. The General infused much patriotism amongst the people. He predicted the future of the Colonies to be great, and advised the martial spirit to be cultivated as became a rising nation and people. He liked the man who neglected self for the good of his country. It would make the manhood of Australia never to forget the advancement of the Colonies. This should be the ruling principle of a great people. "Trade followed the flag, but," says he, "some one must carry the flag. It was the army and navy, and not the missionary, that had to pioneer the trade of the country. It was the advanced duty of Australia to pioneer the future and rapidly

expanding trade with India, China, Japan and the Pacific."

The defence of the New Zealand coast is in a dangerous state, and in the event of war that Colony will require to depend entirely upon the Royal Navy maintaining command of the sea in the Pacific, which if lost, the defence force—with regard to discipline, organization, and up-to-date naval and military intelligence—could not defeat an invasion of say 10,000 well-disciplined and armed European troops. Numbers and self-confidence do not altogether make an army fit to meet a highly-trained army. The present condition of the New Zealand force is just like what the British Volunteer army was twenty years ago. Recent reports of the general defence of that Colony, together with the opinion of Major-General Tulloch and others, bear me out in this opinion. The officers and men are amongst the finest and most well-tried citizen-troops in the world; but like any other army, they want field discipline, camps of exercise, better schools of instruction, a more defined and well-understood scheme of coastal defence, plans of mobilization, and the rapid movement of troops in columns and divisions, the handling of the three arms as one body, the introduction of rifle magazines and more Hotchkiss quick-firing and Maxim guns, the exercise of cavalry in expert scouting, the want of more cohesion and bush tactics (Boer formation) in the Mounted Rifles, and the development of a strong Reserve force, with an ulterior Conscription Army Scheme, such as I advocate elsewhere. This backward state of the New Zealand army is not the fault of the staff officers, but of Governments and Parliaments who carelessly and thoughtlessly cut the military estimates down in ignorance of the fact that an army, to be ready for sudden war, must be studiously trained, drilled, and

disciplined in the piping times of peace and with far-reaching wisdom.

When Captain Russell and Sir John Hall attended Federal Conferences in Melbourne and Sydney, they gave the other Colonies to understand that they were a separate nation by themselves, and that they only wanted some sort of Federal defence without federation—"only that, and nothing more." They declined most peevishly to come under the comity of Colonies, their chief objection being that *distance* prevented such a confederation as included New Zealand, yet at the same time New Zealand did not think the distance too great to export to Sydney and Melbourne huge cargoes of bread stuffs, farm and other Colonial produce. They practically were engaged in commercial federation, whilst disdaining Federal unity and Australasian nationality. I trust the New Zealanders will come under the wing of Australasian Federation, and thus give effect to the English-speaking sentiments of Sir George Grey and not those of the Seddon administration. I also hope that before the next Federal Convention is held a complete change of opinion will have taken place in New Zealand, and that the people will join the other Colonies in political as well as in Federal defence. The Dual Alliance, and even Japan, are in a fitter state to invade New Zealand, in 1896, than in 1885—a touch-and-go affair. If ever New Zealand is invaded she can depend upon 10,000 men of Australia rushing to the rescue. New Zealand is a great mining, pastoral, and agricultural country, and if a foreign Power once established itself there the conquest would be more valuable than Fiji, New Hebrides, Samoa, or Tasmania. Hence we see the value of mutual help and the necessity for the creation of Federal defence. New Zealand must come within the Australian family compact. Distance does not sigh,

but lends enchantment to the view. When she recovers from an overdose of socialistic legislation, perhaps she may turn a wise thought towards closer adherence to both Australasian and Imperial Federation. The coal-ports of New Zealand, such as Westport, should enable the people to study the all-important subject of naval and military defence.

The New Zealand forces, as per Colonel Fox's report, totalized 6343 men, viz. 133 gunners, and these were distributed in Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton, and Dunedin ! The Sub-marine Mining Corps numbered 63, divided into the four ports just mentioned. If this Corps was composed of 63 instructors it would be more reasonable, as the Colony has so many ports. But I praise the Volunteer system of New Zealand, and only hope that they are practically disciplined. Volunteering is my *beau ideal* of recruiting in Australia, and it suits my ideas perfectly. The Volunteer force totalizes 6149 of all ranks, but I think 40 per cent. of these should be Militia, with a greater number of days' parade than the Volunteers. The Naval Artillery—which means Garrison—numbers 1722, the Cavalry and Mounted Rifles 857, and the Infantry 3576. A Royal Maori Regiment, a Garrison Artillery Regiment, and a Corps of Engineers might well be added to the defence force of Australia. The Naval Defence is not a bit too large, especially when it has to defend the coast districts of Wellington, Napier, Auckland, North and South Canterbury, Dunedin, Southland, Oamaru, Westland, Nelson, Westport, and Marlborough. The Cadet Corps numbers 2153, and the Rifle Clubs want a little more drill and discipline—"there is a lack of system or guidance in management." But where is the New Zealand Navy ? Where are its torpedo-boat destroyers ? Where are its far-reaching statesmen like Rhodes or Mackenzie ?

This defence force is richer in war traditions than any other force in Australia, but it is a shade behind in army discipline and field manœuvres. It consists of a Minister for Defence, Head-quarters Staff, with the military districts of Wellington, Auckland, Nelson, Canterbury, and Otago. The permanent Militia consists of Garrison Artillery, Torpedo Corps, a Medical and Chaplain Staff. The Militia is very strong, with many Reserves who have passed through the ranks. The Cavalry consists of Volunteer Yeomanry, Mounted Rifles, Cavalry Volunteers, Hussars, etc. If ever Cavalry wanted reform it is this Mounted Brigade. They should be properly divided into Lancers and Mounted Rifles or Rangers. There should also be a Mounted Maori body of Rangers, trained in Boer formation, or say 500 mounted and 1000 on foot. They could also be trained for service beyond the sea. Naval Artillery Volunteers exist in seventeen ports. There are also ten batteries of Artillery Volunteers, in two regiments, a battery being stationed in the ten chief harbour districts. There are two companies of Engineers, and about fifty district companies of Rifle Volunteers, sadly wanting blending into battalions and brigades. The patriotic spirit is fine, but legislators fail to grasp the importance of re-organizing its army into true Colonial defence, let alone Federal defence. The report of Colonel Fox, R.A., should have been carried out.

I have frequently been deeply impressed with the opinions of Sir C. H. Smith, Sir J. B. Edwards, Generals Tulloch and Hutton with regard to Australian contingents being sent abroad to assist the naval or military forces in defeating a powerful foe, with far greater efficiency in drill, discipline, and fitness than the Soudan Contingent, which force, however, rang the joys of race love and British feeling between England and her

Colonies. They were men stout of heart, sound in limb, brave as Tommy Atkins, but they went forth an undisciplined body. The disciplined Australian soldier is fit to stand in line or in daring scouting with any troops in the world. General Tulloch regretted that Russia did not give the Mounted Rifles of Victoria the chance to try conclusions with the Cossack and Turkoman in the Candahar plains. General Hutton carries away with him ideas of New South Wales Lancers and Mounted Rifles that will always be present with him, and should a force be wanted to operate in the Russian rear in Trans-Caspia, he would be proud to command those daring and hardy Australian boys whom he taught to ride, jump, scout, and shoot in the Centennial Park and near Campbelltown. Sir Charles H. Smith says "that the Mounted Rifles is the arm of Australia."

"Should war break out," says General Hutton, "do not be surprised if instead of confining themselves to mere defensive operations they should consider it necessary to act on the offensive. On five different occasions during the last century naval and military experts, when the Empire was threatened, had advised that offensive operations be undertaken. As a result of these there were the expeditions against Quebec, against Gibraltar and other places, and these posts had been added to the Empire. It might be considered, should Australia be threatened, that the best policy was to undertake operations, perhaps in the China seas, perhaps in the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere. Of one thing he could assure them—in this Colony we had the embryo of a force which in a few years would be a most powerful one." The training and bush-life of both men and horses well qualify them for co-operating with Imperial troops. The Maoris would make a grand body of New Zealand Rangers, and they actually volun-

teered to serve against the Boers, under the gallant Dr. Jameson.

A Federal Contingent of 5000 troops would not cost much, and by travelling in the large armed merchant cruisers to Aden, India, the Cape, or New Zealand they would land in fine soldiering condition, constituted as follows—

Mounted Infantry	1500
Infantry	2500
Medical Corps	250
Army Service Corps	250
Field Artillery	500
					<hr/>
					5000

The past strength of the military forces of Australasia may be taken from the several returns of 1890-91, before the date of the recent crisis and days of retrenchment. It would be useless to quote the strength of 1895-96, as the several Colonial Parliaments have retrenched the defence force out of all reason, and "almost afraid to know itself." It is true that the Royal Navy in Australian waters is the first line of defence, but it is also true that the Navy, for all that, is only a portion of general defence, and legislators ignorant of the laws and preparations of war jumped at the conclusion that since they pay a few pounds to help to maintain an Australian Squadron, they are safe from the dangers of invasion, ship destruction, and coastal bombardment. The Australians pay 1s. 6d. per head for defence, and the British taxpayer 10s. But Colonials know nothing of the unexpected, the mighty initiative, nor the fact that there is no finality in the application of science to warfare. The sudden rise of Russian, French, German, Japanese, and United States naval power in the Pacific, together with the strange and treacherous diplomacy of European Powers in the Siamese, Corean, Transvaal, and other recent questions, have aroused the thinkers of

Australia to the fact that they must arm and strengthen Federal defence, and join hands with every other Colony to help the mother country in defence of the whole Empire. Numbers count in war, be they half disciplined or disciplined. I should be sorry to see a Federal army in Australia described as "food for powder," or "men with muskets." A small disciplined army, armed with the Lee-Metford, is almost twice the strength of an undisciplined army possessed of the Martini-Henry. If the Australian troops were accustomed to the Lee-Metford, with a more killing bullet, it would make the strength of the disjointed forces fit to meet any European invader. If 10,000 selected Russians with Maxims, quick-firing, and magazine rifles landed in the Colonies at present, they would be equal to 30,000 Australian soldiers armed with the Martini-Henry rifles, despite the fact that one Britisher is equal to three Muscovites.

In 1890-91 the total military forces were—

Permanent and Staff	1,245
Militia and Partially Paid	12,936
Volunteers	11,518
Reserve and Rifle Companies	9,576
				<hr/>
				35,275
Cadet Corps	12,314
				<hr/>
				47,589

In 1896 the total force in the Colonies fit to take the field did not amount to 25,000 men, and these were fearfully distributed amongst seven Colonies, out of touch with each other. The details of the distribution are as follows—

New South Wales	9,822
Victoria	7,314
South Australia	5,508
Tasmania	2,115
New Zealand	6,700
West Australia	580
Queensland	4,157
				Total in 1891	<hr/> 38,196

I do not count the police, nor many rifle clubs, as they are non-efficient. It is reported that the Commandants of the Australian Colonies at the late Sydney Conference resolved to fix the first Federal army at 7050 men. If this be true, then the gallant gentlemen were more animated with the spirit of retrenchment and the fear of unpatriotic Parliaments, than with the spirit of Federal defence, sound military advice, and responsibility. The *Federal* strength was to be as follows—

New South Wales	3000
Victoria	2500
South Australia	900
Tasmania	150
Queensland	500
				<u>7050</u>

Two Federal Military Conferences have been held in Sydney. The one held in October 1894 was attended by Major-General Tulloch, C.B., C.M.G. (President), Major-General Hutton, C.B., A.D.C. to the Queen, the late Colonel Drury, C.M.G., Colonel J. M. Gordon, R.A., Captain Parker, R.N., and Major Bridge (secretary), thus embracing the Colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and Tasmania. The following agenda was submitted. To consider (1) a general scheme of defence on Federal lines applicable to all the Colonies less New Zealand; (2) the fair allotment of troops for Federal purposes in each Colony, based upon the present military forces, as any material increase at present was inexpedient; (3) the working out of a Federal military organization as above mentioned; (4) to outline a Federal Military Defence Bill, placing the whole of the Australian forces on a similar basis respecting pay, discipline, and military service, to be accepted at once or when a national emergency arose; and (5) the appoint-

ment of a Consulting Military Engineer, to promote efficient defence. I certainly object to Clause 3, for reasons stated elsewhere, and the sealing up of the Report for so long a period. A second Conference was held in Sydney in January 1896, at which were present Major-General Hutton, C.B. (President), Major-General Sir C. H. Smith, G.C.M.G., C.B., Colonel Gordon, R.A., Colonel Gunter, and Major Bridge as secretary. It met to consider the adoption of a magazine rifle for all the Colonies, the question of a powder and small-arms factory, and, of course, to improve upon the Report of the Conference of 1894, upon the general scheme of Federal defence. The Conference rightly recommended the Lee-Mitford rifle. It is still the superior infantry weapon, and is more urgently required than what the Conference thought. New South Wales feels inclined to adopt the .450 rifle bore instead of the .303 bore. But the Colonies are cursed with a black powder contract up to 1900. Like the questions of quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, and more modern projectiles, they should be procured in one year, and not extended over a period of three years. The purchase of a five thousand stand of rifles, with three hundred rounds of ammunition per rifle, is absurd, in the face of foreign relations. Federal defence will also require more quick-firing and twelve-pounder breech-loader field-guns, *i. e.* three guns per thousand of the active army—equivalent to one hundred and fifty of all kinds, well distributed. The storage of military saddles is also a Federal defence question.



SIR HENRY PARKES.

CHAPTER XII

FEDERAL DEFENCE BASED ON FEDERATION

FEDERAL defence can only be a success and reduced to a practical scheme when it is based upon Federation, and working under a Federal Defence Act, as set forth in the next chapter. The "sheer cussedness" of inter-colonial Parliaments prevents the existence of Federal schemes of defence. The Walcheren story of Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan reminds us of each Colony waiting for the other to advance. The object of attack is the Federation citadel. All want to storm it with effect, but in the attempt Victoria waits for New South Wales, and New South Wales waits upon Queensland, all longing "to be at 'em." The sequence is, that the citadel is not yet stormed. In the *Pirates of Penzance* the policeman's chorus "To glory" is very nice and brave, but the Major-General gets tired of *to glory*, and exclaims—"But you don't go." Statesmen have been singing "*to glory*" in the Federation opera, but somehow or other the statesmen "don't go" on to Federation. In a speech at Brisbane, General Hutton, C.B., said that while politics were no part of a soldier's duty, the efficiency of the defence force was especially the anxious charge of every commandant, and every officer holding a responsible command. Viewed from

that standpoint federation for the defence of the colonies of Australia formed a most important factor for increased efficiency. It had been constantly urged by politicians that a central controlling Federal authority was necessary before Federation in the colonies of Australia could be accomplished. This, in the preliminary steps for bringing about federation for defence was, in his opinion, not necessary if only the colonies of Australia would undertake joint action on the following points—(1) A general scheme of defence common to all. The scheme of defence adopted by Queensland was almost precisely similar to that already adopted by New South Wales. The defence scheme of Victoria was also of a similar character. (2) A Military Act, laying down conditions of military service which should be general to all the colonies of Australia, enabling their defence forces to serve for Federal purposes of defence in any part of Australia. The Military Act of Queensland was in this respect more advanced than the Military Acts of the other Colonies. (3) An agreement between the Colonies to maintain for Federal purposes of defence a contingent of their troops in proportion to population and revenue. This contingent to be similarly organized and equipped, and to be kept for joint action with the contingents furnished by the other contracting Colonies. (4) A Federal regiment of artillery. The disjointed fragments of permanent artillery now existing in the various Colonies would by this system be combined, be interchangeable, and similarly organized. The General pointed out in forcible language the impossibility of creating a satisfactory Federal defence when a national emergency had been actually declared. A military force, like any other business concern, required careful preliminary organization, and an effective military

machine could not be improvised at a moment's notice. Hence, he argued that it was to the interest of the Australian colonies to adopt by mutual agreement the above-mentioned points, so as to enable a satisfactory Federal defence to be carried out when the moment of danger had arrived. It was obvious, in the General's opinion, that federation for defence and the creation of a central controlling authority would be met by the joint action of the colonies of Australia upon the first threat of a national emergency, and it was in anticipation of such an event that he so strongly urged the present joint action to make the Federal defence of the future satisfactory and effective. Federation for naval defence of Australia was an accomplished fact, and a Federal agreement further existed for the defence of Albany and Thursday Islands. His proposition now was merely an enlargement upon the agreement arrived at for the latter-named strategical naval positions.

Federation will be the regenerator of Anglo-Saxon national life in Australia. When New South Wales first got self-government in 1852, and when Victoria and Queensland separated from the parent colony, self-government should have provided for a Federal spirit, such as separation with federation. To create separate and independent States, with duplicate forms of government, law-courts, defence forces, and hostile tariffs was a grave mistake, only seen and felt as Colonial progress and civilization advanced. The unified idea lurked within the brain of Wentworth, and many of the able statesmen under parliamentary government, who had emanated out of the administrators, of Crown Colonies. I do not regard Sir Henry Parkes as a Federationist in his youth or prime of life. He only awoke to the fact to satisfy his personal vanity and ambition when his party

was a shade unpopular. In the years between 1856-70 the Australian statesman thought little of Federation. He was more of a log-roller, and could not see beyond the slip-rails of his own special colony. He was a narrow-minded man, most selfish, and sowed the seeds of inter-colonial discord by the imposition of petty and tyrannical tariffs, thus creating hatred and jealousy between colony and colony. The Colonies taxed each other just as if an English or Scotch county were to impose taxes along their respective boundary lines. A Gympie or Charters Towers digger going to Broken Hill had his luggage ransacked in Sydney, overstrewn at Albury, hauled about in Melbourne, rummaged at Serviceton, impounded for hours at Adelaide, and again ransacked at Cockburn, near Silverton. If a passenger bought a clean shirt in Albury, it was taxed going into Victoria. If a Tweed farmer sent up to Brisbane for six pounds of nails, it was detained in the Custom House if the captain of the steamer refused to pay the duty. If a Moama housewife bought six yards of calico at Echuca, over the river, it had to be taxed. The Victorian graziers had the presumption to send their store cattle under bond to eat the grass of New South Wales, yet if a Riverina farmer sent a mob of sheep into Victoria, the owners had to pay the stock tax. An Echuca printer influenced his Government to make a Moama printer pay *ad valorem* upon bill-heads and other job printing done for a Victorian storekeeper, not a mile away from the press. An Echuca firewood carter one morning crossed the Murray river into New South Wales for a load of wood. During the day his moke gave birth to a young donkey, and in going home at night his own colony taxed the new-born donkey. Such paltry cases of ultra-protection had long tended to

intensify the desire for Federation and the adoption of a policy of inter-colonial free trade and federation against the world.

Not only were hostile tariffs trying to foreignize the neighbouring Colonies, but other matters of a deep Federal nature were continually cropping up upon the surface of trade and politics, such as Colonial Federal defence, one set of law and county courts, one system of revenue and railway construction, the reduction of the cost of government, one post and telegraph system, one Governor-General, a new capital, the improvement of credit in London and elsewhere ; that the military and naval defence of Australia should be entrusted to Federal forces, under one command ; a Federal Supreme Court and a High Court of Appeal ; and above all things the power of being able to make Australian interests heard and respected in the councils of Downing Street and by other nations. The colonization of the great island being so recent, and all classes of colonists being daily engaged in clearing and sending the ploughshare through the scrub-forests, the people have ever been apathetic in regarding the exercise of the franchise as a birthright and national duty. "Who is going to pay me for the whole day I go voting for a windy member of parliament ? A day at home pays me better than riding fifty miles to poll my vote." I have heard such unpatriotic remarks frequently said in country electorates noted for magnificent distances. The value of intelligent thought and voting power is lost in many country districts, irrespective of the issue before the country. Except a few idle and dangerous Socialists, all the people have been ripe for Federation years ago, and have got disgusted with party leaders and party government for not having passed Federation after 1870, and especially after 1885. In

short, the leaders and not the people are to blame why the Commonwealth Bill of 1892 was not passed.

In 1853, Mr. W. C. Wentworth, in his report upon drafting the New South Wales Constitution, stated that some Federal measure was required to deal with inter-colonial questions as they arose, and proposed a General Assembly, to make laws of a Federal nature. In 1856, Sir Edward Dean Thompson, M.L.C., made a great Federal speech upon Federal government. In 1857, after the Crimean war and during the Indian Mutiny, Australians and others in Federal conclave in London strongly advised the creation of a Federal Assembly or Parliament, as "a bond of union for all the Colonies forming the Australian group," and that "it was the duty of the Imperial Government to anticipate the wants of its Colonies." In that same year the Victorians called aloud for "the Federation of the Colonies." They asked the four other Colonies to join hands to accomplish Federation, but the movement was knocked about Ministerial offices like a football, which Ministers never had the genius to kick into the Federal goal. Lord Clyde captured Lucknow, and Federal defence died out. The New Zealand war did not further the matter, as so many of her Majesty's ships and regiments in the Colonies made the people think they were safe from invasion. The federation of Canada failed to stir our statesmen up to a sense of union and strength. Now and then a Federal spirit would be made in Sydney or Melbourne simply to cover the tactics of party, like local government in New South Wales. Federation was dangled now and then before electors to keep them quiet until the next general election. At last conventions and conferences were held at Hobart, in Melbourne in 1890, and in Sydney in 1891. Admiral Tryon succeeded in getting the

Premiers to agree to an Australian Squadron, now obsolete in speed, guns, and size. Whenever Federation was mentioned in the country, it always was with feelings of patriotic zeal, warmth, and Australian affection for self and the grand old land between the Atlantic and German Oceans. The Melbourne Conference and Sydney Convention ended in the Commonwealth Bill being passed. Sir Henry Parkes and Sir R. G. Dibbs failed to pass it, owing to the fiscal question, and how Mr. Reid almost shelved it reminds us of a remark of Mark Twain—"We will not pursue the question further, as the reflection would be most painful."

Federation is wanted to protect our shores from aggression, and have a say in the settlement of everything Pacific. Had Australia been federated when Queensland annexed New Guinea and the French almost annexed New Hebrides, there would have been no Bismarckian Archipelago, nor a dual control in New Hebrides. Downing Street would not have given way to France and Germany. Had Federation been a fact, the Costa Rica packet case would have been promptly settled in the interests of Australia. A thousand and one things crop up which can very well be dealt with by a Federal parliament; for a confederacy of free and progressive Colonies to speak upon things national, life-giving, and ambitious with one solid voice is grand, noble, and dignified. That period of Colonial progress has gone past for the people to be ruled by mediocre representatives, parochial ideas, and Fabian legislation. Australia wants to be strong, progressive, and strong-brained, like the Dominion of Canada, the Cape Colonies, the United States, or the United Kingdom itself, to say nothing of the great historical lessons to be derived from German unity and Italian regeneration. The history

of the Spanish republics of South America all points to the dangers of disunion and hostile tariffs. Their strength and progress have been retarded by civil war and mock nationality. Their financial credit in London is base, whilst blood has watered these tropical provinces times without number. Fiscal questions are quite enough for these people to declare civil war, which cannot improve the tone or morals of a nation. Australians are not so degenerate yet, but hostile tariffs have created the germs of that bitter feeling now so restless and jealous between the Spanish republics. Disjointed colonies with small-brained parliaments will never bring forth the best thoughts, intellect, and respectable-ness of the Colonies to stand for parliamentary honours and the higher qualifications for responsible administra-tion. The tone and language of the little forum prevents good men from contesting election combats. The higher thought of cultural minds will always enrich the tone of debate and the soundness of legislation—from the vulgarity of a Sleath and Bradlaugh to the noble-mindedness of a Brougham and a Gladstone.

Federation in Australia has been frequently retarded by the ultra language of its political leaders. "Federation with me," once said a New South Wales Premier, "means separation from the old country. Why should we be mixed up in the broils and wars of England? We want no Imperialism." Of course this was to catch the one man one vote at the next election. These remarks are quite common amongst legislators who degrade themselves as men, and subordinate themselves, as Britishers, for the sake of party votes. They are all for party, and not the State. One has to reside in Australia to find out how party politics can dwarf the mind and degrade the honesty of public utterance. Such men are cowards

who seek by word or deed to evade a patriotic duty, and to take their share of the risk, responsibility, victory, or defeat of progressive empire. Such a sentiment can only spring from an ignoble spirit, overweening vanity, and a running away from the first duties of Colonial statesmanship. In the face of danger or a war with a foreign Power, the spirit of the race is to place their internal differences over some third-rate question in an iron safe, stand shoulder to shoulder, make the best and bravest fight against the Queen's enemies, until the war is over. In the event of war, the labour leaders who gull the unions with boldness of speech and fiery denunciation, should be all deported to Norfolk Island, to experiment upon their forms of social government. Mr. Reid, Premier of New South Wales, has at last concluded that "the Colonies should unite calmly and deliberately without any foreign influence or threat ; that if we did not choose a time when we could unite calmly and deliberately, the time must come when we must be driven to come together by the shock of foreign danger. He hoped to see Federation come to pass without any threat to our liberty—come to pass in a time of peace. The greatest political triumph would be a firm, fair, and friendly uniting of these great Australian Colonies." Every subject should hear the Australian and Imperial burden and danger, and look all responsibilities in the face. Canada, India, and the Cape have declared their intention to defend the standards with their best blood and treasure, even the Maoris of New Zealand volunteered for the same object, and I know when the bugle-call and drum-roll is heard—when the Queen announces by proclamation that she wants the whole strength of empire, the call to arms of her Majesty will be responded to with the glorious British *Hurrah!* throughout Australia.

CHAPTER XIII

WHAT SORT OF AN ARMY DO WE WANT?

WHAT sort of a Federal army do the Colonies want? A paid army or a volunteer army—which? The tax-payer may exclaim: "We want no army at all." I should also like to do away with standing armies, if all the nations of the earth would agree to do the same. But then they will not, nor are likely to agree to a complete disarmament. Cromwell tried the experiment and failed, and in the siege of Charles II. European affairs of that period forced the great Powers to maintain a standing army, simply because they found the truth to be, that, to be successful in war the army must be organized, disciplined, and ready for war during peace. Rough-hew it how one will, the martial truism always stares the wise statesman in the face. It is sad to think of the time lost by Marlborough in drilling his armies before he took the field, of how Wellington was hampered in the Peninsula by the want of discipline amongst the Spanish forces, and of how Lord Raglan was sent to the Crimea with a grand rank and file, but with an inefficient staff and a wretched army organization. Austria, France, Turkey, and China suffered hard from the want of complete war readiness, whilst Germany and Japan were victorious because they were

ready for war in every department. The Federal army of Australia when wanted must be found ready, well found in every department, "fit to go anywhere and do anything," as the Iron Duke once said. That is the sort of army we want in the Colonies—to join hands with the outer Imperial forces for the purposes of combined defence or offence.

The great expense of a modern army under the British flag at home or in the Colonies, compared with a European army, almost precludes Australia from having a large permanent or regular force under arms, owing to the high rate of wages, the cost of living, and the unintelligent military opinion of many who should know better. I always pity Commandants and Ministers for Defence in getting the Estimates passed through the Assemblies. The whole question resolves itself into one of cost. The idea of looking upon the Estimates as only the price of self-defence assurance is scouted by the socialistic demon member. His socialistic bigotry and small-brainedness will not allow him to become a noble patriot of his country. "Confound the country!" says he; "what has the country done for me?" There his wisdom and legislative intelligence ends, amidst the amen cheers of the revolutionary Cave of Adullam. But in the face of the world's affairs every State on earth must have its defence force. There is no getting out of the positive proposition, and it would be dangerous, if not fatal and unpractical economy if there was only a defence force unprepared for sudden war. It will take a deal of hard hammering to convince the negative or thick-heads of the radical and labour members of this higher Colonial statesmanship. Above all things there must be a sound, reliable, paid, and permanent Staff Corps. It is the *brain* of a defence force, and if the Staff officers

know their war-duty in peace-time, we are not afraid of the rank and file becoming an invincible army. Therefore the Legislative Assembly should never begrudge the cost of a good yet economical staff, and a Staff College. To hit the exact Federal defence system for Australasia, upon a simple, definite, and highly workable plan is the great object—the *campus philosophorum* of all statesmen.

Again, the question comes up—Do we wish an army of disciplined soldiers or half-drilled citizen-soldiers, or an army composed of a small force of highly-trained and disciplined soldiers, or a large irregular force of drilled colonists, with a day or two's experience of field operations at Easter time? “To be or not to be ; that is the question,” is the nut for each Colonial Parliament to crack. The British army in the United Kingdom and in India aims to be the perfect disciplined army over the numerous drilled army—“men with muskets.” The first two years of the civil war in America saw an armed mob that met to kill each other without organization. The French mobile armies and the “brave” rabbles of China were only food for powder, troops that melted away in battle like snow off a dyke. I do not believe in the short service system, not even for the Volunteer force. A regular soldier cannot be made in three years, Militiamen nor a Volunteer in, say, thirty days' drill per annum. Rome was not made in a day, nor are soldiers either. It is a long, constant, and continuous process, both on the parade-ground or in camp, of training exercise. We all know the opinions of Wellington, Burgoyne, Moore, Soult, Napoleon, Frederick, Clyde, Alison, and Roberts on the question of short *v.* long service. Wolseley and the German Emperor, however, prefer the short service system, which in a great long war must

break down before the steady and conquering rush and battle fire of twenty-one years' service soldiers. "I want soldiers—not boys," cried Wellington in Spain, when he saw a new regiment reinforce him. "A young drilled army will only melt away by disease in a campaign. Old soldiers give stability to victory," said Sir John Burgoyne in the Crimea, "as they can march, endure, and fight." Pitt commanded a Volunteer Brigade at Ramsgate. When Napoleon desired to invade England he asked Sir John Moore "where to draw up his drilled brigade in the event of a landing?" "Do you see that hill over yonder? Post yourself there, and let the regular troops do the work—your men are not disciplined yet," replied the hero of Egypt. "Give me French troops led by British officers," said Napoleon, "and I will conquer the world." Lord Clyde had a horror of raw young soldiers in the field. The Duke of Clarence was once reviewing the 98th Regiment in the Phoenix Park, Dublin, when a smart shower came on. The other corps took refuge under the trees. An aide-de-camp rode up to Sir Colin Campbell and said—"His Royal Highness desires that you take the 98th under shelter till the rain is over." To the old hero's mind it was something like the Chinese general asking the Japanese general "to stop firing until the rain went off. Don't you see we have got our umbrellas up?" Campbell looked at the royal aide-de-camp and replied—"Tell his Royal Highness that I have taken time to steady, and trouble to discipline, the 98th, and I will make them unsteady for no man living." They stood in the rain, at ease.

During the Indian Mutiny, Sir Colin was always alarmed lest the War Office should send out after him Crimean regiments with sixty per cent. of new recruits to withstand the heavy sun, marching, fighting, and try-

ing climate. Hot work unduly fell upon the 93rd, as they were seasoned and experienced soldiers, but he had "confidence" in them. Whatever system is adopted, Australia wants confidence in its costly Federal defence force. The regiments that went to Abyssinia under Lord Napier, and to Coomassie under Lord Wolseley, were specially picked and seasoned soldiers. Wolseley likes the short-service system. When Lord Roberts made his dive into Afghanistan, after forcing the Peiwar Kotal, he left a young British regiment behind him, rather than melt it away by hardships and winter privations. A general never knows what will turn up in a battle campaign, and a Colonial regular army must be seasoned and long-serviced, with discipline as well as drill. "Drill," said Sir C. J. Napier, "teaches the body to move with exactness as to time and place. Discipline does for the mind what drill does for the body. Without both an army must be defeated. Without obedience neither can exist. Their essence must be produced by *force of habit.*" General Sir A. Alison says—"Discipline is the distinctive mark separating the young and old soldier. When the soldier has come to rank the honour of his corps above all else, when public opinion has become to him the voice of his comrades, when obedience to superior authority is a condition of his being and submission to his officers a law of his nature, when the army becomes his home and the discharge of duty his highest earthly object,—then, and not till then, has he become a soldier in this sense." Lord Roberts since his return from India, in several speeches and addresses, has impressed Regular and Volunteer troops to study, and deeply learn drill, discipline, shooting, and battle tactics. With regard to *drill* Sir A. Alison states—"Drill is a bodily exercise which the common soldier requires to



GENERAL SIR ARCHIBALD ALISON, BART., G.C.B., R.E.

The Author is deeply indebted to Sir Archibald for his valuable work upon *Army Organization*, and his great interest in Federal Defence. His eldest son, Captain Alison, served as A.D.C. to the Governor of Western Australia; and his son-in-law, Captain J. A. Baker, R.N., has served in Australia. Sir Archibald Alison should be the first Federal Commander-in-Chief of Australia, as he is such an able military organizer and administrator.

know in order to execute. All the manœuvres of the drill-book any man can learn in a few months. If it is all that is required, carefully-trained Volunteers may perform all the duties of the Old Guard of Napoleon in a year, and the military experience of all generals in all ages is a myth and a delusion." Discipline is wanted.

Sir Archibald says that "one old regiment is equal to three young regiments," and, quoting Napoleon, "that moral power is to physical power as three to one in war." Alison also terms a regiment of old soldiers as the *priceless heritage* of confidence and experience, which long service can only give, and which a G.O.C. can "trust on the war-power of the engine he is employing." It is only old heroes that know the *true value of discipline in war*. Young soldiers broke down the Moscow campaign, and the defeats of Frederick were also marked when his ranks were recruited by young Prussian soldiers. "With undisciplined troops," said Wellington, "you have no confidence; on the contrary, the chances are that they will do the very reverse of what they are ordered to do." The famous charge made by the 80th Regiment at Ferozeshah could only have been done by long-service troops. The career of the 10th Foot in the Punjab and India; of the Sikhs, 75th, 60th, 64th, 78th Rifles, and Bengal Fusiliers during the Mutiny, was "beyond all Greek, beyond all Roman fame." In a Federal army of Australia it is impossible to get this high state of drill and discipline, as to a large extent it must be a Militia and Volunteer army, with its officers and instructors well up in teaching, in strategy and tactics. The first is the science and the second is the art of war. Lord Wolseley hopes that the Volunteer army will go more and more into the field for tactical operations and battle discipline. He also says that drill

must not be neglected, as field tactics and discipline firstly depend upon drill. Country corps study both freely, as soldiers could not run nor advance before they could walk. "Drill," says the hero of Tel-el-Kebir, "not only disciplines a body of men, but it teaches them what is the greatest and most essential in the rudiments of their calling—*obedience*." I have quoted several authorities to pave the way for the idea of an almost Volunteer Federal army, the details of which are worked out later on. We must strive to reduce the cost of defence combined with numbers, drill, discipline, and efficiency, to make it a great engine of Australasian defence or offence in the hands of a great and experienced British commander-in-chief like Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., Sir Henry Brackenbury, or Major-General Maurice, C.B., R.A.

A long-service corps is cheaper than a short-service system. A Conscription army is costly in the long run, and should never be called out if possible, as it would take so many persons from their homes, families, and occupations. A popular Volunteer system, with Regulars and Militia, will fall cheaply upon the Federal State, provided that a Staff College and a Staff Corps are kept up to the modern standard of organized warfare. It will ease the Treasury, and shut the mouths of degenerate Anglo-Saxons and Celts in Australia. If Australia was Republican to-morrow, the cost of Federal defence would be greater, and less secure than under the British flag. The patriotic intelligence of an army improves its discipline and steady battle power, whilst its voluntary recruitment is equal to three times the value of a Conscript army. An Active army, as I have outlined, will not derange the rate of wages, nor yet give up the freedom of a large number of men. The

Militia system is also inexpensive to the State in peace time, in fact, the short days of training give the men a holiday and a month's fresh air, sending them back to office or workshop fresher, and more healthy men. One year of such service is better than the two years' service of conscription in Europe, as it takes four years to make a soldier. The Australian system will make him a soldier without taking him away from his usual avocations. The fighting machine would be more efficient, and superior to several European armies and navies. The long wash of Austral shores are our frontiers, and the coastal system provides a good defence. The Active army is sufficient in peace, but it could be quickly stiffened for offence or defence by recruiting or volunteering. Alison, Mahan, and Froude all endorse the saying of Montesquieu that "no nation ever yet rose to greatness except through institutions suited to and resulting from its national character." I trust that my system of Federal defence will highly suit the Australian character and institutions in warlike matters, which, however, can be further improved by careful discipline and organization.

The War Office Defence Committee recommended for several years the urgent necessity of Federal defence in Australia. It suggested that "in the event of a great war the military resources of the Empire will be heavily taxed, and the responsibility for land defence must necessarily rest with the Colonies, which have willingly accepted it. In the present day war may break out at very short notice. It would then be too late to assemble Federal committees to decide how the Colonies should best assist each other; that ought to be done now without further delay." The question should now be one for statesmen, as the professional men have settled the matter in conference long ago. But Federal defence

in Australia will not only depend upon numbers and as long service as possible, but upon what General Hutton explained to his officers in 1893—"Two great points in connection with a military system were these: organization and discipline. By organization he meant the machinery. They had the *personnel* of a military force to perfection. He had never seen finer men in his life than he had seen here. But organization was necessary to make men capable of performing in war the functions taught them in peace. Without organization—that was to say, without administration—nothing could be done with an army. Discipline was of many kinds. His own view of discipline was this: If they had perfect discipline they had perfect command and obedience from the commanding officer, through the intermediate officers, to the rank and file, and between the whole of the army. If they were going to have a high standard of discipline they must have a high standard of knowledge on the part of the officers who were to maintain that discipline. Knowledge was power—of more power, perhaps, in the army than elsewhere. Discipline meant superior knowledge on the part of those who commanded. Strength of will was another point. But unless the officers had knowledge their power was small. Strength of will was of enormous advantage, and might almost compensate for the loss of knowledge, but for one who had that power which would compensate for lack of knowledge, there were vast numbers who did not possess it."

CHAPTER XIV

A FEDERAL DEFENCE SCHEME

THE scheme of Federal defence was formulated by me three months before the holding of the last Sydney Commandants' Conference, and the reader will see that it fixed the Permanent Federal force at 5000. I fixed it at 5500, but I trust there will be no two armies of defence such as a Permanent force, and also a Local force. Such a system would not work, and would give rise to a great deal of friction. It will be seen upon reflection that my scheme is the best, and will work out well upon a population basis. Every corps, battery, troop, regiment, brigade, or division must be Federal, no matter whether they be Permanent, Militia, Volunteers, Army Reserves, National Guards, Rifle Club, Cadet, or Conscript Reserves. Local troops must be raised and organized upon a territorial yet Federal system.

The first or initial cost of armament is the cheapest, but I am astonished at the fatal decision of the Premiers' Conference to adopt a Cordite instead of Normal Smokeless Powder for war, when cordite powder is considered dangerous to handle in a heat temperature of 110 degrees; when normal powder is cleaner, and can stand a tropical temperature as high as 180 degrees of heat. Such a resolution should be rescinded at once.

The idea of having two bodies of troops in one colony is unmilitary, will provoke petty jealousy, and not improve Federal discipline nor organization. A Small-Arms Factory will be found useful and economical. The Lee-Metford rifle must be adopted with caution.

In drafting a new Naval and Military Defence Act for federated Australia, all the other existing Defence Acts must be repealed or cancelled, and to remain a dead letter, provided it shall not affect pensions or anything of a legal nature. The new name and title shall be—"The Federal Defence Act of Australasia, 1897," divided into (1) the Naval Defence forces, (2) the Military forces, both directed by the Federal Defence Council. The Federal Governor-General to be Commander-in-Chief in the name of the Sovereign. The military Commander-in-Chief in Australia to be an experienced Lieutenant-General of the Imperial army, selected every five years by the War Office, London. The naval Commander-in-Chief to be an experienced Senior Captain of the Royal Navy, with the rank of Commodore, and in war-time to be under the instructions of the Imperial Naval Commander-in-Chief on the Australian station. The Council of War to be advised in all matters connected with naval and military defence, the whole to deliberate, resolve upon, and manage in a wise and patriotic manner the best schemes of Federal organization, discipline, mobilization, and defence. The Lieutenant-General commanding, in his relations with the Council of Federal Defence and the Minister for Defence, to be ruled and regulated on lines similar, as far as possible, to those recently adopted by the War Office, in London.

The military forces shall consist of a Permanent force, Militia and Volunteer forces, Active Reserves,

Rifle Club Reserves, and two Conscript Levies—the Permanent force, Militia, Volunteers, Active Reserves, and Rifle Club Reserves to be termed the Peace or Active army, and the Conscript Levies to be called out by proclamation to increase the greatest war strength of the Australasian army, and only in the event of the Peace or Active army being defeated by invaders. A Staff Corps of officers must pass the Staff College before they can hold a Staff appointment or chief command, as Brigadier or Commandant, of any military district or defence section of the coast.

The Regular portion of the Permanent army to consist of the Staff, Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, Field Artillery, Garrison Artillery, Submarine Miners, a Torpedo Corps, Engineers, Medical, Army Service, and Telegraph Corps; and a model Australian Infantry Regiment—the whole Regulars totalizing a force of 5300 (see tabulated statement, p. 215). The Militia force of 11,500 men will form the *first* Active army in support of the Regulars engaged in fortress, harbour, or coast defence; to consist of Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, Field and Garrison Artillery, Engineers, Submarine Miners; Torpedo, Medical, Army Service, Telegraph, Railway, and Cyclist Corps; Active Reserves, Rifle Club Reserves, and fully-disciplined Infantry Regiments. The Volunteer force of 34,000 men, to form the *second* Active army in support of the Regulars or Militia in coast or field operations, to consist of corps and regiments similar to those of the Militia. This will make an Active army for Federal defence fit “to go anywhere and do anything,” of 50,800 officers and men.

The extreme war footing of the Federal defence force will only be called out as a last patriotic effort and determined resolve to defeat the invader, or die in the

attempt. I do not propose to provide in any defence cost or estimates for the existence of such an embryo force, as it can only be called out in the event of England having lost command of the sea, or the enemy in such a position as to land several huge army corps to conquer the Colonies for the sake of its trade, mineral and productive wealth ; yet in a general scheme of deliberate Federal defence, the Conscription armies should exist upon something more than paper. The Conscription army, however repulsive to the manly, ready, and patriotic British nation, must exist as the ulterior lines of Federal defence. The first Conscription army of 50,000 should be drawn for, like jurymen, out of all able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-five years of age ; and the second Conscription army of 50,000 (or more) be formed in a similar manner from between the ages of eighteen to fifty years of age (see tabulated statement, p. 215).

All present members of any of the inter-colonial forces to be commissioned, recruited, and enrolled afresh under the new Federal Defence Act, should they desire to continue as defenders of their country. Militia and Volunteer officers and men can resign by giving three months' notice after the new Act is in force. Under the new Act officers can resign in the usual way, but enlistment of men for the Regular force must be for twenty-one years, *i. e.* ten years with the guns or colours, and eleven years in the Active Reserve, as per pay schedules. Men of good conduct, sobriety, and proved honesty, after serving twenty-one years to have the first chance of employment in the Post, Telegraph, Police, Railway, or other civil departments as sorters, messengers, carriers, artisans, guardsmen, porters, fettlers, or other suitable employment. Any ex-member of the Imperial army or

navy to be admitted into the Federal force Reserves upon producing honourable papers of discharge. Officers of the Permanent force shall rank in precedence to those of the Militia, Volunteer, and Reserve forces, but officers of the three latter forces shall be equal in rank.

The Governor-General, in the name of the Sovereign, shall from time to time be empowered to raise, call together, arm, organize, equip, drill, and discipline the said military force ; also to raise, call together, arm, drill, and discipline a naval force ; and also to build war-ships for a Federal navy, upon the advice of the Federal Cabinet and Parliament. Power should also be given to any Volunteer contingent to engage, co-operate with, or help a British colony or territory engaged in war declared by the Crown against a foreign State, or in support of the general defence of the Empire.

The Governor-General and Federal Government to have power in their wisdom to dispatch a combined force to any point of danger or offence within striking or objective distance of Australasia, which in the opinion of the Admiral or Lieutenant-General would be advantageous to the Colonies or Empire in bringing about the defeat of any enemy, or the early close of the war. The Act to provide for the free movement of any troops within the Colonies from one point to another, according to the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief, in Australasia.

All members of the police force to be included in the conscriptive sections of the Act, their places to be filled by special constables during war. Foreigners after five years' residence in the Colonies must become naturalized, and be subject to the law of conscription ; the gates of promotion and the emoluments of retirement to be open to them, like any British subject. All recruits

must be bodily healthy. The only exemptions from war service being the Judges, the members and officers of Parliament (if they like), the heads of departments, special magistrates, the clergy, the governors and staffs of gaols, asylums, and hospitals, railway employés (unless members of Railway Corps), medical doctors not on the army or navy lists, seamen on board mail steamers, members of the Conscript army, the son of a widow, infirm persons certified by a *bonâ fide* doctor, or an ex-officer of the Imperial or Federal army in any grade lower than his previous rank. Voluntary substitutes to be only allowed in the case of widowers or married men with large families. The mobilization of the Active, Reserve, and Conscript forces to be done by the proclamation of the Governor-General.

Each Colony, State, or Province to raise a naval and military strength, as per schedule on p. 216, and the districts to be divided into metropolitan, district, and sub-district military or naval commands. The territorial system to be adhered to as much as possible, so that officers and men of the Active, Reserve, and Conscript forces may be near to their daily avocations and families. The Head-quarters Staff to arrange, fix, or alter all boundaries of command in any colony or district. Enrolment officers to be appointed for the Peace army under the Inspector-General of Recruits. All men fit and liable by law to serve, must present themselves within twenty-four hours after proclamation, or by telegraphing, if at a distance, that they are *en route* to do so, or a penalty of £25 will be imposed. All conscripts must sign their district enrolment rolls, to prevent confusion and perhaps punishments. A correct copy of the roll must be sent to the Adjutant-General's Office, head-quarters. All persons on the roll are held

liable to serve when called upon. False information as to age or qualifications will be punished. Should only a portion of conscripts be wanted by the Governor-General, the Lieutenant-Governor will fix the quota of men to be raised by drawing. The distribution of the Regular forces will be left to the Head-quarters Staff, and the locative schemes of the Militia, Volunteers, and Reserves to the Commandants Staff of Colonies, subject to the approval of the Lieutenant-General, the Adjutant-General, and Quartermaster-General. Camps of exercise, field operations, and continuous training to be had as often as possible by order of the G.O.C. The Militia should have forty days, the Volunteers thirty, and the Reserves fifteen days of field drill and discipline per annum, the rates of pay to be fixed by the Council of War, and voted by Parliament. No pay should be paid unless the number of days' training has been fulfilled. When called out for war, the pay to be increased on the scale allowed for Imperial troops serving at the Cape or in India. The Queen's Regulations to rule the forces in the field during the period of war or actual invasion. Militiamen shall serve for seven years and Volunteers for five years, but can remain in the service as long as they please by re-enrolment, until the age of sixty years. During war or invasion no master will be allowed to cancel the agreement of any servant called to the ranks of any corps or regiment of the defence force. The rights and claims of miners, mining property, etc., to be protected if the owners or leaseholders are engaged during drill, camps, or war. The Governor-General to have power to call a mobilization of the Federal Defence force by proclamation in any Colony or district. A full day's drill or parade to be not less than five hours, a half-

day not less than three hours, and an annual inspection, four hours' shooting, an encampment under tents or field manœuvres for any part of a day to rank as one day. If a corps is badly behind in drill and shooting, the G.O.C. to have power to disband the regiment, company, troop, or battery. The absence of a member of the defence force at drill or camp will protect him from any loss in law-courts or business engagements, when so employed in State service. Leave of absence to be obtained by officers and men as formerly. Militiamen, Volunteers, Reserve men, etc., desirous of leaving one Colony to live in another can do so by giving notice and becoming a member of a district corps in the district he desires to reside in.

The Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief to appoint and promote all officers and warrant officers on behalf of the Governor-General, the brigadiers and commandants of Colonies and districts to nominate local officers for the G.O.C.'s approval and order to be gazetted. Commanding officers of corps, troops, companies, or batteries to select and appoint their own superior non-commissioned officers from lance-corporals to sergeants. The commission of any officer, warrant or non-commissioned officer, may be cancelled at pleasure, and their places filled in the usual manner. Officers and non-commissioned officers shall have relative rank, and take precedence amongst themselves as in the Imperial army, without being senior to those of that army. The details of transfers, resignations, etc., may be left to the Headquarters Staff.

All members of the Federal defence force to be under the Imperial Army Act and the Queen's Regulations now in force. A good soldier will always study the said Act, rules, regulations, articles, provisions, discipline,

etc., applicable to his rank. The Act to be altered to admit and enforce provisions for the better recruitment, training, discipline, promotion, organization, and government of the forces from time to time, or for dismissals or disbandments, according to the provisions of the Act. The G.O.C. to be responsible for enforcing all the provisions and regulations of the Act. All existing regulations to remain in force until the new ones are gazetted in the Federal and inter-colonial *Gazettes*.

Every militiaman and volunteer mounted must provide his own horse, feed and stable it, unless whilst in special camp, or during a campaign. The Governor-General in Council to fix pay, prizes, and allowances, subject to the approval of Parliament. It is much better to fix the regimental pay, etc., of officers and men upon a permanent scale, so that members with a grudge against some deserving officer or corps will not be so much subject to insult, and ignorant attack in Parliament. Officers and men preferring special service should be paid for same like any other person. The army pay in peace or war to be a contract between the State and the defence force, and no subsequent vote of Parliament should break a contract with officers or men. Reduced or increased pay, according to passive circumstances, might safely be left to rules and regulations.

The Militia pay might be: for a lieutenant-colonel, £15; major, £10; captain, £7 10s.; lieutenant, £6 10s.; for sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, and colour-sergeant, £6; sergeant, £5 10s.; corporal, £5 5s.; bombardier or lance-corporal, £5; trooper, gunner, or private, £4 15s.; trumpeter, bugler, or drummer, £3; exclusive of clothing, arms, belts, and ammunition. The Volunteer pay should be exactly half the above,

exclusive of clothing, arms, belts, and ammunition. The Reserve forces should receive a fourth of the Militia pay, with arms and ammunition.

During war the daily rates of pay should be, for all those engaged in the field: lieutenant-colonel, 30s.; major, 27s. 6d.; captain, 25s.; lieutenant, 20s.; sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant, and colour-sergeant, 12s. 6d.; sergeant, 10s.; corporal, 7s. 6d.; bombardier or lance-corporal, 7s.; trooper, gunner, or private, 5s.; bugler, trumpeter, or drummer, 4s., with rations. A scale of pensions to wives and families on account of married men, sons of widows, or brothers the only support of unmarried sisters who fell in action should be introduced. All pay during peace or war to be paid sharp every month. No member of Parliament shall receive pay in the forces if he receives pay for parliamentary services per annum, excepting for uniform, arms, belts, ammunition, rations and fodder (during war).

The Government supply all arms, uniform, belts, cartridges, caps, or regimental equipment, including transit, ration, ammunition, and baggage wagons, apart from the Army Service Corps. In peace-time prize-money should be voted by the State for range and service shooting. In war-time the whole forces in the field should be fed and housed (tented) by the Federal State. After service, the clothing to remain the property of the soldier.

The details of the Rifle and Artillery Ranges, and of the Medical, Army Service, Civil, and other corps may be left to the heads of departments, as they must be regulated by the Head-quarters Staff. The financial, pay, and clerical departments are all important, both in a public, civilian, and parliamentary sense, and which we treat of upon another page.

The Governor-General to call out the Federal forces, or any portion thereof, by proclamation if for service to defeat invasion in any part of the Federal State or its dependencies. Although a soldier's duty is not to act the part of a policeman, the Governor-General should have power to call out any part of the forces to put down large riots, rebellions, or insurrections. Members of the forces must forget political strife for a time, and obey the call of duty to maintain law and order, failing which they are to be dealt with according to the rules and regulations of the Army Act. The Federal forces of any Colony to at once obey the general orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief, who has power to remove any corps, battery, or regiment from one Colony to another, and to brigade or re-organize them with any part or portion of the Federal army, to defeat the common enemy, for public State occasions, or any assembly for military parade. All officers and men, of every branch and arm of the service, must give the G.O.C. and his commanding officers their whole response, confidence, attention, discipline, and prompt obedience when under arms in peace or war. All calls for drills, parades, and mobilization must be attended to as if it were "a rush to arms." When the Active, Cadet, and Rifle Reserves are called out, each Reservist should be able to join his corps in twenty-four hours, so that it may be able to go forth and meet the foe with its united and complete strength. Certified sickness should be the only excuse for the absence of a Reservist from the ranks of war. The G.O.C.'s orders to move, divide, or re-organize the divisions should be obeyed—"their's not to reason why; their's but to do and die," like the noble six hundred of Balaclava. If any member of the Federal defence force failed to answer the call of

naval or military duty, unless prevented by infirmity, the proof of which shall lie on him—he shall be deemed a deserter, and punished accordingly. All military requisitions made by a commander's order upon civilians in town or country, to enable him to carry out the operations of the force or forces under his command, must be properly obeyed, neglecting which orders they may be fined or imprisoned. Any person refusing to furnish any cart, animal, boat, car, engine, etc., required for military operations and transit purposes, to be fined £100, or one year's imprisonment. I will pass over the subjects of courts-martial, Boards of Inquiry, sentences, appeals, etc.

When a conscription is called, the men will not be enrolled for service outside of Australasia. Men who decline to be balloted for will become Volunteers, and may join the Volunteer army at the front. All officers and men must take the oath or declaration that they will be true to Queen and Australia under the Federal Defence Act. The ballot will be the placing of the names of all men liable to serve as conscripts upon respective cards in a cylindrical box, which is turned round now and again, and a boy to pull out a sufficient number of cards until the number of men wanted by proclamation has been reached. The accepted men to be drilled and sent to corps as the Inspector-General of Recruits directs. One son of a large family to be exempt from the ballot-box. Conscripts shall serve until the war or invasion is ended, and notified by the Governor-General. Employers of labour cannot alter or rescind any agreement made with his servant before the war, *i. e.* when the war is over he gets back his old situation. Any balloted man who refuses to take the oath or refuses to be sworn, to be guilty of misdemeanour, and subject

to one year's imprisonment with hard labour ; and upon subsequent refusal to take the oath, to two years with hard labour. Any person refusing to give information, or giving false information, to the enrolment officer to be fined £5 for each offence. Any person refusing to be enrolled for conscription to be fined £50 for each offence. The personator of any officer or soldier on parade will be liable to receive six months with hard labour. Any person resisting conscription by proclamation, or who aids the conscript in refusing the call of duty, who counsels a man not to appear at the rendezvous, or who wilfully advises him to neglect any duty required of him, shall be subjected to a £20 fine, with or without imprisonment for six months. Any person who advises or aids a conscript to desert shall be liable to six months in gaol with hard labour. Any person bringing the uniform into contempt to be fined £20, or six months in gaol.

Such are the leading points of the Federal army we want, minus many items of detail.

CHAPTER XV

STRENGTH OF THE FEDERAL ARMY

IN the following estimate of the military strength of the Federal army, I have based the *main* defence of Australasia upon (1) the smallest Permanent force possible, (2) the Militia, (3) the Volunteer, and (4) the Conscription systems. My object has been to design or draft out a scheme entailing little cost to the country without sacrificing much efficiency. I place value upon a large and highly-trained plane for all branches of the Federal service. A perfect and practical Staff Corps of officers and warrant-officer instructors must be kept up during peace, and the three hundred gentlemen will have enough to do in drilling and disciplining 50,800 troops of a citizen army. The Indian Staff Corps is a brilliant demonstration of what a Staff Corps of military educated officers should be. I will point out the difference between a disciplined and a purely citizen army of soldiers. There must be a base upon which to build up the edifices of drill, discipline, and organization. The tables I have drawn up, after great care and collected data, are the foundation of what I shall term the Federal army we want in Australasia. I have divided the defence force into a peace footing and a war footing. The total number for a peace footing is calculated upon

what the population will be in five years hence, and the 50,800 troops of all arms should be quite sufficient to repel any invasion, provided that our railways are available, and the enemy kept well pinned to the coast—or rather, to the offing of any landing-place. I do not think in our generation that a foreign Power from Europe could concentrate a military force for Australian invasion above 15,000 men; yet Japan is strong and well organized. If an enemy landed, I do not think he would see his ships again, owing to the presence of a Federal force which must be mobile, elastic, and highly trained. However, 50,800 troops, as set forth, and well armed, should be able to defeat twice their number.

THE FEDERAL ARMY OF AUSTRALASIA.

THE MILITARY STRENGTH ON A PEACE AND WAR FOOTING

		Permanent.	Militia.	Volunteers.	Total Peace Footing.	First Conscription.	Second Conscription.	Total War Footing.
Staff—all branches	...	300	—	—	300	500	500	1,300
Cavalry	...	300	1,000	1,000	2,300	1,000	1,000	4,300
Mounted Infantry	...	300	1,000	2,000	3,300	2,000	2,000	7,300
Field Artillery	...	500	1,000	2,000	3,500	3,000	3,000	9,500
Garrison and Fortress Artillery	...	2,500	3,000	3,000	8,500	1,000	1,000	10,500
Submarine Miners and Torpedo Corps	...	100	500	1,500	2,100	—	—	2,100
Australian Guards Regiment	...	1,000	—	—	1,000	—	—	1,000
Army Service Corps	...	100	250	250	600	1,500	1,500	3,600
Medical Corps	...	100	250	250	600	500	500	1,600
Engineers, etc.	...	100	500	1,500	2,100	2,000	2,000	5,100
Army Reserves	...	—	—	5,000	5,000	—	—	5,000
Rifle Clubs and Cadets	...	—	—	13,000	13,000	—	—	13,000
Infantry	...	—	4,000	4,500	8,500	38,500	38,500	85,500
		5,300	11,500	34,000	50,800	50,000	50,000	150,800

Peace Footing 50,800

War Footing " " " " 150,800

DISTRIBUTION.

		Peace.	War.
New South Wales	10,500	30,500
Victoria	10,000	29,500
New Zealand	8,300	24,500
Queensland	6,500	19,800
South Australia	6,000	18,000
West Australia	4,500	13,500
Tasmania	4,000	12,000
Fiji	1,000	3,000
		<hr/> 50,800	<hr/> 150,800

The naval Federal strength will be found in the naval chapters.

It will be seen that I have totalized the Permanent Infantry at 1000 men, under the name of the Royal Australian Guards Regiment. I propose that this regiment should be equal to the Guards of the Household Brigade, the Rifle Brigade, or the Black Watch for good conduct, drill, discipline, and heroic resolution. It should consist of ten companies of 100 rank and file; three quartered in Sydney and three in Melbourne, and one each in Brisbane, Adelaide, Wellington, and Auckland. This regiment should be drilled and disciplined to perfection, and take part in any State demonstration where they may be quartered. Battles will be won as of old by the big infantry battalions, armed with magazine rifles, and animated with the heroic ardour of their forefathers under the Black Prince, Marlborough, Wellington, and Lord Clyde. The soldier is still made on the parade-ground, but he becomes as perfect as possible in field training and camps of instruction, learning not only drill, discipline, and obedience to command, but also to realize and think out for himself the object of war. The infantry must be trained in battle-firing, and to die in the face of modern fire, if need be, in defence of Queen and country. It will be noted that the Engineers,

Active Reserves, Rifle Club Reserves, and the Cadets are infantry numbering on a peace footing 28,600, and on an ulterior war footing 109,500 men. These infantry corps must be raised and quartered territorially, or as much as possible in the places where the men work and reside. Regiments should be numbered from 1 upwards, such as the 1st Sydney Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Melbourne Regiment, the 8th Bendigo Rangers, the 10th Auckland Fusiliers, the 14th Bathurst Rangers, the 15th Queen's Own, the 20th Riverina Rifles, and so on. Country companies can be formed into regiments in some central town. I have merely guessed the inter-colonial distribution of troops, basing my figures upon the probable population by the time that the Federal Defence Act comes into force and operation. Apart from the Reserves, Rifle Clubs, and Cadets, I try to be effective in infantry strength, combined with economy in the interests of the general taxpayer, who after all must decide the strength of the Active army. The Militia infantry is set down at 4000 men, and 4500 men for the Volunteers, or a total of 8500. The really paid force will be 5300 Regulars, as the small pay of the Militia and Volunteers can hardly be refused by any wise Parliament, or by the people, who must pay for the defence of their lives, property, capital, liberty, freedom, and national independence. As a rule soldiers do not serve for pay. I hope that the courses of instruction for both officers and men will be continued and faithfully attended, as education in all the three arms of the service makes the well-trained and highly-educated Colonial soldier. With a high standard of general and military intelligence in the naval and military force, Federal defence should be made sure, perfect, and successful, a credit to the Colonies and

the Empire. I know that my figures will be cut and carved by dwarfish legislators, mediocre journalists, itinerary statesmen, and, perhaps, by an overweening Staff officer, but I respectfully submit that the Colonies of Australasia are not safe from invasion without a well-disciplined Peace or Active army of 50,800 men, to meet the battle strength and destructive power of that invasion, which, if it comes at all, will be numerous, powerful, and splendidly disciplined. I repudiate the idea of the Commandants Conference to defend Federal Australia with only 20,000 men. I hold that no military council, not influenced by ultra-democratic and restless governments, should propose anything less than 50,800 men. My estimate of defence strength may err in detail, but in principle it is right, practical, economic, and State working. Captain Mahan says—"Navies do not dispense with forts nor with armies;" therefore create a true system of military defence and education.

The education of officers of the Australian Staff and Defence forces, through a well-organized Staff College on the lines of Kingston and Sandhurst, or upon those of the Military Academies of Chatham and Woolwich, is all important, and national. In India, England, Russia, Japan, Germany, and the United States constant attention is devoted to such special education. If the main strength of our Federal army is to be chiefly Militia and Volunteer, then we must have the highest standard of educated officers, combined with field experience. The want of up-to-date discipline, experience, and initiative power in a citizen army is its weakest point, for we do not expect business men to be well up in wares and Hamley, in merchandise and Maurice or Moltke. The division of labour demands the creation of a Staff College and a permanent



H.E. GENERAL SIR GEORGE S. WHITE, V.C., G.C.I.E., K.C.B., ETC.,
Commander-in-Chief in India.

Bourne and Shepherd, Photo.

Staff Corps like that of India. But there may be exceptions to the rule, as many a Moltke, a Roberts, a Grant of Thobal, a Chard of Rorke's Drift, or a Kelly of Chitral, may blush unseen in the defence force, although he has no Staff College certificate, and "my young Colonial" might exclaim---"Confound Staff officers! pick out the best men for the Staff. If you like him, keep him; and if not, send him back to his corps." But a Staff officer having professional education, dash, organization, and power of command under all pomp and circumstances of war, must be the superior officer of the two, because *the one is more disciplined than the other*. He must know profoundly the art of war, all about the enemy and his ever-changing movements, and when called upon, to put his special training into practice in carrying out the orders of the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief. A suddenly-raised Staff of officers on the eve of war would only repeat the blunders of the Crimea and the horrors of Walcheren, despite the valour or hardihood of officers and men. Fancy the want of Staff officers to supply the demands of a 50,800 army on the eve of war. We recoil from the idea of "mobiles" and ball-room officers. A war will soon tell who are the best officers for the Staff. Their skill in camp or action will not hide, but force them to the front. There must be a Staff College, and no middle course is possible. Hence, I proposed, as part of the Federal defence system, a Military College. Officers must foresee the future tactics of a campaign, calculate everything, and leave nothing to chance. German students are told that "good officers are made by the constant education of themselves." Napoleon said, "If I am prepared, it is from long meditation and foreseeing of circumstances. Genius does not reveal to me suddenly

and secretly what to do, and unexpected by other people ; it is reflection—it is meditation.” This demonstrates what Lieut. Bower, Bengal Infantry, terms the necessity of “conscientious study” of the military art. He does not choose to learn all that Clausewitz teaches. He prefers to know all about the magazine rifle instead of the Brown Bess, or how to defend the Empire against any nation, with the present organization of the British army. He does not believe in “pendants,” but strives to acquire the most valuable knowledge of the study of the military art and history. For instance, the Australian Staff officer must not only know the primary rules and laws of war in general, but he must know how to prepare a Colonial army to meet a Japanese or combined European invasion. The writings of Hamley, Maurice, Clausewitz, Vernois, Moltke, Kraft, Henderson, Monet, der Goltz, Furse, Napier, and Alison the historian, are all sound works for the young officers of Australia to study, together with current magazine articles, and speeches by officers like Wolseley, Roberts, and Brackenbury. A crowd of smart and intelligent Staff officers soon converts “mobiles” into “ship-shape” and discipline, to meet a foe.

The drill and discipline of the army will be much left to individual responsibility, as in the German army, for in military organization the law of the *division of labour* is recognized, to which is due the changes, reforms, and discoveries of modern war, as in trade and politics. It has also made itself acutely felt in the paths of colonization, good government, and civilization. A youth who is Jack-of-all-trades may be a useful citizen, “but in the maturity of a State,” says Sir Archibald Alison, of Lucknow and Egyptian fame, “the master of one trade is the most valuable.

So true is this principle, so universal its application, that we can trace it in every country, and mark it in all the society around us." Of course we know that the Australian citizen is an all-round handy man, but he is not so efficient as the colonist who devotes all his time to one thing, like the professional soldier. The defence force, like the army, by the division of labour is split up into separate branches, and success is greater. A Federal army is not a hindrance to the laws of progress. When I advocate a standing army of 5300 officers and men, it is because the devotion of a lifetime to the profession of arms "is the only real road to individual or national success." The foot-soldier must learn how to shoot with his Lee-Metford. The mounted man must devote himself more than ever to the *rôle* of cavalry. The General leaves all detail to his officers, and then the officers to the men, in the raging flow and tide of battle. The artilleryman and Nelsonic seaman must know how to become a scientific engineer in working modern ordnance—"the finest and most complicated engines of war elaborated from the fruitful brain of modern science." Modern war has re-introduced the division of labour in all armies, and compelled citizens to pass through the army schools of drill, and classes of tactical instruction. Rifled guns and arms are becoming more perfect weapons of precision every day, all requiring specially-trained men to work them on the day of battle and in coast defence. Half-drilled men cannot hope to damage the foe so well as permanent, disciplined soldiers, made in peace.

I fail to see that my system of Federal Defence and Army Organization would be costly, that it would abstract the time of young and vigorous men in the prime of life from the pursuits of trade and industry in the time of

peace ; that it would prevent the ever-changing march of Colonial progress, production, land settlement, and colonization ; that the labour power of Australia would suffer in any degree, or that it would create a "Jingo spirit" amongst a peaceful population. On the contrary, it would, in the eyes of the leading bishops and clergymen of all denominations, create in our youth the love of obedience to superior and older officers, train the youth to habits of thrift and trust, the love of race and country, mutual respect and gentlemanly feeling amongst all classes ; refine and dignify the tone of the parlours and salons of Australian society ; and above all things, create an Australian nationality, under the Crown. With regard to the pressure on the population in the time of war, the temporary absence of 50,800 men would not be much felt, and the Conscription armies would not be called out unless in the last agony of the State, or upon a very extraordinary occasion. I have confidence in the voluntary spirit of the people always keeping the fighting strength of the Active army up to 50,800 men. I dare say, when the Royal Navy destroys its naval enemy *à la* Niles and Trafalgars, thereby maintaining command of the sea, the Regular, Militia, and Volunteer forces would be sufficient to be called out for active service during war. Indeed, I think the Volunteers could attend to their daily avocations, yet be ready to answer their country's call to duty. The system is so light that, as General Sir Bruce Hamley wrote—"It is the mould through which the able-bodied youth of the country is passed, entering at one end as recruits, and coming out at the other as trained soldiers, to resume their career as citizens."

But the cost of a necessary standing army, ready and well disciplined to meet an invader, weighs heavily upon

new Colonies as upon older nations. Naval and military estimates are always unpopular votes in parliaments and amongst ratepayers, especially of the unmanly and selfish type. Europe groans under military expenditure, yet the people see that the cost is a forced evil, and fail to solve the question : How to reduce fleets and armies down to a normal condition ? Colonial defence must increase every five years, and is specially costly when war is threatened. A small army, with a complete staff, drilled, equipped, and disciplined in the time of peace, is far cheaper and more effective than in creating a field army during war. All great commanders know this, and historians have frequently recorded this great military fact. The present state of Colonial defence is dangerously weak, and almost invites invasion. But when a Minister has to keep office, he subordinates the national subject to party legislation and socialist requirements ! A British-speaking defence force costs more per soldier than the French, Russian, or German soldier, because wages and the rate of living are higher, and because he is a volunteer and not a conscript soldier. The Australian soldier is taken from a keen labour market, kept up by strikes and combinations. European soldiers are recruited without such wage considerations, and receive half less pay than Colonial troops. Thus, a Volunteer force costs twice as much as a Conscript force. It is the price British taxpayers have to pay for enjoying their liberty— freedom, and exemption from conscription. There is no necessity for a Conscript army in Australia during peace, but a conscript law should exist as in Canada, Queensland, South Australia, and to be used in the event of a powerful invasion. A Volunteer defence force is naturally costly, and the Colonies must pay the piper, like many more things, bought at a high price. I hope

to create an Australian Federal defence force at a much less cost per soldier than what the Colonies are now doing at a tremendously large cost, and practically of little use.

In the Australasian Colonies there are resident or located large numbers of ex-naval officers and seamen who would be glad to join the Federal navy as a Royal Naval Reserve. As the men have undergone considerable training in the Royal and Colonial navies, this Regular corps should certainly be established, paid by the Imperial Government, and drafted for say two weeks' drill into the ships of the Australian fleet, just to keep themselves in touch with modern drill, gunnery, and fleet discipline. The losses of the Imperial fleet in sea-fights in Austral-Pacific waters could be supplied from a Royal Naval Reserve, for I presume that the crews of three Imperial gun and survey ships would be turned into three reserve men-of-war, now lying off Garden Island. The Naval Brigade and Naval Reserve might then have a chance to learn ship drill and discipline, and to accustom themselves to the harbour defence, and perhaps the offensive—such as the capture of Noumea—or in coastal convoy duty. I also advocate the establishment of a Coast Guard, to embrace a properly-trained system of signalling between the shore and ships of our Navy, and also to send information respecting the movements of suspicious or hostile ships along the long extent of coast. This should not cost the Federal Government anything, as such duties should be made compulsory on the part of pilots, lighthouse-keepers, custom-house officers, etc. Stockmen and farmers might be included in this Coast Guard, as they might reside along the coast where no pilot stations or lighthouses exist, and they have all good smart horses ready to gallop to the nearest telegraph station. I trust that the Royal

Navy will always be able to catch a raider and destroy a combined expedition with infantry on board, yet these look-out stations along the coast would render great service to both naval and military officers, responsible for successful defence. This would reduce the chance of an enemy doing injury, or demanding ransom from small towns like Bowen, Geelong, or Cooktown, under threats of quick-firing gun fire. Raiders, with smart torpedo-boats, would cruise inshore in search of coal-ships and fresh provisions, but it would be dangerous for them to land for a kangaroo hunt, or a brush with our Mounted Rifles.

It is rather a large order for the Colonies to keep up a large commissariat, clothing, and other stores for the several Reserves in peace-time. The Colonies could feed its armies with plenty of meat and farm produce, but the cost of storing up huge piles of kits, blankets, tinware, maps, tools, rifles, wagons, etc., would give a Colonial Treasurer enteric fever and a want of courage to face Parliament. The working of an army is a wonderful machine, requiring great administrative and executive skill. "An army organized in peace with the object of war," says Sir Charles Dilke, "falls into two great branches, command and supply," the one directed by the G.O.C., and the other by the Master-General of Ordnance. In the supply branch all officers should have their duties well defined and act up to them strictly. "The distribution of authority is given by the organization." The rule in modern war now is: Obey orders from the General, see that they are carried out, and when left in sole command colonels and majors should study the drill-books and the codes of army regulations—they are the law of a well-disciplined army. The Federal Ministry must finance the army, and the Treasurer should find

the money. It is right that Parliament should control the cost of an army, but in the Colonies that State control is lost by the Treasurer's veto power of retrenchment. In adopting the naval and military estimates for Parliament, the Council of Federal Defence should carefully discuss them, with their recommendations, for submitting to the Cabinet, which will finally decide what to ask for from the Assembly. I agree with Sir Charles Dilke that if a Treasury can object to one item, then it controls the army—not the Minister for War, the G.O.C., the Council, or Parliament. The same rule applies to naval defence, but the Council for Defence aims to blend the cost of joint defence, though the two services must be administered separately. In discussing army management and war preparations, both sides of the question must be considered.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FEDERAL STAFF AND COMMANDS

THE head of the Federal Defence force must be the Sovereign, who will be represented by the Governor-General of Australasia. The Federal Minister for War will be a Cabinet Minister, responsible to Parliament for the complete defence of Australasia, inside of the three-mile limit, as outside that limit the responsibility rests with H.E. the Admiral Commanding-in-Chief on the naval station. The Admiral being charged with the Imperial defence of the Austral-Pacific, his Excellency will be daily identified with Federal defence. The Navy is the first line of Australasian defence, and in order that the naval organization shall run smoothly and without official friction, it is necessary that the Admiral and the Captain in charge of Garden Island—the naval base of the Imperial fleet in the Southern seas—should have a seat at the Board of the Federal Defence Council. The Federal navy, composed of its *Latona* ships and fifty torpedo-boats of the *Desperate* type, should be commanded by a senior Imperial naval officer with the rank of Commodore, under the orders of his senior officer, the Rear-Admiral. The Commodore to be selected by the Admiralty for appointment by the Minister for Defence. He should also have a seat at the Council

for Defence. This arrangement should comply with the rules of the Admiralty, satisfy the Australian people, and respect the principle of "no taxation without representation," until the ideal of an Imperial Federal Government and Parliament is reached. The Minister for War's position should be similar to that of the Imperial Secretary of State for War, but having his power limited to Australasia. He should be advised by H.E. the Admiral, the Commodore, the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief, and a Council of Federal Defence, called to settle important naval and military subjects—vital items of national defence; and to consider or frame the Estimates; all reforms, new inventions, the reports of the heads of departments, organization, mobilization, armament; all military reports to be submitted through the Commander-in-Chief; all naval reports through the Commodore, and all Imperial naval reports through the Admiral or the Captain in charge. The resolutions of this Council of Federal Defence to be sent to the Minister for Defence, to lay before the Ministry for adoption, and submission to Parliament.

The Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief in Australasia should be an experienced officer of the Imperial army, specially selected by the Field Marshal at the War Office in London, with the Queen's approval, to hold office for five years. He should have the entire command of the Federal military forces, and be responsible to the Federal Minister for the discipline, efficiency, and war readiness of the Federal army, upon lines similar to those now held by Lord Wolseley, but limited to Australasia. All the military departments will be under his command, each department being responsible to the Lieutenant-General commanding, and all sub-heads of

departments to the chief heads of departments, so that there will be centralization without decentralization, as per the new system at the War Office, with plenty of division of labour and individual responsibility, according to the Queen's Army Regulations, and the proposed Federal Defence Act of 1897. He should have power to issue all General Orders, hold inspections of troops in any Colony, act as Chief Military Adviser, submit the whole military estimates, hold levees, deal with all promotions and appointments, the retirement of officers, carefully select proper persons as officers to hold the Sovereign's commissions on the Staff, Permanent, Militia, Volunteer, Reserve, or Conscript forces. The Lieutenant-General should also have a seat in the Upper House of the Federal Parliament; and be charged with the organization, mobilization, and complete military command of the Federal army, and also with designing plans of offence or defence, a campaign scheme, all war preparations, the collection of all hostile information, the armed strength of foreign combinations, and the recommendation of all distinguished officers for military honours and rewards. Of course he will be assisted in all this responsible work by an expert Head-quarters Staff, as already stated, upon the principle of Adam Smith's *division of labour* principle. He must submit his views in important matters to the Council of Federal Defence, before his wishes are stamped with the authority of the Cabinet and the controlling power of Parliament over expenditure, especially in times of national danger and great emergency. If his plans are approved of, then he is directly responsible to the Federal Cabinet, as the General who plans, must also execute. In war he is supreme in action.

In the carrying out of his responsible and numerous

duties and supervisions, he should be closely and faithfully assisted by his Military Secretary, Adjutant-General, and Director of Military Intelligence. The Military Secretary should first deal with Staff and other army appointments, the selection of officers for honours, etc., and the admission of candidates for army commissions. The Adjutant-General should be second in command, charged with drill and discipline. He should specially select the appointments of all adjutants, the training of officers, warrant and non-commissioned officers and men for every branch of the service, subject to military law when under arms for training, inspections, camps of exercise, parades, and other military duties. He is also charged with the returns and statistics connected with the Federal army; its clothing, numerical strength, efficiency, and the military establishments. The Director of Military Intelligence should prepare all essential defence information relative to the military strength of Australasia, the British Colonies, and the armed strength and capabilities of foreign Powers to land in any of the Australian Colonies, or, indeed, in any of the islands in the Austral-Pacific. It will be his special duty to keep his Chief accurately posted up in the ever-increasing strength of such Pacific Powers as France, Russia, China, Japan, Germany, and the United States, and to collect all facts regarding Imperial and foreign schemes of strategy in the event of sudden war. He should also deal with the geography, history, resources, military surveys, maps, and armed forces of foreign Powers. He should translate foreign letters, articles, books, documents, etc., upon military matters, and have a *carte blanche* to correspond with all departments of the services, in order to elicit truth and positive information connected with his official duties.

The Head-quarters Staff, as a whole, corresponds in rank and duties to those of General Staffs, as it is only a Chief Head-quarters Staff, centralized yet decentralized. The officer in charge of the well-defined mobilization schemes of defence is responsible for the state of the field establishments, and should examine with great skill and military intelligence all tactical schemes of Federal defence.

Neither the Minister for Defence, nor the Council for Defence, must hamper his generalship in the field, unless the Cabinet in their wisdom, and Council assembled, desire to recall the G.O.C. for inability or non-successful operations. The Lieutenant-General must be the *god of war* in the conduct of a campaign, which must be very sharp, sudden, and destructive in results. He alone must judge, act, and be responsible for battle strategy and tactics. His army is built up of parts of a game, and his soldiers are merely players. He gives written orders to his generals, and sees that they are well carried out. He and his Staff get the forces at his command into working order during peace as terrible engines of war. He plans the operations of war from day to day, to defeat the object of his enemy, or discover his unknown movements. His orders and correspondence must be copied, and he requires a large military staff of writers. The want of a trained Staff was awfully felt for four years in the American army after the defeat of Bull Run. But the German army in 1866, and in 1870-71, had a splendid set of trained Staff officers during the wars. The Japanese had good Staff officers, and the Chinese *none*. A Staff must be made during peace. Moltke said—"A General Staff cannot be improvised on the outbreak of war. It must be prepared during peace, and be in practical working touch

with the troops. But that is not enough. The Staff must know its future commander; must be in close touch with him and acquire his confidence, without which its position is untenable." This is the opinion of Marlborough, Napoleon, Frederick, Wellington, Wolseley, Roberts, and all the great commanders. The General Staff must be "the enlargement" of the G.O.C., yet a Staff without a commander is a mistake. The Staff must look out for the sufficiency of the fighting power of an army in every detail, or it might be destroyed in a day. Transport, food, fodder, guns, ammunition, horses, wagons, and troops must be ready to move forward to the front, ready to deliver and receive the unknown blows of war. When an army is in the field, the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff must always have it *fit* to fight the foe. Nothing must be left to chance. And the public should back him to win. The composition of the Head-quarters, and also of the high departmental Staffs, must be a matter of deep thought and heavy responsibility. Many a responsible, able, and experienced General has been defeated, and his service reputation ruined, from the want of a smart, clever, reliable, and intelligent Staff of officers. Fine, complicated, and powerful modern arms and armies require highly-trained and specially-gifted Staff officers to direct the men and brigades who use them. Australian soldiers must not be brave men led by asses, nor by officers "whose only boast is but to wear, a braid of some fair lady's hair." Staff officers must be gentlemen, the true reflex of the G.O.C., who know his wishes, plan of campaign, strategy, tactics, and who know how to carry them out with exactness and reliability. Mansfield, Wolseley, Roberts, Alison, Dillon, Brackenbury, Wood, Buller, and others came to the point of distinction as much by

good Staff qualities as by courage and good generalship. In fact, a good Staff officer is born, and not educated up to order. The Crimean War and Indian Mutiny proved the want of such officers. It took Lord Clyde and Sir A. Alison two months of hard work in Calcutta, organizing the army that relieved Havelock, Outram, and Napier in Lucknow, stamped out mutiny in the Doabs, and finally conquered Oude. The Staff has a deal to do with the army supply and transit, which frequently breaks down in the British army. The Staff officers are the very soul of organization for war, and they must be trained for years before war is declared, with a profound knowledge of their duties and the wants of an army suddenly thrown into the field of operations. Sir A. Alison, Bart., says that an army sent into the field without such Staff and Supply officers *is an army doomed to dogs and vultures*, and "that no expenditure of the moment, however lavish, can supply their wants or avert their doom." The strain of the conduct of a campaign becomes more than severe from the want of far-seeing Staff officers, and the men melt away like snow before the first touches of hard marching and fighting. The China, Abyssinian, African, and Egyptian wars were examples of how a G.O.C. was served by good Staff officers. The German army had a good Staff in 1870-71, but both the Russian and Turkish armies, in 1877, were badly served with Staff officers. Let us hope that all Staff officers in Australia will be found numerous enough to enrich the many martial virtues of an able and intelligent Staff Corps.

The third department in importance and responsibility is that of the Quartermaster-General, who should be charged with the movement and direction of troops; the supply of food, stores, light, fuel; the control of camps,

barracks, quarters, etc.; land and water transit, remounts, the distribution of stores, the direction of the Pay, Army Service, and kindred corps relating to the health and movements of an army. Like the Adjutant-General, he should advise his Chief upon departmental questions.

The Director-General of Fortifications should be the scientific brain of an Australian army, either in harbour defence, or field operations. He has to select sites; build forts, barracks, military buildings of all descriptions; railways, bridges, and entrenchments; map out the local *terrain*; design works to defeat raiders, cruisers, or sudden invaders; supervise bombardments *à la* Todleben, counteract naval river expeditions, invent lines of coast signals, lay down submarine mines, obstruct navigation in the face of hostile vessels, superintend electric lights, select range-finders, study gun-fire from certain positions, repair damages during defence or battle, instruct all corps in the use of the pick, cover field redoubts, military surveys, and a hundred and one other things; to say nothing about the maintenance of discipline and the application of new inventions or improvements in warfare. The Colonies have ever regarded the Engineer Corps as a most valuable arm. The Director-General should select his own officers, the distribution of companies, the appointment of officers to command fortified works, make general inspections of corps, works, technical instruction, and corps discipline. The Director-General will be able to save much money in the practical yet extensive Federal defence. Coast and harbour defence will be his first study. A great deal of work has to be done in this direction in Australia. The Sydney and Melbourne armies are in a high state of efficiency, though, I believe that military telegraphy should be more under military discipline than at present,

as some Electric Corps fail to realize drill, discipline, and enthusiasm.

The Director of Artillery has also most responsible and all-important work to do in the manning of forts with the latest improved guns, projectiles, and ammunition. This is a department where the Chief should be changed every three years, and be an expert Shobburyness officer. The Inspector-General of Ordnance should be placed immediately under him; in fact the latter should supply the best guns, and the former the best gunnery. The Director's Staff should be highly trained, educated, and initiative. Harbour defence has yet to be studied in the Colonies, and so important do I regard fortress fire that, the forts should be manned with a fair supply of Permanent officers and men. It is too risky for the State to depend upon Militia artillerymen. It would be a suicidal policy, and one which no organizer of Federal defence should advise for a single moment. Woe betide Australia if its second lines of defence have to be defended by troops having only two days' shot practice, and twelve days' training per annum! It is bad enough for our field army to be a citizen—and therefore a half-disciplined—army, but to man our coastal forts with half-disciplined gunners, with a short annual course, would be an act of madness. Parliament must make up its mind to spend money upon the Garrison Artillery and Fortress Corps, good guns, good ammunition, and good artillerymen. Then the Field Artillery is far behind that necessary to meet European invaders. The A Batteries are splendid in men and horses, but the hand of the modern reformer is still wanted before the Artillery Corps will obtain the general confidence of expert commanders in harbour defence or in the field, combined with other arms of the

service. A new, active, and expert Director-General for some years to come will be a busy man, and with the Director-General of Engineers, I look forward to a complete revolution in the true and safe fortification of federated Australia. It is right that the two costly departments should have a seat in the Federal War Council, to advise Ministers and Financial Secretaries. The Artillery Staff should consist of the Director and several highly-trained and educated officers of the Imperial army to help him, with officers of the same type, but of lower rank, to take charge of, and administer, the artillery department of each first-class district under the Federal Defence Scheme. Each battery and company of Permanent, Militia, Volunteer, Field and Garrison Artillery must go through a complete course of annual field training under its own officers, supervised by the chief local artillery officer, and sometimes under the eye of the Director, or the Commander-in-Chief. A well-drawn-out syllabus of instruction should be issued by the Director at Head-quarters. Apart from the education of young officers, the non-commissioned officers must be continuously trained and instructed under practical officers. It is too much to expect the Commander-in-Chief to be responsible for the perfection of the Artillery forces, as such a high and responsible command should be filled by a distinguished Colonel of the Imperial army, as the position will be much higher than the Artillery commands of Malta or Gibraltar. When one comes to think of the large sums invested by the several Colonies in coast defence—in guns, forts, buildings, stores, and general equipment—the costly charge is responsibility itself. Hence we see the great importance and trust held by the Artillery department in peace or war. It is enough for the Commander-in-

Chief to see that the Director of Artillery does his efficient duty, that the training and discipline of the force is right, and that he can rely upon the successful use of every gun, battery, or company in battle action. The Director must keep his force up to date in every economical, technical, and professional detail, and be responsible to the country through the Commander-in-Chief. Such smart officers from home would soon train young Colonial officers to take charge of sections and subsections, and fight their guns with any officers. I note that Colonial officers have already been charged with the most important section of Sydney and Melbourne defence. Organization and administration must work well together in the hands of competent, experienced, and scientific officers, to deal with such a mass of professional detail. The Director must also provide commissioned and non-commissioned officers to organize, drill, and discipline newly-strengthened corps from the main Reserves for field, battery, and fortress duty, in the event of invasion. It is a serious thing for two G.O.C.'s to report that if their advice is not attended to by governments, they will not be responsible for the security of Sydney, or Melbourne, in the time of war. Parliaments must do their duty.

The Inspector-General of Ordnance must be charged with the true manufacture, or supply, of all types of guns, war stores, carriages, projectiles, and complete equipments ; the questions of armament of ships, forts, and batteries ; the inspection of all war material, and of factories and modes of manufacture of both public and private firms ; the examination of new inventions, discoveries, patterns, designs, models, etc., for artillery warfare. He should also see that a full supply of all

war stores are kept up, and that the Ordnance Store Corps is efficient and ready for hard service. This officer should send in monthly reports to his chief, considering the absence of gun, small-arms, and powder factories in the Colonies. Red tape should be abolished in this department, which has so much to do with every arm of the service, even with swords, bayonets, revolvers, torpedoes, and naval guns. It is considered premature to erect a gun and small-arms factory yet, but we hope to see Colonial-made smokeless and other powders made extensively in Australia, without importing wholly or in part from England, or "made in Germany." With the manufacture of iron in Australia, I hope that the Colonies will be able soon to make their ships and guns for the Federal Navy. It is necessary to look forward to the erection of naval shipbuilding yards, large engineering works, and an arsenal in Australia, as in the event of our sea-power and lines of communication being broken, such factories will be able to make us, perhaps, turn the tide of British reverse into victory. There are good docks in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne, and New Zealand, and coal is plentiful in every port, but a great defence want, of forging the engines of war, will not hastily be voted by Colonial or Federal statesmen. However, it is something to look forward to, especially when Japan and the United States have large docks, yards, and workshops to create navies and hostile ports. When Federation becomes a fact, and a Federal army is in existence, Parliament must not turn a deaf ear to Federal Clydebanks, Elswick, Jarrows, Chathams, Woolwiches, Plymouths, and Portsmouths.

The Director of Engineers and Fortifications will have a busy and scientific department, and for many years be

as hard worked as the Chief Engineers to the Board at Lahore and of the Punjaub, from 1845 to 1852. The Director and his Staff must be Imperial officers. The Director of Education and Military Intelligence is charged with a heavy responsibility, being responsible for the education of the army, and in supplying the Headquarters with prompt information with regard to the strength, composition, and doings of any hostile nation. The Military College should be near the Head-quarters. The Inspector-General of Cavalry, Infantry, Volunteers, Reserves, etc., should be located near the Adjutant- and Quartermaster-Generals; and also the Directors of Remounts, Recruiting, Transit, Stores, Clothing, and the Medical and Veterinary Staff Corps.

The naval head-quarters, or Australian Admiralty, should be close to the Council of Federal Defence building, and next to the military head-quarters. The Federal War Office should be in the centre, with the naval head-quarters on the one side, and the military on the other. The naval Commodore should be responsible for everything in the Federal Navy to the Minister for Defence, and should submit any important reforms with regard to naval organization to the Council of Federal Defence, especially when H.E. the Naval Commander-in-Chief, the chief officer in charge of Garden Island, and all naval members of the Council are present. Naval stores and many naval departments, such as clothing, arms, equipment, etc., could be placed under the military departments. Pay should emanate from the office of the Paymaster-General, and a fixed rate of pay adopted. In times of war the Commodore should take his orders from the Admiral, should his Excellency desire him. In harbour defence plans of

defence should be arranged with the Commander-in-Chief and the Brigadier in command of the artillery fortress defence. Thoughtful co-operation should exist at all times between the Federal army and navy. A *bonâ fide* system of responsibility must be worked out, all the more so, as many of the chief commands will be most distant from the Federal centre.

CHAPTER XVII

THE STAFF AND DISTRICT COMMANDS

THE SOVEREIGN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN AND
EMPRESS.

Commander-in-Chief: His Excellency the Governor-General of Australasia.

One Military Secretary and two Aides-de-camp.

Minister for Defence Department: The Hon. the Minister for War.

One Private Secretary and one Aide-de-camp.

The Under-Secretary for War.

The Parliamentary Secretary for Finance.

The Paymaster-General of the Forces.

NOTE.—*The clerical staff cannot be detailed here.*

THE COUNCIL OF FEDERAL DEFENCE.

President: His Excellency the Governor-General.

Vice-Presidents: The Hon. the Premier of Australasia.

The Hon. the Minister for War.

His Excellency the Military Commander-in-Chief.

His Excellency the Rear-Admiral of the Imperial Fleet.

Members: The Commodore of the Federal Fleet.

The Captain-in-charge, Garden Island.

The Adjutant-General of Australasia.

The Quartermaster-General of Australasia.

The Director of Artillery and Ordnance.

The Director of Fortifications.

The Director of Military Intelligence.

The Director of Army Service Corps.

The Parliamentary Financial Secretary.

Secretary: The Under-Secretary for War.

FEDERAL HEAD-QUARTERS MILITARY STAFF.

The Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief in Australia.

One Military Secretary, one Private Secretary, and three Aides-de-camp.

Six Aides-de-camp, one from each Colony or State.

Major-General, Adjutant-General of Australia, second in command.
Major-General, Quartermaster-General of Australia.

The Director-General of Artillery.

The Director-General of Fortifications and Engineering.

The Director-General of Education and Intelligence.

The Inspector-General of Cavalry and Mounted Troops.

The Inspector-General of Infantry—Permanent and Militia.

The Inspector-General of Ordnance and War Stores.

The Inspector-General of Volunteers and Reserves.

The Director of Transit and Army Service Corps.

The Director of Recruiting and Remounts.

The Director of the Medical Corps.

The Veterinary Surgeon-General.

The Inspector of Gymnasia.

The Inspector of Signalling.

The Judge Advocate-General.

The Chaplain of the Forces.

The Auditor-General of the Army and Navy.

HEAD-QUARTERS STAFF OF THE FEDERAL NAVY.

The Commodore commanding the Federal Navy.

One Private Secretary and one Flag-Lieutenant.

One Flag Captain, second in command.

One Director of Naval Stores, Transport, and Ordnance.

One Inspector of the Fleet and Navy Yards.

One Engineer of the Fleet.

One Paymaster and Financial Treasurer.

One Chief Medical Officer.

Permanent Naval Secretary.

The Medical Director-General of the Navy.

First-class Commands.

The Captains commanding at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Auckland, Port Albany, Thursday Island, and Wellington.

Second-class Commands.

The Commanders commanding at Newcastle, Townsville, Geelong, Hobart, Fiji, Woolongong, Rockhampton, Port Darwin, Lytton, Warrnambool, Dunedin, Swan Island, Invercargill, etc.

Third-class Commands.

To be adopted by the Council of Federal Defence upon the advice of the Commodore.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

The Adjutant-General of Australia, and second in command.
One Military Secretary and two Aides-de-camp.

One Deputy Adjutant-General.

The Inspector-General of Cavalry and Mounted Troops.

The Inspector-General of Infantry—Regular and Militia.

The Inspector-General of Volunteers and Reserves.

The Inspector-General of Recruiting.

The Inspector-General of Shooting and Ranges.

Four Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals.

Aides-de-camp allowed to Inspectors-General.

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Quartermaster-General of Australia.

One Military Secretary and two Aides-de-camp.

One Deputy Quartermaster-General.

One Deputy Adjutant-Quartermaster-General.

THE DIRECTOR OF ARTILLERY'S DEPARTMENT.

The Colonel Director-General of Artillery.

One Military Secretary and two Aides-de-camp.

Assistant Director of Artillery, and one Aide-de-camp.

Adjutant of Garrison Artillery.

Adjutant of Field Artillery.

One Inspector-General of Ordnance and Stores.

One Inspector of Artillery and Section Commands.

THE DIRECTOR OF FORTIFICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

The Director-General of Engineering.

One Military Secretary and two Aides-de-camp.

One Assistant Director of Fortifications.

One Adjutant of Engineers.

One Inspector of Submarine Mines.

One Inspector of Telegraphy.

One Inspector of Surveys and Military Works,

MILITARY COMMANDS.

First-class Commands.

The Colonel commanding in N. S. Wales, ranking as Brigadier-Gen.

“	“	“	Victoria	“	“	“
“	“	“	New Zealand	“	“	“
“	“	“	Queensland	“	“	“
“	“	“	South Australia	“	“	“
“	“	“	Western Australia	“	“	“
“	“	“	Tasmania	“	“	“

Second-class Commands.

The Officer commanding in South N. Z., ranking as Commandant.

“	“	“	North N. Z.,	“	“	“
“	“	“	North Queensland	“	“	“
“	“	“	Fiji	“	“	“
“	“	“	Riverina	“	“	“
“	“	“	Port Jackson Fortifications	“	“	“
“	“	“	Melbourne	“	“	“
“	“	“	Northern N. S. Wales	“	“	“
“	“	“	Southern N. S. Wales	“	“	“
“	“	“	Western Victoria	“	“	“
“	“	“	Northern Victoria	“	“	“
“	“	“	Darling Downs	“	“	“
“	“	“	Thursday Island	“	“	“
“	“	“	King George's Sound	“	“	“

Third-class Commands.

The Officer in charge of Moreton Bay Defence.

“	“	“	Newcastle	“	“	“
“	“	“	Kiama-Woolongong Defence.	“	“	“
“	“	“	Geelong	“	“	“
“	“	“	Auckland	“	“	“
“	“	“	Otago	“	“	“
“	“	“	Wellington	“	“	“
“	“	“	Hobart	“	“	“
“	“	“	Darling River District.	“	“	“
“	“	“	Wide Bay	“	“	“
“	“	“	Rockhampton	“	“	“

N.B.—Only a few districts are named, as the distribution of the army will be detailed by the Head-quarters Staff on appointment.

I need not go largely into the details of territorial district, and sub-district commands in each Colony, as that will be purely speculative, and must be left to the

General Staff after appointment. I have no doubt that many of those now existing will be maintained upon a larger scale, owing to the increase of Militia, Volunteer, Army, Rifle Club, and Cadet Reserves. My idea of first-, second-, and third-class commands is purely suggestive, but given to demonstrate the further Federal organization.

Cavalry.

The half-squadrons and squadrons to be formed into regiments, brigades, and divisions of Lancers and Hussars ; the Mounted Rifles into companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions. Half-batteries of Maxim and Hotchkiss guns to accompany each regiment as Horse Artillery.

Garrison Artillery.

To be formed into companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions for the defence of coast fortresses. The Reserves to form second and third battalions of regiments.

Field Artillery.

To be formed of batteries of two 15-pounder breech-loading guns, one Maxim gun, and one Hotchkiss or other quick-firing gun. Six batteries to form one regiment of Artillery. The Reserve batteries to consist of four 6-pounder guns, one howitzer, and one Maxim. Cadet Artillery to have three 3-pounder and three Maxim guns. The Militia Field Artillery to be armed with four 12-pounders, one Maxim, and one 6-pounder quick-firing guns, in one battery. The Permanent Artillery only to have the new 15-pounder field-gun.

Corps of Engineers.

To consist of companies, battalions, and brigades, composed of Field Engineers, Submarine Miners, Tele-

graph, Post, Balloon, and Pioneers. A permanent company to be Instructors.

Infantry.

To consist of companies, batteries, brigades, divisions, armed with the Lee-Metford magazine rifle, and the Reserve battalions, at present, with Martini-Henry. To be raised upon the voluntary territorial system. See other pages *re* the ulterior Conscript army. Every regiment to be provided with twelve Pioneers, and four Maxim guns.

TABLE I.
EXAMPLE OF CAVALRY ORGANIZATION.

1st N. S. Wales Royal Lancer Regiment : 8 troops of 50 = 400 men.			
2nd Victoria Lancer Regiment	,	,	,
3rd New Zealand Lancer Regiment	,	,	,
4th Queensland Lancer Regiment	,	,	,
5th South Australian Lancer Regiment	,	,	,
6th West Australian Lancer Regiment	,	,	,
7th Tasmanian Lancer Regiment	,	,	,
<hr/>			
8th Cumberland Mounted Rifles : 10 troops of 80 = 800			
9th Bendigo Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
10th Wellington Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
11th Moreton Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
12th Gawler Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
13th Perth Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
14th Tasmanian Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
15th Bathurst Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
16th Rodney Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
17th Riverina Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
18th Darling Downs Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
19th Ballarat Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
20th Dunedin Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
21st Maitland Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
22nd Stawell Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
23rd North Queensland Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
24th Wide Bay Mounted Rifles	,	,	,
<hr/>			
No. 1 Battery, N. S. Wales Royal Horse Artillery : 4 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun,			

- No. 2 Battery, Victorian Royal Horse Artillery : 4 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.
 No. 3 Battery, South New Zealand Royal Horse Artillery : 4 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.
 No. 4 Battery, North New Zealand Royal Horse Artillery : 4 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.
 No. 5 Battery, South Australian Royal Horse Artillery : 3 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.
 No. 6 Battery, West Australian Royal Horse Artillery : 3 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.
 No. 7 Battery, Queensland Royal Horse Artillery : 4 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.
 No. 8 Battery, Tasmanian Royal Horse Artillery : 3 6-pounders, 1 quick-firing, and 1 machine gun.

N.B.—The districts may be altered, troops can be divided in local districts, and increased to full strength by volunteers in the event of war.

TABLE II.

ROYAL REGIMENT OF AUSTRALASIAN ARTILLERY.

- No. 1 Battery, N. S. Wales Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 2 Battery, N. S. Wales Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 3 Battery, N. S. Wales Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 4 Battery, N. S. Wales Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 5 Battery, Victorian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 6 Battery, Victorian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 7 Battery, Victorian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 8 Battery, Victorian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 9 Battery, New Zealand Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 10 Battery, New Zealand Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 11 Battery, New Zealand Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 12 Battery, New Zealand Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
 No. 13 Battery, Queensland Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.

- No. 14 Battery, Queensland Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
- No. 15 Battery, Queensland Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
- No. 16 Battery, South Australian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
- No. 17 Battery, South Australian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
- No. 18 Battery, West Australian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
- No. 19 Battery, West Australian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.
- No. 20 Battery, Tasmanian Field Artillery : 4 guns, 1 quick-firing gun, 1 machine gun.

ROYAL DIVISION OF GARRISON ARTILLERY.

New South Wales Fortress Brigade—

- 4 Regiments of 6 Companies. Those not with the guns to act as Infantry in support.

Victoria Fortress Brigade—

- 4 Regiments of 6 Companies. Ditto.

New Zealand Fortress Brigade—

- 4 Regiments of 6 Companies. Ditto.

Queensland Fortress Brigade—

- 2 Regiments of 6 Companies. Ditto.

South Australian Fortress Brigade—

- 1 Regiment of 8 Companies. Ditto.

West Australian Fortress Brigade—

- 1 Regiment of 6 Companies. Ditto.

Tasmanian Fortress Brigade—

- 1 Regiment of 4 Companies. Ditto.

Every fortress to be supplied with the best machine and quick-firing guns.

It will be seen that I have added twenty-nine 6-pounder guns, eight quick-firing guns, and eight Maxim machine guns to the Cavalry Division. To the Field Artillery I allow eighty 12-pounder guns, twenty quick-firing guns, and twenty Maxim machine guns. It is a new departure from the old composition of a battery, but

the advance of science and invention demands this reform ; or, if expert artillerymen prefer it, let the proportion be thirteen batteries of 12-pounder guns, three and a half batteries of quick-firing guns, and three and a half batteries of Maxim guns, an arrangement more uniform in battery array, and easier handled by specially-trained men. Most of the armament of the said batteries is in the Colonies, and the batteries short of guns should be provided with the latest 15-pounder gun, as 1897-98 will see another great change in field-guns. I have not mentioned the number of guns for the Garrison or Fortress Artillery. Most of the guns wanted are supplied already, but the numerical strength of the Royal Regiment is large ; but such artillerymen must be able to repel any storming parties, either in or outside the forts, as the mobilization of infantry and the Naval (harbour) Brigade may prove too slow and too late. The true local distribution of companies must be left to the Head-quarters Staff. The Militia Artillery should man the guns, and the Volunteer Artillery act in support, thus allowing the infantry Movable Column to move as a field army.

TABLE III.

CORPS OF AUSTRALASIAN ENGINEERS.

The Royal Instructional Company of Engineers : 4 officers, 100 men.			
No. 1	Field Company, N. S. Wales	3	50
No. 2	Fortress Company, N. S. Wales	3	50
No. 3	Submarine and Torpedo Company, N. S. Wales	3	35
No. 4	Telegraph Company, N. S. Wales	3	50
No. 5	Railway Company, N. S. Wales	4	100
No. 6	Railway Company, Victoria	4	100
No. 7	Field Company, Victoria	3	50
No. 8	Fortress Company, Victoria	3	50
No. 9	Submarine and Torpedo Company, Victoria	3	35

No. 10	Telegraph Company, Victoria	3	officers, 50 men.
No. 11	Field Company, Brisbane	3	„ 50 „
No. 12	Artisan Company, Townsville	3	„ 30 „
No. 13 $\frac{1}{2}$	Telegraph Company, Brisbane	2	„ 30 „
No. 14	Field and Fortress Company, Adclaide	3	„ 50 „
No. 15	One Field and Fortress Company, Perth	3	„ 50 „
No. 16	One Field and Fortress Company, Wellington	3	„ 50 „
No. 17	One Telegraph Company, Wellington	2	„ 30 „
No. 18	One Submarine Miners Company, Auckland	3	„ 50 „
No. 19	One Field Company, Auckland	3	„ 50 „
No. 20	One Field and Fortress Company, Hobart	3	„ 50 „

N.B.—The sub-distribution of the above corps must be left to the Head-quarters Staff.

TABLE IV.
INFANTRY ORGANIZATION.

I advocate the district or territorial system of four battalions each; the first battalion to be Militia, the second battalion Volunteers, the third battalion to be Senior Cadets and Rifle Gun Clubs, and the fourth to be composed of newly-enrolled, ex-Volunteer, and other Reserves. The first and second battalions to be companies of eighty men with the colours, and the balance of twenty men to be composed of their own Reserves. The Reserves should be called out in full, at Easter camps, and on Queen's Birthdays (see my remarks on other pages). The following table is merely an example to show the nature of the regimental system, with the third and fourth battalions affiliated like the district battalions of the British army. The regimental numbers to run on from No. 1 upwards, and each battalion to consist of eight companies of eighty men with twenty-eight officers each. In some districts the fourth battalion may be non-existent. In all cases

precedence should run from the earliest dates of first embodiment.

The Royal Infantry "Guard" Regiment of Australasia, to consist of ten companies of four officers and one hundred men each, and to be quartered as follows:— Two companies in Sydney, two in Melbourne, one in Wellington, one in Auckland, one in Adelaide, one in Brisbane, one in Perth, and one in Hobart. This regiment is to be permanent, and the *élite* infantry corps of Australasia. Every officer must be a passed Staff officer, and every non-commissioned officer capable of instructing any Infantry or Reserve corps in drill, discipline, and efficiency.

No. 1 : The Sydney Royal Militia (1)	28 officers, 640 men.
,, ,, Royal Volunteers (2)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Royal Reserves (3)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Volunteer Reserves (4)	28 ,, 640 ,,
No. 2 : The Victorian Queen's Own Militia (1)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Queen's Own Volunteers (2)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Queen's Own Reserves (3)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Queen's Own Volunteer	
Reserves (4)	28 ,, 640 ,,
No. 3 : The New Zealand Dunedin Regiment (1)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, ,, ,, Volunteers (2)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, ,, ,, Reserves (3)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, ,, ,, Volunteer	
Reserves (4)	28 ,, 640 ,,
No. 4 : The Moreton Ranger Regiment (1)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, Brisbane Ranger Regiment (2)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Reserve Regiment (3)	28 ,, 640 ,,
,, ,, Volunteer Reserves (4)	28 ,, 640 ,,

I need not fill up space with more illustrations. The head-quarters of a regiment should have its own dépôt, head-quarters, built by the State or public subscription. Each head-quarters should know, and keep in touch with, all its units in every district and sub-district. Each regiment, with local cavalry and artillery, and its own wagons, stores, etc., should form a brigade by itself

on mobilization. Such cities as Goulburn, Bathurst, Maitland, Newcastle, Armidale, Albury, Kiama, Grafton, Wagga, Bendigo, Ballarat, Williamstown, Geelong, Riverton, Shepparton, Brisbane, Maryborough, Charters Towers, Toowoomba, Townsville, Rockhampton, Cooktown, Adelaide, Wallaroo, Gawler, Gambier, Burra, Port Pirie, Geraldton, Bunbury, Albany, Perth, Fiji, Hobart, Launceston, Dunedin, Christchurch, Nelson, Napier, Wellington, Auckland, etc., would all make good head-quarters to start with ; but no difficulty should be experienced in leaving the local grouping and district distribution to the Head-quarters Staff, who will no doubt be properly advised on the subject.

With regard to the distribution of the Naval Forces of 5000 men, the matter should be left to the Council of Federal Defence, as the mass of naval and military detail, fully worked out, should be finally approved by the Minister for War and the Council of Defence.



H.E. SIR WM. MCGREGOR, M.D., K.C.B., ETC.,
Governor of New Guinea.



COLONEL ROWE,
Commanding N.S.W. Corps of Engineers.



COLONEL C. F. STOKES,
*A.V.C. Regiment, N.S.W., and Officer Commanding
Newcastle District, etc.*

CHAPTER XVIII

ARMY ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND COMPOSITION

“Everything in war is simple, but that which is simple is difficult.”
CLAUSEWITZ.

ARMY organization is a large subject. It wants continuous improvement, to suit ever-changing requirements. The cost of Federal defence will always be subject to the votes of the Federal Parliament, and the spirit of the constitution. A new defence scheme begins in a nebulous, and ends gradually in some definite form, as so many points have to be considered and hewn into ship-shape. The naval defence scheme is totally distinct from the military ; yet there are some experts who desire to see harbour defence in the hands of the Navy ; but coastal schemes must have the most steady and intelligent co-operation of both arms. The defence schemes of General Hutton may be applied to the other Colonies. The defence of New Zealand, with a well-developed railway system, will be easy, as three large Colonial forces, covered by the fleet, could rush to the rescue, as proposed in 1885. A naval and military defence should be perfect at a cost of £1,000,000, including the annual contribution to the Royal Navy. The effective services may be set down as the pay of Staffs, Regulars, Federal

Navy, Militia, Volunteers, Reserves, etc. ; medical, transport, remounts, education, food, fodder, war stores, buildings, fortifications, armament, officers, salaries, miscellaneous, etc. When the Federal Constitution is established, and receives the Queen's Assent, I hope that hundreds of our lucky miners, property holders, banks, financial institutions, and large capitalists will generously and patriotically combine for a Contributory, Patriotic, and Defence Fund, to give the first Federal defence force a good start in covering the first cost of the new naval, ship, and military armaments. The wealthy classes, who have most to lose by war, should subscribe £1,000,000, in the seven Colonies, for such a purpose. It would be a noble and national act, and if they took the grand initiative, they would be followed by the cash donations of many not so well off in financial conditions. I think the military force of 50,800 could always be kept up by unenforced recruiting. The Reserve forces should be composed of all able-bodied men who have passed through the ranks of Regulars, Militia, and Volunteers, and those who are members of Rifle Gun Clubs. All these corps can be affiliated to the nearest territorial regiment or corps. Should the Volunteer Reserve be formed as requested by Lord Wolseley, they should form extra battalions of territorial regiments, the third and fourth battalions of which would only be called out in any national emergency. The Permanents, Militia, and Volunteers should be armed with the best magazine rifle, and the Reserves with the time-honoured Martini-Henry. Any go-as-you-please sort of Reserve will tend to make the Active army unsteady and undisciplined. Organization must have cohesion and co-operation.

To make the conditions of service plain, let me state as follows :—All soldiers of the Permanent army—

50,800—to engage for twenty-one years with the *colours*, with the right of fair pay, a life pension when discharged, or employment in the Civil Service. The Militia to enlist for twelve years, and then to rank with the Active Army Reserve. The Volunteers to serve for eight years, and then to join the ex-Volunteer Reserve, or Active Army Reserve, as they may elect to do. The Reserve forces of all kinds to be paid at per annum, with free arms, etc., as stated elsewhere. The Senior Cadets to receive 5*s.* on Queen's Birthdays until they individually join the Regular, Militia, or Volunteer forces. I know that the above conditions will be improved and amended according to practice and experience gained. The conditions of service are always changing in Europe, and will no doubt change in Australia. The transfer of officers and men to the Reserve, and the reliable keeping up of their strength, will tax the energies and patience of any G.O.C. and Head-quarters Staff, because the new Federal system will have to be proved, and the Australian population is to some extent nomad, owing to the shearing seasons and distant gold-field rushes. The strength of the Active army of 50,800 must be kept up. It should not exist on paper. The only paper army to be thought of is the ulterior Conscript armies, which must, however, have some sort of existence in the Federal military system. All batteries and regiments of the Active army should number from one upwards, with a territorial designation. Camps of exercise should be held once a year to show progress made in drill, discipline, battle firing, and field tactics. It would be a good thing if the Reserves of all classes would be present with the other troops on such occasions at the nearest camps of exercise, when all troops would stand in line as the armed strength

of the Active army of Australia, "ready to go anywhere and do anything," or to act in combination with all arms of the service—ready to defend a fort, cover military routes or a naval base, or to join Imperial forces, if necessary, on the offensive-defence, to close the war.

A cavalry force of 5600 troops is not too large for six Colonies to supply, whilst the two dépôts of 300 men each would simply be schools of instruction for the whole Mounted Brigade. To mobilize cavalry on the spur of the moment without previous training would be a fatal mistake—it would simply be sending men to their doom without benefit to the whole army. The distribution of the armed strength totalized in this book is a matter of detail which must be left to experienced Staff and district officers, and the genius of the Lieutenant-General commanding. I would insist upon all Cavalry regiments consisting of four squadrons of 150 men each. It is enough for me to state the total force required for a Federal army, and any attempt on my part to divide it into fort or camp quarters would be premature. Cavalry units in the field must not become weak or ineffective. The district commands we are pretty sure of, but to advise proper distribution throughout seven Colonies will be a slow, careful, and changing task on the part of the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General's Staff. With regard to the proportional division of the whole force into troops, batteries, corps, battalions, regiments, brigades, and sections of coast defence, they must also be left to experienced Staff and local officers, as it is a question hanging upon naval and military positions, towns, ports, coaling stations, naval harbours, points of strategy, and geographical positions. The present forms of defence

will perhaps be changed for something better, and the distribution of the forces so placed as to be within easy touch of each other, either for brigade drill, battle tactics, camps of continuous training, or field manoeuvres. In the distribution of corps it is necessary that brigadiers and commandants should know their mixed troops, and call parades as often as possible for combined movements in the field. The trooper and his horse must be *fit* for parade or a campaign. Australia being the habitat of horse breeding, the Remount Department should always be able to keep up a sound horse supply. The many prize tournaments, rifle, and jumping contests, should be kept up.

The Permanent Cavalry will be the *élite* squad of the large metropolitan towns, or a pet corps which will supply non-regular troops with good instructors and non-commissioned officers upon the eve of war. A sprinkling of Regular men amongst Militia and Volunteer drilled men will be much felt in scouting, reconnaissance, and spying the way for mounted infantry. Each of these two arms will have their special drill, work, and rôle in warfare. The rôle of cavalry is quite different to that of dragoons, or men mounted with rifles. Cavalry have not yet disappeared from value and use in a great war. It is right that Australians should know this truth in army organization. Cavalry can still do what it ever did in the great wars of history. All arms of the service depend upon each other to bring about the great consummation of victory. Cavalry are still the eyes and ears of an army, and its officers should be blessed with a great idea of strategy and an intelligent reading of the doings in front of a rapidly advancing army.

For the first time a representative cavalry division

was mobilized lately in England to undergo field operations upon a practical scale, to bring out their perfections and imperfections in manœuvre and formation, as this arm of the service is anything but obsolete in modern warfare. We have studied voluminous reports upon recent French, German, Austrian, and British cavalry operations, but can only find room for a digest of Lieutenant-General Fraser's report upon the conduct of the cavalry operations in the district of Betterton. The chief object-lessons to be derived by horsemen in war are that regiments want more manœuvre and reconnaissance practice; quick mutual understanding between leaders and Staff officers, subordinate leaders to possess more individual action and ready initiative, skilful choice of tactical formation and complete mastery of their employment, great rapidity of movement combined with perfect order, and the power to quickly rally in any direction. Cavalry leaders must master the handling of large masses, upon the principle that the squadron is the true tactical unit. General Fraser says: "It is the chief means of combining the mobility and rapidity of masses with precision and certainty of movement." The squadron leader must lead in mass, regiment, or brigade, have it always in hand, and be responsible for its cohesion and good order. This will compel officers to practically train individual squadrons as laid down in the drill-book. The principles will be enforced, and attacks oftener practised against moving objects in the distance. A squadron must be trained to take up and keep any desired direction with certainty at the quickest pace, which prevents the loss of intervals and direction. The word of command must be more firm and precise, as they influence good order and cohesion. Excited, inexperi-

enced leaders give hasty and useless orders, such as "Come on" and "Gallop on"—words which break the formation and disorganize the impact on the enemy.

Lieutenant Rhodes, U.S. Army, writes of cavalry:— "At the first bugle-note of war, the great cavalry screen will assemble towards the hostile frontier and cover the mobilization of the army. If it can, by bold dashes into the enemy's country, disturb or prevent the mobilization of his forces, so much the better. The mobilization having taken place, and the advance having begun into the theatre of hostile operations, it is imperative to have this considerable body of cavalry far in front, interposing itself as a veil to the forces behind it, during the march, halt, or bivouac. Supposing that the advance of the cavalry screen has *not* preceded the mobilization, then, as Prince Hohenlohe says, the cavalry division must 'be able in three days to gain a distance of from two to three days' marches on the army. To do this, the cavalry must march from twenty-five to thirty miles a day, while the army follows at a rate of from eleven to thirteen miles a day.' In making these advance marches, the cavalry must not in any way impair its fighting efficiency; after gaining a distance of from twenty to forty miles on the main army, its marches may be shortened to correspond with those of the forces in rear."

I am afraid that the mounted troops would make many mistakes at first, as the several squadrons and half-squadrons are so much scattered in the bush-land, which prevents officers, men, and comrades knowing each other, and *even their horses*. The mounted men—cavalry and infantry—meet in brigade very seldom. To encamp 500 men and horses is regarded as a great feat, but so seldom is this done that the officers have no chance to

handle large bodies of horsemen, nor learn their capabilities in action. Without mounted men being brought more together, the cavalry brigades will lack that cohesion and valour tempered with judgment so well used by Murat, Kellerman, Paget and Combermere, Fraser and Trench. Mistakes are more frequent in cavalry than in infantry, and if mounted infantry are to be the *élite* arm of the Federal forces of Australia, they must be numerous and highly disciplined. Generals Tulloch, Edwards, Hutton, Owen, and Sir C. H. Smith have a high opinion of them. If specially trained they could defeat Cossack lava, ride down with success the Boer formation, or paralyze the rapid advance of German Uhlans. Of mounted troops in war Major-General Hutton, C.B., says—"It was incontestable that the power of mounted troops in recent wars had proved itself as of great, and even greater effect than ever before—though perhaps in a form less attractive, less understood, than when 'ascending squadrons come.' When the great area to which modern battles must extend, the vast range of fire, the accuracy and deadly nature of modern fire power, were considered, it followed that rapidity of movement and the power of covering distances at a rapid pace by the advanced bodies of troops became a necessity. Of what avail will slow-moving infantry scouts be when opposed to a long-range and powerful artillery? What commander will dare to develop an attack against an enemy whose presence at three miles' distance, unmarked by smoke and unannounced by the 'cannon's deadly roar,' is only revealed by the shower of bullets fired at long range, and well-directed shrapnel fire? Will it not be necessary to push forward mounted men, who, by their rapid manœuvres and far-reaching flank movements, can give intelligence and compel the enemy to display

his strength and make evident his position? The preliminaries of every battle and skirmish must be left to mounted troops. It must be borne in mind in modern battles, that infantry once committed to an attack cannot be withdrawn except by undue loss of life, of some initial energy, and *morale*. Therefore, for the primary duties of reconnoitring, scouting, and covering an advance for which all mounted troops exist, or have existed in past and recent times—their value is now even more evident than ever it was before. It is a curious fact that a modern military school of thought ascribes more tactical importance than before, to its effect upon infantry and artillery, when shattered or shaken by the deadly character of modern fire, or when taken by surprise. It is argued, with reason, that in modern battle the effect of a superior infantry or artillery fire will be so great and demoralizing that the victims will become an easy prey to an impetuous, well-timed charge of well-led cavalry. I am inclined to this view, and many who, like myself, have taken part in recent wars in Africa and Asia."

Mounted infantry have in recent wars created for themselves a *rôle* in war that has performed wonders in the alone advance, or in following up the rapid scouting of cavalry. They have dash, boldness, and tenacity of purpose, and can hold important positions either in advancing or retiring. I do not think they can in a great war perform the double task of cavalry and mounted infantry. They can keep their eye upon the cavalry in front, and when rifle fire is wanted to inflict deadly loss upon the foe this arm is indispensable. They proved heroically useful in the Cape wars, in the Soudan, and in Burmah. Major-General Hutton told the author that if Russia was to attack Herat and advance

upon Candahar, the attack upon India would be paralyzed by the arrival of an Australian division of 5000 men, with 2000 troops of the Mounted Infantry of Australia conducting the advance, to strike at Zulfikar or Merv, in the Russian rear. The Mounted Rifles and Rangers of Australia would strike terror, fire and sword, destroy the Transcaspian railway, and cut their lines of support from the Caspian and Southern Russia. This is a force which neither Lord Wolseley nor Sir G. S. White have yet considered. It lies in latent power and patriotic in heart, and 2000 bushmen, good in the saddle and in shooting, would gladly respond to the call of their late commander, who may be termed the father of the Mounted Infantry of the British army.¹ Mounted infantry are the very thing for our Federal army, for offence or defence, and their numbers in the Regulars, Militia, Volunteers, or Reserve should be 3300 in peace-time, or 7300 in the event of powerful invasion. For coast defence they could defend posts, telegraphs, bridges, railways, etc., or, quietly reaching the sand-hills of the seashore, cut off boat parties in search of information, provisions, a few Mayors or country J.P.'s. But I must advise Lancer Cavalry and Mounted Rifles to appear upon more corn-fed, instead of grass-fed, horses; to have their over-bred animals more uniform in strength and possessing more staying power, as daily reconnaissance work takes the stamina out of the distant strains of Yattendon, Abercorn, Richmond, and Carbine. But this is a weak spot in the Mounted Brigade that can only be cured by time.

¹ See my paper in the July number, 1896, of the *Journal of the United Institute of India*, Simla, upon "How far Australia could help India in the time of war." I broke into some new ground of Imperial and Colonial defence, which will afford some food for reflection to many naval and military experts.—G. C. C.

The Engineers are much wanted, and a Staff Corps of one hundred instructors should be permanent. During peace the Permanent Engineers would be fully employed in military survey, and in mapping out the *terrain* of that coastal country likely to become the scene of war in the event of invasion, and the advance of the foe upon the rear or flank of a naval base or chief stronghold. The Director of Engineers is charged with the state, condition, and impregnability of the defence works of Australasia. This department must contain the most highly-educated officers, and know every detail of modern armies and general warfare. The forts must be well designed against modern fire, be fitted up to suit the most scientific system of gunnery ; teaching all arms in the construction of hastily-made shelter trenches, the throwing up of field entrenchments and Plevnas, the conversion of coaling ports and naval bases into Sebastopols, the bridging of rivers, the laying of mine fields, submarine defence, the planning of field works to cover fortified places and lines like those of Torres Vedras ; the management of balloons, telephonic and telegraphic system in defence ; the erection of military buildings ; the direction of electric appliances in war (including Edison's), and communication with all signal, coast, pilot, and lighthouse stations, to work in unity and co-operation with head-quarters and the Federal system of defence. Many Imperial Engineer officers have visited Australia and New Zealand, and all left the Colonies strongly advising governments to perfect the work of fortified defence. A great amount of money and work have been expended in all the Colonies under the judicious advice of Jervoise, Scratchley, Boddam, De Wolski, Renny-Tailour, Reynolds, and other officers of the Royal Engineers. The Director of Engineers

should also have a major of the Royal Engineers of high professional attainments, and I do not see why the Federal government should not have an Engineer officer of the Indian army, well up in irrigation, as well as in fortification, and in the erection of naval and military buildings. There are lots of work to do for a Director of Engineers in artillery defence, *re* new pits, range-finding cells, fire-master's stations, extra emplacements for quick-firing and howitzer gun armament.

Submarine miners are important factors in river and harbour defence, though naval commanders have always treated submarine mines and booms with partial contempt, as mines can be countermined and booms jumped or broken by ships, or by gun-cotton. It is often the case that the E.C. or observation mines do not go off at the right time. The Navy insist upon the principle that mines can be countermined by sweeping boats, night and day, under cover of the big ships, and that torpedo attack can be defeated by quick-firing gun fire. Naval officers know how to take Sydney or Melbourne. Flag-Captain Fisher, R.N., said as much in the presence of some military and submarine Engineer officers. This rather astounded them, and Major Lee exclaimed—"Do you think our forts are manned by Chinamen?" As this system of defence is somewhat secret I will not detail it, but in the Colonies submarine mines and torpedo harbour defence is far from being reliably perfect. They must be simply and quickly laid, or they are of no use. They must be "well and truly laid," or they might not go off. Electro-hydraulic and submarine mining is always being improved. The mine defence of coaling and naval stations can only be complete under Federal government. The width of channel to be defended is costly, as also the protection

of same by guns and other arms of the service. There should be concert of action between the section officers of a mine-field, the guard-boats, the infantry, and each fort-commander, and the general officer charged with harbour defence. Victoria has the best system of submarine defence. Rivers can always be studded with mines with rapidity, if the ground torpedoes are available, and a submarine corps exists to lay and work them. Mine-field work wants a deal of practice, and therefore a permanent Federal corps of submarine miners. Harbour defence brings out with vivid force the co-operation of all arms of defence.

The development and expansion of the Cadet, Rifle Club, and Rifle Associations, and their patriotic desire to amalgamate with the Federal defence of Australasia and their fellow-subjects in arms, should be assisted in every locality by the Federal Commonwealth. I am pleased to note, during the past twelve months, that such valuable factors in war have assimilated themselves with the defence forces of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, etc. They will add largely to the united strength of a Federal army. In my estimate of a Federal army I have only allowed for the strength of the Senior Cadets affiliated with recognized battalions, but a Minister for War should be only too pleased to recognize the large force of cadets, well selected, as future defenders, and not as having been placed in the ranks "to make a crowd." Thousands of our school-boys can "shoot straight," as Lords Roberts and Wolseley so much desire in the army; and who in a year or two would jump into the proud position of patriotic Anglo-Australians—not the less British because they are Australian! If the Cadet forces are weeded of some sickly boys whose constitutions will never allow

them to be soldiers, they would be found valuable in a variety of ways by any Commander-in-Chief. Cadet Corps also give birth to an honourable, martial spirit. The creation of large half-trained Reserves makes me pause at the thought of their state of discipline and field instruction. "If officers," says Colonel Otter, "are to become the instructors of the men, as they should be, they must make constant use of their books, and the best-trained officer is he who can best train men in every detail of their duty, from the barrack to the battle-field. To obtain and hold the confidence of the men the officer must impress them at all times, whether it is in the lecture-room or the field, with his ability to command. You cannot fool men with a show of knowledge above that which is actually possessed; and it is only by earnest, steady study that men of our profession can keep abreast of the times, carrying in our progress others with us, and by our example show that in no profession in the world does the old adage more fitly apply than in ours, that knowledge is power."

Major Mayne says—"Recognizing those forces which are at play in the sphere of human nature, we must also have a clear idea as to the part that each plays in battle. Generally speaking, *the moral forces* give determination to act; *the mental forces*, skill to act; and *the material forces*, capacity to act. It is very necessary for any one who aspires to be a leader of men, especially in times of great moral excitement and mental strain, to make as close a study as he can of human nature or character; its capacity and its weakness, not only in the individual but also in the mass. For it is a curious fact that even if the individuals composing a mass of men are each of them brave and courageous and animated by the highest personal motives, yet when



COLONEL OLIVER,
Commanding Victorian Rangers.

The first officer to lead the Victorian Force into N. S. Wales. He has been long identified with Victorian Defence.

they are congregated together they are more influenced by adverse causes. It is very necessary that we should have a clear idea of what a battle is. If we do not know what it is and what it involves, it is impossible to properly train men for it. As I have already stated, the battle is a great drama of life and death ; it is a passionate struggle between two bodies of men, who each make use of the best weapons of defence that they know of and can procure. The value of such weapons depends partly on their technical construction and properties, and on the requirements for their effective use being provided ; but far more does it depend on their rational employment, and this in turn depends on the men using them. We must always remember that the value of any weapon depends on the man making use of it. There are other moments in every hotly-contested battle, periods of intense emotional strain, in which a stick or a stone is as useful as the most improved modern rifle, so far as practical effect is concerned, and even in which the men might as well be without weapons at all."

The Rifle Club Reserves are now a formidable force in Australasia, and with sufficient drill and discipline they could be made cohesive enough in battle to hold a fort, shelter, or entrenched position with heroic tenacity, firmness of purpose, self-sacrifice, and first-class shooting against masses of troops engaged in desperate assault within the zone of effective rifle fire. I do not expect them to be used in field operations and manœuvres, like Regular or Volunteer troops, but under the direction of a good Royal Engineer and painstaking Inspector-General of Musketry, their use in defensive battle would be terrible, if well posted. Their *rôle* in war resembles that of the Boers. When their position is pointed out

to them under cover, and they are told what is expected of them, we can fancy the deadly effect of their magazine rifle fire at long distances; but a Wellington or a Lord Clyde would require to have both cavalry and artillery covering them all day. Rifle clubs, if specially drilled in simple formation—of course in shooting well and in bayonet exercise—would help to decide a battle like the heroes of Hastings and Agincourt. Let clubs be formed and disciplined. The rules and regulations of rifle clubs are now well known, and adopted by the several commandants. Members should provide their own arms, but the State should supply the uniforms and liberal ammunition. Clubmen like to own their own weapons, and make pets of them.

We can also fancy what an army of individual sharpshooters and dead shots there are in the several rifle associations of the Colonies. Their numbers are *prodigious*, the membership being open to civilians, naval and military heroes. Royal Federal rifle associations, with all their tribes of prize shooters, would be valuable riflemen for fortress and coastal defence, by picking off, from under rock and boulder cover, the crews of torpedo-boats, the gunners of Maxim and quick-firing guns on board of daring cruisers, and the directors of landing parties. Arrangements can always be made with the Minister for Defence for the prize-money, transit, and cost of ammunition.

With regard to educating the army, commandants have been obliged to send home for expert Imperial officers, fresh from artillery and scientific study, the latest war, professional schools, camps of instruction, and field manoeuvres. Several of the smartest and most promising Australian officers have been specially sent to India and England for higher practical training,

modern instruction, and military experience in all branches of the service. They passed high examinations, received many awards, and splendid reports as to efficiency and practical study at Chatham, Woolwich, Shoeburyness, Aldershot, Poona, Rawul Pindi, Delhi, and Lucknow. One of the officers went through the Chitral war, and a Queensland major visited nearly every military centre of Europe in search of practical instruction. Such visits must improve the training and efficiency of a Federal army, and make the experience gained felt amongst the rank and file. It tends to qualify officers for the Staff and higher commands, creates a fine race and martial feeling, and gives them a love for higher technical education in the art of war. Elementary education must not be neglected by the civilian soldier, engaged in private business all day. The Militia and Volunteer officers have done wonders in passing "exams." connected with the various schools of instruction for all arms in the several Colonies during "stolen hours from sleep and business." The efficiency of commissioned and non-commissioned officers during the past two years has been most marked, though the Colonial youth is slow to patronize the military Press or United Service Institutes. Military education does not stop at passing through schools of instruction and camps of exercise, as there is no finality to naval and military change. Officers and men have now no excuse for not having a profound knowledge of the modern art of war. It gave me great pleasure one day to receive a scientific paper by Lieutenant Corderoy, Sydney, on the "Flight of a Projectile." How many Colonial officers can write such a paper?

Staff officers to carry out the work of Federal defence are not made in a day. They must be trained for the

special work of Federal organization, so that in the event of mobilization young and martial Colonial officers will know how to take up and conduct important commands, apart from teaching the Militia and Volunteers a higher military education. The days of overpaying officers are over, yet democracy must not seek to under-pay officers, or it will not procure the long-service and scientific leaders of troops. The love of salary and the army go together in the Colonies, as few families are in a position to make soldiers of their sons without pay. The rank and file like every penny of their pay, especially when their employers deduct a few hours' pay from the man who must attend parades to qualify himself for efficiency in the very force designed to protect the employer's property. When the Volunteers were formed in 1859, employers were only too glad to let their gallant young men off for a few hours' drill. It is not so amongst the merchants, shopkeepers, and employers of Australia. This is how volunteering in all the Colonies has been a failure, and resort had to the partially-paid, or really the Militia system. Reduced pay is always a sore point with any body of men, but there must be a uniform rate of Federal pay, just to the Militiaman, the Volunteer, the Reservist, and certainly to the taxpayer. Fair pay commands good officers and men in the army and navy as well as in other professions. Ability and genius commands its price, and the South African scale of pay and promotion is now being recognized. Pay shows signs of zeal, ability, and proved capacity amongst commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers. It will draw a superior class of men towards the forces in all the Colonies, for the time, energy, and self-denying patriotism of men must be paid. In addition to pay, "promotions and appointments should be made

contingent upon their professional value." The financial condition of a Colony should not be an excuse to reduce men's pay from £12 to £5 12s. It is a breach of faith.

When Federal defence is an accomplished fact, I hope to see established at once a State Naval and Military College, pupils using the inter-colonial grammar schools and universities before entering the Federal College to pass final examinations for commissions in the army or navy. Arrangements could be made to procure masters and professors from home, whilst Imperial and well-educated Colonial officers could be had as examiners. The Kingston College in Canada has been a decided success, and many of its pupils were passed into the Imperial army. Why should an Australian Naval and Military College not do the same?

The training of the whole army is one of the first duties of Federal defence, in accordance with the syllabus order. I regard the present system of camp, field, garrison, and Easter training as insufficient to bring officers and men up to the standard of army discipline, hardiness, ordinary military intelligence, and fitness to repel invasion, with success and little cost in men and money. The men must know how to march, fall into the general idea of attack, how to conduct themselves in battle firing and tactics, and the officers, above all things, must know how to direct such movements with masses of men under fire, without making a single mistake. It is bad enough to make mistakes in sham fights or field manœuvres, but to do so in real battle with the foe before them is most unpardonable, in fact, as Sir C. J. Napier said, such leading "is murder, and a crime." It is necessary that additional instruction should be given to the troops in courses and camps of instruction, the scope and length of the annual training enlarged and

made as continuous as possible, like those now in vogue in England, India, and Europe, to make them fit soldiers. Annual training should also include object-lessons in mobilization, concentration, tactical operations, and field warfare, combined with success and practical economy. Owing to false retrenchment there has been no chance given to field officers for the handling and leading of large units, and the result is *inexperience*. "It should be continually borne in mind," says General Hutton, "that the individual instruction of troops in small units is only the elementary stage of military training, and that no army can have any pretension to efficiency in war which does not give its members, especially the senior officers and Staff, the instruction in field training and practical experience in administering and commanding the larger and more important units of command, which cannot be obtained by occasional drill in isolated districts. This advanced system of field training, which can only be given by continuous training in camp, is the very essence of military efficiency in modern armies, and disaster in war must attend that nation which neglects this universally accepted and necessary factor for military efficiency." These words of military and defence wisdom should not be thrown away upon thoughtless legislators. Local camps of instruction are not mis-spent money, as every commandant knows; for they not only give training but improve district concentration and the love of self-defence amongst the people. I rely very much upon the Militia force, but its pay will be regulated by the number of days' drill per annum, especially in the Artillery Militia, which must become efficient to work and defend the forts upon mobilization. Some experts say the Militia should have thirty days' annual training. The Volunteers will not have sufficient

time to spare from business and avocations for many days' drill, but I have confidence in their ready intelligence and devotion to country.

"Let us," says Major Mayne, "consider for a moment why this is so. Man has a tripartite nature—*spirit*, *soul*, and *body*. These three factors must all be considered before we can understand what a man is. And the forces which come into play in each of these factors are respectively called the *moral*, *mental*, and *material* forces which arise from or act on the threefold nature of every man. *The moral forces* arise from courage, ambition, love of country, *esprit de corps*, discipline, sense of duty, and such-like motives appealing to man's highest nature, and which are independent of the intellectual and physical powers that a man possesses. They can be held by the weakest and sickliest of any community or body of men. *The mental forces* arise from education, training, instruction, and practice. *The material forces* arise from numbers, physical strength improved by practice and training, the perfection of the weapons, and in the necessary conditions being supplied for their adequate use.

Australian soldiers must agree with Colonel Otter, that "good drill and a high state of discipline are essential to success; and though British troops have proved on many a hard-fought field that they were not deficient in either one or the other, still the requirements of modern battle are so many and various that a much higher standard is requisite than was the case in former years. How is this to be attained? Not by the old methods, certainly, of hard punishment for small offences, but rather by the intelligent co-operation of all ranks, made possible by the spread of education. The rank and file of the present day must reason. They are

quick to grasp ideas, and this, combined with the wondrous powers of discipline, renders them capable of carrying out duties which it would have been impossible to teach the good, though ignorant, soldier of a past generation."

The Australian soldier is part and parcel of the people, in fact the best portion, as they are prepared to die in defence of their soil and liberty. More than this heroic soldiers cannot do on behalf of Queen and country. In every Colony where reduced pay was deplorably fashionable, the martial spirit of Australians never deserted them for a moment. In Tasmania, Victoria, South Australia, and Queensland the forces were shabbily treated by Ministers and Parliaments, but the male population still lives in hope that Federal defence will soon do them permanent justice. Strikes, agitations, and retrenchment did not affect the drill, discipline, and efficiency of the defence force as a whole, which augurs well for the voluntary spirit of the new army. The decentralizing system of authority, in delegating responsible duties to each officer and man, will popularize all ranks, and make both officers and men reach a high state of intelligence, efficiency, and martial ardour. It is a mistake to think that Australians are one whit behind their Canadian comrades in martial zeal, love of empire, and patriotic devotion to the old flag. The pride of race and blood tells in the two countries as well as in England. If some Canadians had to join the United States army to satisfy their martial spirit, many Australians have and are being incorporated in the Imperial army and navy. Australian soldiers in the future, as General Hutton said upon leaving our shores, "were on the point of a fresh departure on the part of the military forces—such a departure as would place all of them on a very much higher level. This, he was sure,

would be welcome to them all. Instead of being the force of New South Wales, the larger part of them would become connected with the forces of Australia. Under the present arrangement they were subject to local influences, to local political influences, and to personal influences. They would in the future, he trusted, be above all that. Their responsibilities would become Australian, their obligations national, and that was a great future to look forward to. The result would depend upon each one of them, and how each performed his duties."

Australia will always be indebted to Major-General Hutton of New South Wales for his army reforms, tactical schemes, and organization. He was always received by the people as a smart and up-to-date Imperial officer, as one who knew what war truly was, and as one who studied war in the school of Wolseley, Buller, Wood, and Alison—great masters in the art of war. He was the only English officer on the Staff of the Highland Brigade in Egypt, and "the Kilted Lads" named him *McHutton!* He regarded the Colonies as "pegging out claims for posterity," as they were always adding fresh territory to her Majesty's dominions. He found the *personnel* of the force in 1863 second to no army in the world, but felt a little surprised at the want of professional knowledge amongst the officers, and the confusion of the Ordnance department. He told the public that he entered upon his duties with great satisfaction, but he wanted high results from the force, as military science was changing from day to day, and as there is no finality to military organization. The British army, like that of Australia, was always learning and improving its condition, by working itself up to the efficient standard. The two great points were *organization* and *discipline*; the one was

the machinery of war, and the other was the perfection of the power to fight and win battles. A believer in the words of Moltke, he told both officers and men that they must learn the functions of war in peace. Without discipline nothing could be done with an army in war. His idea of discipline was perfect obedience and command, from the G.O.C. down to the rank and file of the whole force. Officers had to possess a high standard of knowledge to command that discipline—strength of will, firmness of purpose, self-confidence, and power. As the Anglo-Saxon was naturally an intelligent soldier, it was necessary that he should be led by well-trained and intelligent officers. He believed in the system of units and individual responsibility, a great feature in the making of fine modern soldiers, *i. e.* the colonel to command the regiment, the captain his company, the lieutenant his company-section, the sergeant his squad, and the non-commissioned officers their groups. With this object in view General Hutton elaborated an excellent scheme of schools of instruction and examination for both officers and men, of all arms, for those living in towns or the country.

General Hutton felt proud of the Lancers and Mounted Infantry, and considered them to be better than the Yeomanry, and felt confident that the Australian Mounted Riflemen could be trained to be a better force than the Boers. He flattered them too much, as they do not yet show sufficient cohesion and realization of their duties in the field, but for daring and active movements across bush country they can be trained second to none in Africa or America. He soon made all ranks "sit up" in their discipline and military duty, and it took the G.O.C. two years before he was properly understood. He threw himself into



MAJOR-GENERAL HUTTON, C.B., A.D.C.,
late Quartermaster N.S.W. Define Forces.

Bassano, Photo.

the work of education, organization, and field instruction with devoted energy, and he rendered efficient service by trying to popularize the status of the soldier and the defence force amongst the people. His speeches were genial, instructive, reflective, and full of anxiety for the future of Australia. His zeal to organize the force to a high standard of efficiency made Labour and Radical members taunt him with being an "Imperial officer"—a great compliment—but he had too much experience of men and the world to be angry with such observations. *Duty* to his Queen and New South Wales was ever uppermost in his mind, and the men began to see that discipline and organization, with efficiency and economy, in the light of the tax-payer, were the sole objects of his ambition in the Colony. He was sent for to specially organize the force, but whenever he began to reform, it is said that "petticoat government" stepped in. But he was cast in a thicker skin than what Sir G. R. Dibbs thought he was. The holding of the great Tournament did wonders in creating a fine *camaraderie* amongst the Colonial and inter-colonial forces. He was a keen advocate of Federal defence, and on one occasion he said—"To begrudge sending a contingent abroad for the common good, and for persons to object to it, was a miserable spirit, and a sentiment not voiced by the people." Major-General Tulloch also spoke in the same way. If the Queen called for volunteers, there is nothing to stop Australians from going to the front, though the Defence Act referred to the defence of the coast from invasion, "and not one whit beyond it." General Hutton always said that it was for the people to decide the defence policy of the country: soldiers had only to obey and carry out that defence policy.

CHAPTER XIX

THE VALUE OF ARTILLERY IN DEFENCE

IT will be seen that I have selected the Artillery as a leading part of effective defence strength. During recent wars I have noted that "the theatrical branch" of the service contributed more to victory than the other arms during the crux of battle. I desire to see Federal defence strong in the most powerful breech-loading rifle guns, howitzers, quick-firing guns, and machine guns, provided with the best smokeless powder, the best modern projectiles, and the best disciplined gunners and officers. Well-served guns will rule the fate of battles as potently as they did before. Artillery fire gives great moral effect, issuing from marked physical causes. It is the chief factor in war; not only does it kill and wound, but it produces an idea in the foe that it is useless to stand before well-directed and massed artillery fire. The "enormous calculation" is the moral effect of such fire upon cavalry, infantry, and ships' crews, especially when terrible losses occur in a short space of time. The loss of fifty men in five minutes would have greater moral effect upon a body of men than the loss of two hundred men in ten hours. At Rossbach, Frederick won the day by artillery. Guns created victory at Zorndorf, Torgau, Minden, Marengo,

Eylau, Friedland, Wagram, Lützen, Bautzen, Vittoria, Waterloo, Sobraon, Chillianwallah, Gogerat, Manassas, Gettysburg, Königgratz, Gravelotte, Sedan, and Mars-la-Tour. Guns did not show up in the Crimea, nor in the last Russo-Turkish war. Russian guns failed at Plevna, but at Aladja Dagh, Ahmed Kohl, Magfar, Slievnitz, in the Chilian, Brazil, and Chitral wars, guns were the useful and effective arm. Australian coast defence depends upon the rapidity, accuracy, and efficiency of gun-fire against modern ships carrying powerful ordnance. To know how to sink hostile ships is the main object of fort fire.

Captain White, R.A., an able writer, has recently pointed out that the last word on fire discipline will depend on the "power of command" possessed by the battery leader. There is no doubt that this is so, and that however well drilled a battery may be, however good its general state of discipline, unless its major "knows how to command," it cannot hope to win success. The power of command is a moral gift more or less developed in each individual. Like all other natural talents, it requires practice to bring it to perfection.

In the field, artillery plays a terrible part if the generals know the relative value of the three arms, with the use of the wires and railways for battle shock and sudden concentration, so that they may be able to deliver a final and glorious blow, at the right time. A shrapnel-shell fire at 3000 yards enhances the value of gun-fire. Captain White, in his Silver Medal Prize Essay, 1892, says—"Fire discipline is the combination of those qualities within a battery which enables its commander, in the shortest possible time, to turn fire of any desired nature and rate, upon any portion of the field at will." The massed fire of guns

will be largely indulged in, in the next great war. With its continuous stream of shot and shell the enemy must soon become demoralized in nerve power, and in the confusion a smart general like Roberts or White would send in his magazine riflemen to fire, and charge the hesitating soldiery with the fatal bayonet. This is what Low did in Chitral. All generals aim at rapid yet accurate shrapnel fire in the field. The modern fire-master must get his range accurately, and deliver his fire with rapidity and fierce energy if he desires to paralyze his enemy in fresh battle tactics. Long range, combined with powerful concentration, is fatal to the foe in the field, or off Sydney or Melbourne Heads. Guns used in mass or collective groups, all welded together by telephone and directed by one controlling grasp, have a greater chance of victory. The Germans in France, and the English in India, have charged in line with infantry with successful results, succeeding in ending a long infantry fire struggle. But it is no use having good guns, unless there are hardy, resolute, and heroic gunners to work them. Therefore, I make no apology for placing 3500 Field Artillery and 8500 Garrison Artillery in the Active army of Federal defence. The Artillery force will also require to provide men and horses for such new artillery batteries as machine, howitzer, and quick-firing batteries for both cavalry and infantry movements; to say nothing of those required in forts and entrenchments for covering mine-fields, destroying torpedo fleets, forcing passages, defeating attacks upon "the back door" of forts, horizontal fire, and sweeping the front of dense masses of infantry, and at fresh preparations being made at from one thousand to three thousand yards distance. Flying Artillery will yet be composed of Maxim and 6-pounder quick-firing guns.

The guns for field artillery are also undergoing a rapid and improved change, and the Colonies must be prepared to buy guns of the latest type, approved by the War Office, so that our gunners will not be placed in battle at grave disadvantage. France, Germany, Austria, and Russia have all been secretly improving and inventing new field artillery, all said to be sudden death to those in front of it. France and Austria especially have got hold of a handy yet powerful small-calibre quick-firing field gun. Private firms in Europe and America are busy inventing better guns, to excel those known and in use in field armies. Experts say that quick-firing guns waste ammunition, through too rapid fire. The questions of focus, dispersed fire, direct, plunging, and "gusty" fire, shrapnel, common shell, and bursting projectiles of all kinds are still all the rage at home. Reduced calibre and quick-firing guns for field use are questions that will be solved in 1897. The new horse batteries have 12-pounder breech-loading steel guns, with a 3-inch calibre, a steel carriage, and a brake-absorbing recoil. It only weighs 7 cwt., and with a charge of 4 lbs. has a muzzle velocity of 1720 feet per second, and a range of 8000 yards. This gun, for size and weight, beats any gun in any foreign army. The Minister for Federal Defence should keep his eye upon the newly-developing 15-pounder gun for heavier work in the field, and for manning movable batteries in coastal defence. Howitzer batteries should not be despised. The question of position finding along our coasts wants constant study by our permanent fortress artillery. New telescope sights have been adopted at home. Sights illuminated by electricity, for night-firing, are also a success. The addition of machine guns to cavalry, artillery, and infantry units should be considered. When the Federal

army is formed, I trust that part of the re-organization of Australasian defence will be to anticipate the armament and gunnery of the day, in the interests of both naval and military defence; the discipline and intelligence of garrison and field artillerymen must be kept up to the highest standard; and that defence schemes will always be associated with the offensive in the interests of successful defence. I approve of four-gun batteries to battalions of infantry, or as 3 is to 4. In Australia this gun strength in the field will most likely be altered. I hope not, for guns cannot be had in a day.

In further consideration of "the army we want," the public taste, of course, is to have a cheap one, without considering the value and defence efficiency of permanent garrison artillery, with plenty of gunners and infantry near at hand, in shelter trenches. I learn that the Australian Commandants lean towards the South Australian scheme of Colonel Gordon. It is most thoughtfully and masterly thought out, and reflects great credit upon his tact and anxious desire to have a complete defence in the event of invasion. His Act may be taken as the reflex of what Colonial Parliaments want, and which the Commandants have been compelled to advise, as Hobson's choice—that or nothing, because the people cannot afford to pay for a highly-paid defence force. Wages are high, and the wisdom of Australia wants a large and cheap, yet an undisciplined army, in place of a small disciplined army. This is the true meaning of the South Australian Act, combined with compulsory service. Apart from the valued opinions of many Commandants, I object to the placing of such a heavy trust, great national responsibility, the care of valuable guns and fortifications, and the defence of first-

class harbours in the hands of a Militia garrison artillery. The coast batteries must be manned by the very best and strongest-nerved gunners, sufficient to man the guns in action, with a strong reserve of men within signal call. Artillery is the most scientific branch of modern defence, and this demands a large staff of permanent officers and expert instructors. The capture and sack of an Australian town through bad gun-fire and undisciplined gunners might resemble the sack of Badajoz, San Sebastian, or latterly, Port Arthur, as described by Mr. Villiers. To prevent such terrible disasters, it will be seen that fortress corps must be strongly supported by garrison artillery, local infantry, submarine mines, guard-boats, and smart torpedo gun-boats, operating under gun-fire cover, outside the Heads. In Muscovite warfare we have to remember quarter like that given at Magdeburg, the Alma, Bulgaria, and the murderous pursuit from Geke Tepe.

The Colonies have also to look to the improved gun power of coastal defence, as the armament of some fortifications wants strengthening and rendering more efficient against modern naval gunnery. There is evidently no finality in the progress of improved artillery. Fresh designs, better metallurgy, new propellants, new conditions that affect gun and target, and alterations arising out of recent warfare, greater range, velocity, and penetration, have disturbed Colonial confidence in our coastal defence. Heavier guns may not be wanted, but we want more of the new guns mounted in detached forts to improve greater fire concentration. Colonel Rowe, of Sydney, believes in movable batteries. If long guns with smaller calibre, of longer range and destructive power, could be mounted on wheels, they could be thrown into unknown positions behind earthworks along

the coasts or at the mouths of harbours. Quick-firing guns will reduce the cost and weight of such armament and movable batteries. If the Japanese and their quick-firing guns had such terrible effect upon Chinese crews, one can fancy the effect of powerful quick-firing guns fired from the Port Jackson or Port Phillip Heads, with a steadier platform, against a raiding or bombarding fleet. At home, 111-ton and 67-ton guns will no longer be mounted in battle-ships, and with lighter guns of long range and penetrating shell power, we may see the two- or three-deck armour-clad ship, and three-tier gun forts, mounted with guns of 30-centimetre calibre. Still, we must not forget what the heavy guns of the *Chen Yuen* did to the Japanese flagship, and a 13-inch Canet gun, at Yalu. Modern guns are now closely associated with smokeless powders, with high explosive power, muzzle energy, and velocity. The old 25-ton gun of 1867 had a muzzle energy of 7006 foot-tons, whilst the new type of 24-ton gun has an energy of 11,230 foot-tons. Wire-wound made guns have developed real strength and energy, or an increase of maximum pressure of 45 per cent. It took Mr. Longridge forty years to convince the War Office of this new system of gun construction. The wire-built gun is far superior to the Canet, after severe test trials. The 6-inch quick-firing wire gun weighs only 7 tons, and its firing power commends it to the Federal forces of Australasia.


There is a delicate subject connected with the supply of ammunition to the inter-colonial forces of Australasia. All the small-arms and gun stores of powder is the old black powder, perfectly behind the times for use in war. Sir G. R. Dibbs, late Premier of New South Wales, signed a contract in 1893 or 1894 for the supply of black powder for small-arms up to the year 1899, and he

must have known that smokeless powder was the true powder to be used in war. The signing of the contract was a stupid blunder, indeed, a crime against patriotism. Sir George had no right to sign such a contract against the advice of the Commandant. I hope this contract will be burst up somehow. Major-General Hutton and Sir Charles Holled Smith both condemn the use of this powder in the Colonies, in the face of the higher and better explosive. Smokeless powder will derange the future conditions of battle, and upset both leaders and men. But it gives the men a clearer front view, permits a steadier rapidity of fire, gives a hitherto unknown degree of initial velocity, low trajectory, ballistic accuracy, and better impact penetration of projectile. It disconcerts an enemy if a smokeless-powder fire emanate from a wood or ambush ; but it is not yet *noiseless*. It is "not seen beyond 330 yards, and is inaudible at 440 yards ; and even with guns it hides the exact range position." This is the opinion of Captain Moch, but I differ from him with regard to the sounding report of 24 guns, or 3500 rifles, all going off together. Having read the latest contests of the several smokeless powders at Bisley, in Sweden and Switzerland, the Normal Smokeless Powder is by far the best for the Federal army of Australasia. It is non-nitro-glycerine, and can be safely handled in tropical and sub-tropical climates. In coast defence the good guns must have good powder, were it only to defeat raiding, the cutting out of expeditions designed to set fire to merchant ships and surprise warships at anchor. When the *matériel* is all right, I hope that cohesion and resolution in the *personnel* will not be found wanting. Hence my anxiety to see coast and harbour fortifications in the hands of permanent and highly-trained artillery.


CHAPTER XX

HARBOUR DEFENCE

How many persons fail to realize all about the complex and difficult nature of mobilization for harbour defence! It wants something more than heavy, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, and garrison artillery. It wants numbers, all arms of the service, well-trained and scientific officers. All our large ports and coaling stations invite a hostile foe, because there is an absence of practical experience and local organization. Every man has got to learn his true position in the fort, guard-and torpedo-boats; in covering mines, entrenching, etc. I only speak of typical harbour defence. Federal harbour defence will require vast re-organization, simple, plain, and complete. The Director of Harbour Defence must place himself in some conning-tower, like the captain of an ironclad, with all parts of his command connected by telephones and signal codes, so as to have complete fire control over every fort, mine, and torpedo-boat. The fortress commander must know how to fight his fort, just as a captain knows how to fight his ship in action. He must know the power of every gun, its range and probable effect on the hull of a hostile ship, and should the enemy land, he must know where his supporting infantry and rifle-club troops are



Naval gun.



Field gun.

The new Hotchkiss Naval and Field quick-firing Guns.

These quick-firing guns are admirably adapted for almost every phase of the naval, coastal, harbour, and military defence of Australasia. This type of gun has proved its value in action upon several distinguished occasions.

sheltered. It was proposed to put harbour defence under the naval power, in England, but it should be in the hands of a permanent or local garrison artillery and naval brigade, under the artillery officer solely charged with harbour defence. A combined expedition might convert a bombardment into a regular siege, like Gibraltar, San Sebastian, Sebastopol, or Port Arthur. The artillery officer commanding should have his plans ready, his command properly subdivided, and in conducting the defence to see that his orders are promptly obeyed, to correct his own mistakes, and defeat the objective of the attack. He should have an able officer near him to work the range-finder, either in small or heavy defence. He should know every point and range of a harbour, know how to sink a war-ship steaming "zigzag," "dodging," or at a 22-knot speed, and trying to force the entrance through a gauntlet of 25-ton gun and machine-gun fire; after dividing his general command into responsible units—artillery sections, submarine defence, torpedo-boat and foreshore defence.

The business of a garrison artilleryman is to work his guns in a fort, know every part of the fort structure, be able to take his gun to pieces and put all its parts together again, to repair pumps, works, and work his own engines, electric lights, and position range-finders. Can a fort artilleryman do all this when war is declared? No; he must learn to do so during peace, under the best Staff officers and Warrant officers. He should be able to use the rifle and bayonet to repel ladder stormers and sudden rear attacks. He need not be an expert miner, sailor, or infantry man, but should know how to act in unison if necessary. The division of labour in harbour defence is a technical question, and the men specially trained

for technical work, such as gunnery, station observation, position-finding, test and electric stations, etc. Infantry trenches, movable batteries, and sundry stations should only exist on paper before war, yet be known to every commanding officer, so as to be created in an hour or two, when war is declared ; to better deceive the enemy. Ten per cent. of supports should be near at hand to reinforce the fighting power. Parapets and entrenchments should be manned, and plans for reliefs arranged in due form. When a 25-knot cruiser can enter a harbour or pass a fort in three minutes, her hull target is ever shifting, and this necessitates all arms of defence being *ready under arms*. When once a war-ship gets inside a harbour, the Director of Harbour Defence and the forces under his command should not let her go out again, even by boarding her in Nelsonic fashion, if torpedoes fail to hit the hull. As the work of watchful defence will be continuous night and day, three reliefs of eight hours each will be necessary. The forts should use black powder during peace, and smokeless powder during war. The guns and projectiles should be up-to-date, and the shell store-rooms large enough to hold one hundred rounds. Artillery stores, complete in everything, should have shot-pits, magazines, and store-rooms excavated out of solid rocks, as forts should be built upon rocks commanding coast-lines and harbours. The fort commander should also have each part of his fort under direct control by the electric dial and speaking-tubes, in a casemate armoured conning-tower, with maps, having an all-round view of the operations. The chief director should have his observation station in a select place, with telephones to each unit commander, and also signal codes for night or day communication. He must be in touch with every point of defence and

offence, with a chart table and a powerful telescope before him, and provided with all the scientific instruments for fire control and range-finding, thus placing him in telephonic or signal-code communication with officers commanding the forts, submarine mines, the naval boats, the infantry, and also the Commander-in-Chief, who would be on the look-out for landing columns that might lead attacks in the rear of fort defence. Hence we see that officers in command of units require great military skill in handling troops during a siege. Schemes of defence have to meet any unknown or changeable schemes of attack. Every officer must be held responsible for the work of his command. Officers commanding artillery districts must be responsible to the G.O.C. for the success of the defence entrusted to them, become their own fire-masters in forts, correct the shooting, work the electric light at night to the danger of the enemy, and co-operate with their covering infantry, night or day. Submarine mining is a special command in harbour defence, yet under the senior artillery officer. He is responsible for the complete system of harbour mines and working operations, and ever ready to carry out the orders of the director of local defence; the mine-fields must be in faultless working condition; to see that his E.C. or observation mines will go off at the right moment, to prevent his wires from being cut, and his mines from being countermined. He must be able to report properly to the director the state of his mines during every changing phase of attack, and know what vessels are to be blown up or allowed to pass. His electric lights must be worked to decoy the enemy into his network of mines, and to let fort commanders see the position of a ship having passed the submarine mines successfully. The fort lights

crossing with other lights will confuse a hostile ship under steam, as she cannot see ahead of her. The submarine officer should be able to charge and repair his mine-field, send out guard-boats and post his covering infantry to protect landing-parties at night. Again we see how Federal defence would improve submarine mines by superior types of intelligent officers and men, if passed through special schools of instruction. The drill regulations must be learned as if they were the grammar of defence, so that every man in forts or guard-boats promptly knows what to do. Each officer in charge of units or sections should have good maps of the harbour, with the mine-fields and shelter trenches well defined, and know how to obtain reliefs, fresh stores, ammunition, and the dispatch of wounded men.

The naval officer commanding guard-boats should take charge of all entrances and passages during the night, by sweeping the water area for the enemy, and direct false and position lights. He must also be in touch with the local commander of harbour defence. He may have guard-, launch-, torpedo-, or gun-boats under his command, and be responsible for discovering night attacks. If his boats, etc., are divided into sectional commands, they must be able at all times to report events to the chief commander on shore, as also to the chief naval officer. It is thus seen what a vast amount of drill and discipline is here wanted before the naval defence of a harbour would be perfect. Such perfection can only be attained and made economic under a common Federal naval defence system. Fresh drill regulations would be necessary. Should an enemy rush over mines, or through a secret channel, the guard-boats should advance to meet it, and destroy it. Guard-boats could also give a landing-party or countermining attack

a raking flank fire from machine or quick-firing guns, and co-operate at many points of defence with both artillery and infantry fire. Here again is seen the want of organization on safe lines between the naval, submarine, infantry, and artillery arms of the defence, under the conditions of divided and undivided responsibility. Each commanding officer must understand the nature and charge of such expected operations. Co-operation, with fixed responsibility, must exist in such cases of defence, and in accordance with the plans of defence laid down by the artillery officer in charge of harbour defence.

Commander Bosanquet, R.N., in command of the Sydney Naval Artillery Volunteers, gave a practical lecture, in 1896, upon the duties of guard-boats, the position to be taken up by them, the control and system to be carried out in action. That lecture was valuable, but the improved condition of torpedo-boats has changed their *rôle* in war into guard-boat defence. Commander Bosanquet's recent lecture upon harbour defence supports my argument in favour of a Federal torpedo-boat fleet. His paper dealt with the special protection given to the coast, harbours, and rivers by torpedo-boats, independent of the British Navy. "The torpedo-boats should defend pilotage water, including the approaches and entrances to ports, and in harbour defence should be employed in defending the inner waters by enclosing particular positions, and by repeated attacks on the enemy in confined water. A long coast-line was particularly adapted to defence by torpedo-boats, seeing that their proper work was as raiders from a base. We could not look to the Admiral to station his war-ships at any particular spot for the protection of our coast or harbours, but must be prepared

to guard our merchant ships in pilotage waters out of reach of the fixed defence. He considered that for an efficient coast defence by torpedo-boats there should be four torpedo-boats for each principal port, and two for each of the harbours or rivers which had any claim for protection, supplemented by one torpedo-boat destroyer for every hundred and fifty miles of coast-line. In time of war these boats would be stationed temporarily at dépôts on the coast, where they could water and coal from punts. The duty of the torpedo destroyers would be to supply information, to cover the enemy by day, and to worry them all the time. They would cover an area of six hundred by one hundred miles, and would frequently be in touch with the first line of defence, constituted of the vessels of the Navy. In attacking a ship under way or in confined waters, the boats should approach in pairs from the leeward, if possible, and if possible assisted by a similar attack from a different direction, which might be from seaward, the unexpected quarter. It had been found that the probable position of discovery would be about a thousand yards from the enemy, and this zone should be travelled over at full speed, a moderate speed sufficing until discovery. As the movement would be rapid, it would be best to take the enemy end on, sweep past as close as possible, and use the broadside discharge, as being the quickest and most reliable in and out of action. The percentage of hits in action at sea was, according to Admiral Colomb, two per cent., and taking into consideration the actual rate of fire in warfare, it was probable that a torpedo-boat would escape from the fire of the enemy. In firing a torpedo at a vessel, it had been found that a fifty-yards range was quite long enough, and when ships had been struck it was generally by the broadside.

torpedoes, which should be fired first, the bow tubes being kept in reserve. Successful attacks must be sudden and unexpected, and given with dash, and unless favoured by fogs or rain squalls, a daylight attack would have little chance of being successful. For harbour defence, the torpedo-boats should attack from seaward, thus falling on the enemy in the rear; that was when they were kept outside the harbour and not allowed to cross in. When attacks were about to be made from inshore, the officer commanding the defence would give the order to cease fire, and the attack would thus relieve the garrison. There was nothing like repeated attacks to demoralize the enemy, and attacks such as he had indicated should be made frequently. In all probability an enemy could rely upon at least four clear days on the Australian coast without interruption, though at Wai-Hei-Wei, where the Japanese had complete control of the seas, it took twelve days to silence the guns. Batteries, mine-field guns, and submarine mines were the recognized defences in protected ports, though history had shown that such protection was by no means invulnerable, and rather that passive defence was invariably unsuccessful. The moral effect of torpedoes was quite as great as that of mines, and its effectiveness with regard to hitting its object far greater. Even the small torpedo-boats of an antiquated type, and considered useless for an attack against ships in the open sea, might be substituted for mines, and they would have all the advantages that the attack mobile and sudden has over the defence immobile and passive. In the near future it was quite possible that mine defences would be altogether abolished, opinion generally inclining towards keeping the main channels in all harbours absolutely clear." After dealing

at considerable length on the method of harbour defence, Captain Bosanquet said that, to sum the whole matter up, he considered that a good armament of quick-firing guns, backed by some fast torpedo-boats, would be the very best way of expending a defence vote, the fixed defence invariably taking second place to the mobile force.

CHAPTER XXI

MOBILIZATION

MOBILIZATION, in naval or military language, jumps into martial life and activity, at the first sounds of war. It means the national gathering of all arms of the united services in Australasia for offence or defence, by order of the Governor-General, in proclamation. The most complete military mobilization in the world is that of the German Army, and in naval mobilization that of the British Navy. Mobilization is worked out in the time of peace. When the war banner is unfurled the Colonies must rush to arms with one start, one cry, one readiness for war. It is the outcrop of the organization of well-trained and disciplined troops ready to march out to the points of danger, and take the field to meet and defeat the foe. Every defender, upon the word *mobilize* being flashed from Colony to Colony, must know his first act of national duty. The generals of division and brigade, the colonels and majors of regiments, the captains of troops, batteries, and companies, and all ranks, from sergeant-majors down to privates, must know when the first train starts to join his dépôt; know the very spot where he must get his uniform, kit, food, arms, ammunition, and first *fall in* with his comrades of the territorial corps to which he belongs in the army.

or navy lists and rolls, which are also the rolls of fame that moment the Australian defender answers the call to "mobilize." It is a moment of pain, parting, nerve power, mental courage, nobility of thought, and race patriotism. The love of bush home, family affection, and domestic association give way before the defence of property, nationality, independence, Queen, country, and empire. Mobilization is a sad and heart-rending, yet heroic and tremendous moment in the integral life and longevity of colonies and nations. When mobilization is a failure, and a general does not know where to find his own troops—armed strength—success and victory would be doubtful, for the "first broadside is half the battle."

The territorial military districts depend upon the size of the population of the recruiting areas, and their geography in relation to combined movements. I think the territorial system of brigades, regiments, and battalions would work well in the Federal army. Let the 1st Regiment of Victorian Infantry be composed of four battalions, *i. e.* one of Militia of eight companies, one of Volunteers of eight companies, one of Rifle Club Reserves of eight companies, and one of Cadets of eight companies. This would tend to localize the regiments and facilitate the work of mobilization upon a sudden emergency. All the troops should be quartered within the recruiting area, and could be easily brought together on special days from country districts to the district head-quarters for battalion, brigade, and field manœuvres. Under this territorial system the men could be created soldiers, from the drill-room to camps of training. When the men of one military district command are gathered with those of one or two other neighbouring military districts, a spirit of emulation would arise to

excel in smartness, shooting, and field discipline. "It is a wise and patriotic step," says Major Adye, R.A., "which seeks to identify each corps with a certain territorial area, but the system cannot be complete till it is possible to station these corps within the limits of their recruiting districts in the time of peace, and their association with other corps will do much to promote local interest and enthusiasm." Metropolitan troops should also associate themselves more with the country corps, and be given an idea of marching, as if on campaign. It would strengthen the federal tie, by binding the town with the country. The territorial system helps to perfect the organization of the forces for peace and its expansion into war, which is most essential for the efficiency of a large mobilized army. The Wagga heroes would try to surpass the Gympie men in valour, or the men of Bendigo would try to outshine the courageous yeomen of the Darling Downs. War organization in peace-time should be nearly the same as in war-time, with its army corps, divisions, brigades, staffs, trains, and subsidiary corps. No army strength, personal bravery, or splendid units will make an army terrible in war, if its organization is not brought up to the highest standard in the time of peace. Let the territorial system be adopted.

The proper development of a well-organised and efficient system of "District Concentration," upon the lines recently laid down by Captain W. G. Hamilton, is full of deep object-lessons, and application to the Australian territorial system, which I have proposed. All officers should study his splendid paper. He defines district concentration as the massing of local "troops of a military district at a selected station within the district, usually the head-quarters station, for purposes of

instruction." The district troops can be added to by passing or neighbouring corps or batteries. The number of troops so concentrated may vary in size in different corps, but they concentrate all the same for drill and field exercises, were it only for seven clear days' instruction, instead of a month or six weeks. "What to teach, and how to teach" is the main object. Such camps of manœuvre mean time and money, items which must be left to the Council of Defence. A good time of the year should be selected, and every penny spent should be shown in soldierly results. District troops should go into camp well drilled on the parade-ground, and the officers both ready and capable to handle their men. These camps are the Colleges and not the Grammar-schools of the force. The garrison artillery will always have days and dates for the holding of their special days of fort discipline and instructive gunnery in conjunction with other forts, with a covering division of infantry and the harbour tactics of the naval brigades. These camp days are the days for testing the acquired field knowledge of the officers learned during the course of the year, when the proficiency of both officers and men will show out. The very marching of troops to points of concentration affords practical minor tactics, as is done at Lytton, Minto, Campbelltown, and Frankston. Captain Hamilton states—"The main object of district concentration should be the various arms in combination, and generally a training in mutual co-operation between every unit engaged, for the benefit of all ranks. It is a principle to be hammered into every one that co-operation is essential to success." Sham fights, like cricket, should be played to win, without the loss of temper, on either side.

For mobilization purposes the Federal army scheme must be thoroughly studied, owing to distance, location,

and cost. When the word *mobilization* is flashed forth from the Governor-General, by telegraph, to all Colonies and district head-quarters, it means a *rush to arms at once*. The details of an Australian mobilization are wide and far-reaching. The fighting formations and sections of coastal defence can be made permanent, and the Federal forces divided into territorial batteries, companies, troops, squadrons, battalions, regiments, brigade units, and divisions of varying strength. Unlike the British army, none of its units on mobilization would be abroad, and if a force of 5000 men had to be sent out of the Colonies, it would not affect the Federal strength much. The distributive organization would facilitate the mobilized fighting formations or flying columns. Every corps must have its known station, where its brigade and division is centred for mobilization and strategic concentration. When the order of mobilization is received at each station, the mobilizing signal should be hoisted, and the news spread, as effectively as the Fiery Cross. When units arrive at depôts or stations, the Staff officers should have everything ready to house, feed, and move them off *en route* to the front or point of danger, ordered by the Commander-in-Chief. The assistant quartermasters should have the camps mapped off, with corps flags flying, so that the soldiers could join or fall into their proper place in the ranks, without confusion. The garrison artillery would be always with their guns, but the Militia and Volunteer garrison artillery should be held ready to reinforce any threatened part of the coast.

I have already pointed out the necessity in peace-time of Australia having a numerous and most practical Staff Corps, the officers of which should know their

duties and places upon mobilization, without fresh general orders being given; in fact, every soldier of any rank should know his duty, when and where to fall in, so that the G.O.C. will know where to find his main military power and strength. The peace organization should now be seen to be perfect upon mobilizing for the hard experiences and changeability of stern warfare. Commanding officers should have their corps ready at once. But no funds are allowed to put Mobilization schemes into practice.

The Army Service Corps should first see to the rations of the men, and know beforehand the amount of transit necessary for any given number of men. The price of food, etc., should be fixed by Act of Parliament during war, and any one charging more money to be imprisoned for from two weeks up to twelve months, according to the nature of the store imposition. The men should find the arms, clothing, accoutrements, cooking utensils, entrenching tools, cartridges, saddlery, harness, wagons, and all other items of the unit, to make it ready to take and keep the field as a fighting body at an hour's notice. All corps should send their lists of corps requirements for war, and the Army Transit Corps should be responsible for finding food and transport, having the power to seize it if necessary, from private stores or merchants. Saddles, harness, and boots should be always stored. The Army Clothing Department should have on hand uniforms suitable to clothe 50,000 men of a mixed force, without considering that wanted for 100,000 Conscripts. Reservists should be able to appear in uniform in twenty-four hours. All clothing to be found stored at the mobilization dépôt. The Ordnance Department must have all the guns, wagons, horses, and ammunition ready to enable the batteries to take the field. The Medical

Corps stores and ambulance material are as a rule always ready for 50,000 men, as also the Veterinary Corps. The men's kits should be as light and useful as possible, with a change of under-clothing and other articles wanted on a hard campaign. The Director of Army Clothing to supply these kits upon mobilization, and the men should at once mark each article. All unfit men should be sent back to their homes, and the corps should be declared ready for service. All horses wanted to be supplied by the Remount Department, care being taken to supply the type of horse wanted for each arm of the service. Commanding officers to send men to take charge of and sign for the number of horses wanted by their corps, troop, battery, or regiment. Saddles and harness should be marked on their arrival at the corps, battery, or regimental depôts. Some corps only come into existence upon the act of mobilization, and these would be clothed, fed, armed, and equipped. Similar arrangements must be made for the expansions of the Active army in the field and garrison, if conscription is not resorted to. Railways, steamboat companies, and public conveyances must carry any mobilist signing a printed form, to cover the cost of his travelling ticket, at half rates.

The units of the Field army to be formed on mobilization are Brigade, Divisional, Corps of Staff, Artillery, Engineers, Mounted Infantry, Lancers, Ammunition Columns, Ambulance Companies, Military Police, Post and Telegraph, and Army Service. The details of the Field army must be left to the Head-quarters Staff, and the adoption of the Council of Federal Defence. It is an organization which cannot be formulated in a day, nor in a year, of theory and practical experience, for there must be theory worked out before there can be

practical experience. The first days of mobilization will tell the military qualities and intelligence of the officers—their training, organization, and fitness for command, in the camp, on the march, or in battle. The sterling qualities of an officer are clearly seen in those short and anxious days that daily lead troops nearer to each other, and draw them up by strategy into battle tactical formation. It will be then seen if he understands the drill-book, and has initiative enough to understand the orders of his superior officers. The cavalry and mounted infantry officers will be first sent to glean information of, and “scent” the enemy. They will be the eyes and ears of the army, and Australians will be found far superior to Cossack, Hungarian, Hussar, or German Uhlan in the work of reconnaissance. Attack formation in the bush is yet to be solved by experience. Australian officers may yet find some improved form to suit their country and topography. It may be that of European troops or Boer guerillas, but the real attack must be confined to the genius and generalship of a bold and dashing commander, well up in all the principles and arts of war. Success and dash in the attack upon the ranks of an invader will depend upon the tactical training of both officers and men, and the teaching them to act independently, upon their own responsibility. One officer can command, but he cannot do the work of a hundred. All ranks must be sharp, prompt to obey, full of decision of mind, deaf to delay and the weakness of vacillation under a decimating fire.

In Australasia, mobilization is based upon the general Federal defence scheme and armed strength which I have set forth, and it comes into force in times of urgent emergency. It may be found necessary not to call out the whole Federal forces all at once, and

that the Council of Defence might only ask the Governor-General to call out the Active or Field army, with its full Reserves. It is officially proposed to divide the mobilization of the forces into two parts, i. e. *partial mobilization* and *full mobilization*. Partial mobilization means the gathering of the troops on a *peace* footing, in accordance with the naval and military establishments, consisting of two stages. In my Federal army, I place the Permanent, Militia, and Volunteer armies, with their respective Reserves, as the Active, Field, or Peace army; and the full War army to consist of the Conscript army, with any other corps that might suddenly spring into existence, like Dihbs' National Guard. The *first stage* of partial mobilization will be confined to the complete, and instant manning of the fortifications, representing coast defence. This will bring out *at once* all the garrison artillery, both Naval, Militia, and Volunteer, the members of which knowing beforehand which fort in coastal defence they are allotted to. The Reserve of each regimental or battery unit to be duly warned to be ready for active service. The *second stage* of partial mobilization means the rapid mobilization of all arms of the military defence, and allotted in district or movable columns, ready to start wherever directed by the Commander-in-Chief. The point of concentration may be in one Colony, or in a neighbouring Colony, ready to cover fortress or harbour defence, go into field action, or embark for some objective point to deal a heavy, if not a final blow at the enemy. The Reserves of every troop, battery, company, or other corps must be warned in due course, and the men proceed to the head-quarters of such corps to fill these up to their complete war footing. There must be no first or second Reservists in this

scheme, as I know the voluntary spirit of the Active or Peace army will be found ready in their unit ranks of war, upon mobilization, fully clothed, armed, equipped, etc.

Full mobilization means the complete armed strength of both the Active and Conscript armies, according to the detailed scheme of such mobilization and the establishment, the perfection and discipline of which will be suddenly thrown upon most experienced Staff officers, assisted by old officers and men of the Imperial or ex-Colonial forces. I trust that the armed strength of 50,500 men will be found sufficient to defeat invasion, yet the *fourth stage* of full mobilization must have some organized existence, even on paper. It will be a sad day for Australasia when the Conscripts must be called out. The *third stage* of full mobilization should mean the calling out of ex-Volunteer, Police, Rifle Club, Cadet, and Volunteer Reserves not included in the second stage of partial mobilization. The strength of this third stage should be formed by a serious and final call for Volunteers, to increase certain units or movable columns fronting, or operating against the enemy. These Reservists and new Volunteers should mobilize at their nearest district head-quarters, where they could be clothed, fed, armed, equipped, and sent off according to orders. Most of these "third stagers" should have some drill and discipline in them (for one undrilled man can spoil a unit); whilst the "raw recruit" element could be easily drilled in a week or two, to qualify them to join the ranks of some unit they might prefer. The fourth stage of full mobilization is explained further on, and I need not repeat the Conscript mobilization. The territorial military corps, or dépôt system, should be the bases for Conscript mobilization.

No special time can be laid down between the successive stages of mobilization. All depends upon the quickness, suddenness, and formidable nature of hostile attack or invasion. Nor can we know the point of attack or landing, which necessitates the troops upon mobilization standing at arms ready to obey the word of command, for the forces must "be in the right place at the right time." The power to dismiss certain corps, units, or parts of the mobilized force when not wanted in the forts, or in the field, should be left to the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, or to the commandants of military districts. This would "ease off" the pressure of war upon the population—the married men, family wage-earners, and weak-chested men should have the preference of going home, but subject to be recalled to join their unit, on signal, or other arrangement. It is proposed that the "commandants should be empowered to make local arrangements to provide that a proportion—not less than one-third—shall be continuously on service, the remainder—not more than two-thirds—being available for immediate service at the shortest notice, given by a pre-arranged signal. The same principle may be allowed to hold good for the 'movable column,' whose services would in all likelihood only be required as a whole in the event of hostilities being imminent. The proportion of the men continuously on service may be made up by men volunteering for the duty, or by men detailed by roster. When the services of a portion of the mounted troops are so dispensed with, and it is not found convenient to take their horses with them, they will be sent to the Remount Depôt for care, but whilst there will be at the disposal of the Government."

It is highly necessary that such mobilization schemes

of Federal defence should not exist upon paper, and—excepting the Conscript armies—the forces of every two or three districts should concentrate for field manœuvre, to enable officers to handle brigades and divisions, to give the whole force a fair idea of working with all arms, and put mobilization to the practical test. For me to assign the division of the Federal army into the just proportion of officers, rank and file, horses, guns, wagons, etc., would be too speculative in this book, as the exact number of each district and Colony, based upon population, is a matter that can only be worked out properly by the steady development of the whole force, in minute detail. If the Active army is set down at 50,500, the number of field-guns for the Federal army, upon mobilization, should be: 80 heavy guns (6, 12, and 15-pounders), 20 Hotchkiss quick-firing guns, and 30 Maxim guns, 2250 horses, and 1000 wagons. But the clothing, stores, transit, entraining, etc., must be left to the Council of Federal Defence. There is a class of nondescript corps which would be wanted upon mobilization. It would be a good thing in army organization to have twelve pioneers, six wagons, six cyclists, and twenty-five Maxim gunners, belonging to all infantry regiments, to mobilize, and march with the battalions. It is necessary in testing mobilization that all imperfections and deficiencies should be noted and rectified by the Staff, as wagons, horses, stores, arms, and clothing may not be forthcoming upon mobilization. Changes might also be seen to be necessary to better organize, equip, and evenly distribute the cost and burden of military service. No matter how careful and exact Staff officers may be in peace in preparing the art of defence and war, mobilization finds out weak spots. The G.O.C. and Head-quarters Staff will have a secret

plan of campaign ready, to set in motion, by some celebrated Moltke button, the whole force, without calling out any set of Conscripts. I do not believe in a Conscription army under the British flag, as "mobiles" did not fight so well at Moscow, Bull Run, before Paris, or in the Corea. I regard the Conscription as a last resort, or call of the Commonwealth to arms, and that before it is too late in the theatre of operations, but I place more reliance upon the Reserves and the Rifle Clubs, who, with a little more drill, would prove telling in a fight. The Reserve ranks would perhaps be swelled out to 20,000 men, as there are so many old soldiers of the Imperial and Volunteer army and navy of Great Britain resident in the Colonies, and who would nobly volunteer in defence of the old flag. A deal depends upon the Staff officers to bring the Rifle Club Reserves up to active service, discipline, and service musketry.

With regard to Reserves, care must be taken that they *do exist when called upon*. I have designed the Federal army of Australasia upon the voluntary principle. Members of the force can resign at short notice, and they do not always pass into the Reserve, but into the obscure Retired lists. I should like to see the Permanent men enlist for twenty-one years, the Militia for twelve years, and the Volunteers for eight years. The Militia and Volunteers should be with the colours (why not colours?) for three years, and the balance of service in the Reserve, their names still borne on the rolls of the corps to which they belong. When they change residence from one district to another, they should belong to the local corps, even in another Colony, where they reside. This system only would make a Commander-in-Chief sure of the strength of his Reserves upon an emergency. The nomad life of the Australian

necessitates such a clause being introduced into the Defence Act. The great value of Reserves is to have fairly well disciplined soldiers to increase and stiffen the movable columns or fortress defence on the eve of war. The men having passed through the ranks for three years, the inference is that they are trained and seasoned soldiers. At home, Reservists turned out at the dépôts and joined their units almost to a man, and when the Yankee, Boer, and German affairs cropped out "like a bolt from the blue," over 500,000 ex-Volunteers of the United Kingdom declared themselves ready to re-volunteer, in defence of country. The same spirit was manifested in Canada, at the Cape, and in Australia. If the Active army can be fed by Reservists and ex-Volunteers, we shall not want a Conscript army. It is better to volunteer than to be "press-ganged," and one volunteer is equal to three pressed men. The peace footing of an infantry company may be composed of 60 members and three officers, and on a war footing of 100 men and four officers. This will do away with skeleton companies. Rather than have these filled up to 100 by Senior Cadets and Rifle Club Reserves, these corps should form extra battalions to the territorial regiments, as described elsewhere. I am pleased to see the Cadet and Rifle Club forces being brought under the military departments. The hostile spirit of foreigners in 1896 against the British Empire brought out much latent martial spirit in Sydney. The Volunteers were only represented by three companies of Scottish Volunteers, but in January the pure Volunteer Force was largely increased by the establishment of three companies of Irish Rifles, three companies of St. George's Rifles, three companies of the Defence Guard, and the Sixth Regiment of Australian Rifles. These corps were got up in the

most loyal and enthusiastic manner. I was glad to see this new volunteer movement, as it proved the loyalty and devotion of all classes to Queen and country, and also went to show that my estimate of the Australian Volunteer arm, despite the partially-paid system, was a factor in defence to be relied upon in the event of war or invasion. General French seems to depend too much upon the Volunteer branch of the service, but as the Militia force will have more days' drill per annum, it should give colonial infantry more discipline and "backbone."

CHAPTER XXII

DAME EUROPA'S SCHOOL

“Great England put her armour by, and stretched
Her stately limbs and slumbered in the sun ;
The nations, seeing then how long she slept,
Comminuted together, aud, in whispers, said :
‘Lo ! she is old and tired ; let us steal
The crown from off her brow. She will not know.’

* * * * *

Mocking her, cried, ‘Her time is past ; her blood
Is sluggish, and her sword from out
Her scabbard she will draw no more.’

* * * * *

Then, swift as lightning flashes
From the blue skies, her glance of scorn fell on them,
And they crouched like wolves that are o'er-mastered.
England stretched forth her hand, and touched the world ;
England arose, and spake, and calmly said :
‘Nay ! *I am mistress still.*’”—OUIDA.

ARGUE how one will, the world is still regulated by the ever-restless politics of Europe, and Australasia is now within their dangerous sphere and influence. A review of the dormant embers that may soon blaze up in a general war should be studied with deep interest just now. The Eastern Question and the aggressive policy of Russia is secretly at work. She has got a big leg into Corea, and France is constructing the Manchurian branch of the Siberian railway. This means more than peaceful trade. It points to the rear or sea attack upon India and Burmah, and is a challenge to

British supremacy in the Pacific. The Russian fleet in Chinese waters is large enough to defy that of England. The issue is far-reaching. I trust that British diplomacy will not depend upon the pacific and friendly assurances of the Czar at Balmoral, for the march of Russia eastward will go on all the same. Russia "bossing" Europe and England sounds strange in English ears.

The Dual and Triple Alliances should at present deeply exercise the Australian mind, which perceives that war between two distinct Alliances will bring British Imperial interests into the gigantic struggle. France wants the Rhine provinces, the Congo, Niger, Egypt, and Siam. Russia wants Turkey, India, terminal ports for her Caspian railway in the Persian Gulf, and for her Siberian railway, at Port Arthur. These questions are gravely bound up with the Dual Alliance. Russia, being so bent upon weakening Austria and Germany to gain full power on the Danube, over the Balkans and in Constantinople, and knowing that she will have England against her, has formed an unholy alliance with republican France. If France reconquered Alsace and Lorraine she might desert the Russian alliance, and if Russia conquered Asia Minor and Turkey in Europe, she might desert France, stop her march upon India, whilst building up a Cronstadt on the Persian Gulf and a Sebastopol in Corea, she would thus become a standing menace to the trade of India, China, and Australia. The present armed strength of all the great Powers of Europe, being armed to the teeth with most destructive engines of war, and directed by thoroughly disciplined officers and men, the sequence and results of modern war make the boldest pause in the desperation of race hatred, and military attack. Austria and Germany are resolved to keep Russia to the north and

out of Turkey, whilst both are pledged with Italy to defend each other against France and Russia. A war of the Dual Alliance with England would be the opportunity of the Triple Alliance to attack the Dual Alliance, and smash it, with the help of the British fleet, which would also command the sea, for the said Powers. Spain, Italy, and England will never agree to a Russian naval port in the Levant, nor will they agree to the Mediterranean becoming a French lake. If the Dual Alliance is permitted to "boss" the world in diplomacy, it will conquer all Asia, all Europe, and all Africa in the next century. But there is a great "if" to this foreign ambition. Indeed, it would be to the interests of Japan, the United States, and England to join their Triple Alliance. England must take sides in the next great war, as the policy of the balance of power will dwarf all ideas of non-intervention. In the next European war our allies would be Germany, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Spain, and the Danubian principalities, whilst our foes would be France and Russia. It is an open question that if England and Russia go to war, whether the Triple Alliance would also declare war against France and Russia. Some sages seem to think that the Triple Alliance would remain neutral. Australians do not think so, as such an opportunity would not be missed by any Continental Power to square accounts of long standing. The rapid advance of Russia eastward has placed enormous wealth, men, and money at her disposal for war. This increase of strength and resource has justly alarmed Austria and Germany, and the day may come when they will be too weak to keep back the tide of Cossack invasion into Western Europe. The creeping advance of Russia will endanger every nation, including that of France. The average Englishman sees

dangers ahead in the Pacific through the two colonial policies of France and Russia; and it behoves the Australian Colonies not only to be armed with the latest naval and military weapons, but to have their defence forces well drilled, disciplined, organized, and commanded. It would be too risky to neglect the lines of harbour and military defence during these days of sudden and expected war, and to depend solely upon the success of the Royal Navy at sea. If the Navy was strong beyond the shadow of a doubt, it cannot preserve all parts of the Australian coast from attack, and therefore it is more than necessary that the second line of military defence should be made perfect. In all wars some parts of a coast will be subject to raiders and cruisers, whilst some ships and steamers will be destroyed out of such a large number to protect. It would be too much to expect from the Navy to guarantee the safety of every coast town or small island, and to make sure of local defences the people should not only fortify harbours, but know how to fortify and defend with discipline such fortification against cruisers, torpedo-boats, and invaders.

The Eastern Question has not only disturbed the peace of the world, but its prime mover bids fair to conquer the world—to win the whole north, south, east, and west. The wills of Peter and the Catherines, of Princes and Moscow editors, are tinted with the ambitions of Alexander of Macedonia and Napoleon of Corsica. When a Russian Prince said that "Russia's real enemy was England," he was right; but he might also have added that "England's first enemy was Russia." It would have been more to the point. The execution of the will of the great Peter has made England and Europe the sworn foe of Russia, as

her spirit of universal conquest set in, in 1820. The Crimean war did not stop her dreams of conquering Stamboul, which in all ages has been the key of the world. The conquest of Moslem and Slav, and the breaking up of ancient kingdoms, distributed races in many corners of south-eastern Europe, which to-day desire to follow the example of the Italian and Teuton, and be united. The Eastern Question is hydra-headed, and it crops up in Cadmean fashion. The Romanoff has long cast a greedy eye upon the waters and genial clime of the Golden Horn, whilst shivering in his Winter Palace, on the banks of the Neva. Stamboul is the goal of Russian ambition, and with it, the central and western Powers know that, the balance of power would be finally disturbed. It would also mean the conquest of Greece, the Austrian and Danubian provinces, the complete conquest of Turkey, and the beginning of long and bloody wars. Russia is already too large for the peace of Europe and the world. The Treaty of Paris was not a peace with honour, no more than the Treaty of Berlin. The expansion of the Eastern Question has brought it into the sphere and foreign policy of Australia. The Russian cruisers have surveyed Colonial ports, and her fleet in Pacific waters are more than a match for the Australian Squadron. This fleet, united to that of France, and perhaps China, must make Australian statesmen rub the dust from their eyes, and see that the future safety of the Colonies must depend upon the Royal Navy ; a perfect disciplined strong Federal defence, and complete inter-colonial organization.

The policy of France and Russia is to destroy our trade in our very commercial ports, and they are backing it up by strong war-ships and huge ship construction. It is surprising to see how Russia keeps up such an

army and such a gigantic ship-building policy. France has a navy stronger than the old country cares to see. The *Times* now tells us that France and Russia combined are building fifteen battle-ships to twelve battle-ships of England. These two Powers must have a naval object in view. Against what nation are such huge fleets and powerful cruisers to be directed? It does not require a prophet, nor the son of a prophet, to answer at once—the *British Empire!* Any foreigner will give the same answer. That being so, the Colonies must see that a strong naval and military Federal defence is wanted *now*—not when the blood of thousands has been shed, and millions sterling of property have been destroyed. Had Pitt lived to see such tremendous naval preparations being created and actually existing to bring about the loss of England's sea-power and her Imperial humiliation, that great Commoner would have dispatched several fleets to Russian and French ports, to destroy the hostile warships before they were fitted out. English statesmen are simply waiting to see their country's enemies put on all their armour, instead of smashing that armour before it is put on, to smash the power of England. Australia feels safe when it knows that the Royal Navy is safe, and has succeeded in maintaining the command of the sea. It is a long time since Trafalgar, and in the next war the British Navy will again have a hard fight to keep its sea-power against grand and secret European combinations. The ruling passion amongst Britishers and Colonists should during war be that of solid, mutual, and unified confidence between the United Kingdom and all her Colonies. England should say to the hostile foreigner, "If you touch my Colonies you touch me;" and the Colonies should say, "If you touch England you touch

me.' This is the true spirit to fight out the row in Dame Europa's School. The alliance between France and Russia will be found to be an unholy one. The alliance represents two direct negatives in government, as different as day and night, the one humane and civilized; the other autocratic and half barbarous. Knowing the aim and object of the Dual Alliance, our Colonial policy is to join issue with England. The revelations of Bismarck and the Armenian Question are evidence enough to make England and her Colonies prepare for any sudden emergency. I am not in love with the Russian maiden—"trust her not; she is fooling *England.*"

CHAPTER XXIII

THE REVIVAL OF ‘RULE BRITANNIA’

“ May all thy glories in another sphere
Relume, and shine more brightly still than here :
May this—thy last-born infant—then arise
To glad thy heart and greet thy parent eyes ;
And Australasia float, with flag unfurld,
A new Britannia in another world.”—WENTWORTH.

JOHN BULL is slow to wrath and feelings of revenge. He can stand a lot of insult and abuse, until it reaches a certain provocative point. He is genial, full of manly fair-play, and loyal in friendship; but when he feels imposed upon by foreign nations, or when foreign nations tread too heavily upon the lion’s tail, he springs to a deep sense of dignity, and stands upon the defensive. Newspaper and magazine readers have realized that three great Powers have not only been provoking John Bull to wrath, but have been drawing hostile cordons around every part of his frontiers at home and abroad. Their traders have gone so far into the centres of British and Colonial trade, and taken advantage of our national and Colonial good-nature, peace-loving characteristics, etc., that France, Russia, and Germany tried to twist the lion’s tail with bounce and braggadocio, at a time when they thought she slept, indifferent to the state-craft of Europe. But foreign nations forget the result

of the rude awakening of the great British nation. The Russo-China Treaty ; the Mekong, Niger, Congo, Transvaal, and Cleveland difficulties were considered with dignified and calm reason ; but when Germany proved false and Bismarckian to friendly England, "the splendid isolation" caused the British race to draw the sword and stand to her guns, all over the world, against the three corners of the universe, with the resolve to be *mistress still!* The revival of "Rule Britannia," dawning by the able lectures of Miss Shaw at the Royal Colonial Institute, began with Colonial expansion at Ottawa, aroused itself by the well-timed circular of Mr. Chamberlain, and electrified itself by foreign threats in 1895-96.

The Canadian report of Earl Jersey with regard to the Pacific cable, the Canadian route to Australia and the East, brought out to the Anglo-Colonial mind that all the Colonies and the Mother Country must "pull together" to defend international matters, arising out of trade competition and commercial expansion. Chances come and go, "the sands of time run quickly down," and as Tennyson says, we should "know how to take occasion by the hand," in things mercantile and national. It is the duty of Government to assist and protect private enterprise in the great national expansion, as the public Treasury shares in the reaping results of mercantile enterprise and inter-colonial co-operation. To a large extent Colonial development and prosperity and national wealth depend upon the life, spirit, and far-reaching wisdom of patriotic statesmen. Anglo-Colonial trade must find its way into new ports and fields, so that "the flow of trade may be increased, and the feeling of kinship uninterrupted." Earl Jersey, all the Colonial statesmen at Ottawa, and the circular note of Mr. Chamberlain, have at last struck the time chord of

immediate action to secure this Imperial trade before it is nibbled at by foreign merchants, like the Japanese, clever in following and adopting the policy of England in the past. The last two years' trade returns show that the activity of four foreign countries has driven a firm wedge into the trade and commerce of the British Colonies, to the disadvantage of the people at home, who are our largest and natural buyers of Colonial products. By taking advantage of present foreign threats, encroachments, and complications, the Colonies should now settle the direction and future groundwork of material trade. Here is the genuine race sentiment, uttered at Ottawa by the late Premier, Sir John Thompson—

"On this happy occasion these delegates assemble, after long years of self-government in their countries, of greater progress and development than the colonies of any Empire have ever seen in the past; not to consider the prospects of separation from the mother country, but to plight our faith anew to each other as brethren, and to plight anew with the mother-land that faith that has never yet been broken or tarnished." This is how to strengthen and preserve the race ties of blood and feeling, "on the score of national pride and solidarity felt in one great Colony for the aims and aspirations of other portions of the British Empire." The Conference resolved that any one Colony should have power to make differential reciprocity treaties with another Colony and with the United Kingdom; that all existing treaties with any foreign Power to prevent Imperial trade should be removed, and that "the stability and progress of the British Empire can be best assured by drawing continually closer the bonds that unite the Colonies with the mother country, and by continuous growth of a practical sympathy and co-operation in all

that pertains to the common welfare. And whereas this co-operation and unity can in no way be more effectively promoted than by the cultivation and extension of the mutual and profitable interchange of their products, that this Conference records its belief in the advisability of a Customs arrangement between Great Britain and her Colonies by which trade within the Empire may be placed on a more favourable footing than that which is carried on with foreign countries; and that until the mother country can see her way to enter into a Customs arrangement with her Colonies, it is desirable that, when empowered so to do, the Colonies of Great Britain or such of them as may be disposed to accede to this view take steps to place each other's products in whole or in part on a more favourable Customs basis than is accorded to the like products of foreign countries."

This proposal involves a fundamental change in the financial policy of Great Britain. But though this change of policy may be neither necessary nor practicable under present conditions, it may be said that the general feeling of the Conference was that the question will assume a different shape as the population and commerce of the Colonies increase.

Mr. Forrest said—"This development is coming, as certain as I am here to-day, and I think in the future of the Colonies of Great Britain, the Colony of Canada, the Cape, Australia, and other British possessions will be capable of producing as much raw material, and consuming just as much from England of her manufactures as the whole world is taking from her to-day. Our imports from foreign countries in 1893 amounted to £313,000,000, or 77 per cent., whilst from the British possessions the amount was 92,000,000, or

23 per cent. We find a market for two-thirds of our exports of British produce in foreign countries, and for one-third in British possessions, viz. £146,000,000 to £72,000,000. British possessions in these figures include India. The imports from and exports to Australasia in round figures stand at £30,000,000 and £15,000,000 respectively. But it seems very probable, not to say certain, that as time goes on these proportions will steadily and surely increase. One Colonial consumer is, it was said, worth more to Great Britain than six European consumers."

Mr. Foster stated that "the Colonies have all protected against the mother country, but none of them have protected as the foreign countries have protected against her; you can take them and make an average. Take the French tariff and compare it with the Canadian tariff. Take the United States tariff and compare it with the Australian tariff. Take the German tariff and compare it with the other Colonies. Look them through and through, and when you come to read out results you will find that the protection is far lower in the Colonies of Britain against British goods, taking it on an average, than it is in the foreign countries."

Earl Jersey concluded his report with some reflective points—"What is proposed is that the United Kingdom should create a new Customs barrier against foreign produce, and in my opinion the conditions operating upon Great Britain, in part indicated by the foregoing statistics, would not admit of the acceptance of this proposition, but, as I have said, it would appear from the discussions, taking them generally, that there is no expectation of any immediate departure from the free-trade policy pursued by Great Britain. There was, however, a belief that the conditions of the case will

in progress of time undergo a change, and a desire largely based upon friendly and loyal feelings towards the mother country, to find a means by which this change should be turned to account, so as further to strengthen the ties between the various parts of the Empire."

I hope those statesman-like ideas will do good. I think Mr. Chamberlain, and the spirit of the home people, felt pride and comfort in such Anglo-Colonial trade feeling, indeed, as the Hon. Robert Reid of Victoria said—"There is no need for any part of the Empire to leave the grand old combination to advance its own fortune." When I contrast the light of the Ottawa Conference with the dark waves of foreign envy and jealousy at British progress and prosperity, Empire interests have reached a point when they must go forward, and not go back. A retrograde step would be dangerous, and the British family know it. The Imperial citizenship is the grandest and noblest in the world. It is more glorious than that of Greece or Rome. Just now the unity of the Empire is everything, and Australians will do their share in consolidating it along with their Cape, Indian, and Canadian brothers in arms. Trade follows the flag, as the clear noonday light the darkness. Mutual trade and increase of Colonial wealth is the great, grand, and comprehensive object of Imperial and Colonial life. The Australian policy joins in the mercantile-naval-military procession. The history of Australasia is also that of England. It is the history of all the Colonies, and the history which "our boys" must study in their manhood. Every Canadian, Africander, Australian, and New Zealander is as much a Britisher as the native of the Avon, Clyde, and Liffey. They have the same rights,

privileges, freedom, liberty, trade, and Imperial protection. As Major-General Hutton says—" You are all members of the great British family, and none the less British because you are Australian born. We can hold our own in defence, and show the world that we mean to do so, no matter what hostile nations may think."

I am glad that the Sydney Conference, of January 1896, has removed the last stone of opposition to the Pacific cable, which will be laid from Brisbane to Vancouver, touching upon British territory only, the Imperial Government paying one-third, Canada one-third, and Australasia one-third. In peace or wartime the cable will benefit the Colonies and Empire. During war, by blockading the enemy in port, there can be no cutting of the cable, nor tapping of messages. Some say that the long line of the Canadian-Pacific railway can be cut in many directions by Yankee cavalry. My answer to this is that we shall never be at war with the United States, as the common-sense of the two great nations will remain peaceful, despite Jingo speeches, and the foreign vote. The railway terminus being at Esquimault, that port is the naval and military base of the North Pacific—a strong *quid pro quo* to the frozen-in port of Vladivostock. The Canadian-Pacific route is also a set-off against the Suez and Nicaragua Canals. Like the Cape route, it is an alternative route to India, China, Japan, the Pacific Islands, and Australasia. It enables England to push, develop, and command a trade with the Far East and North, and add security to her Colonial sons in working out their own commercial destiny in the broad Pacific. The presence of Russia at Port Arthur, French aggression in Siam, and the martial assistance given by one Colony to another, are questions which the Austral-Canadian

route will speedily solve in the interest of Great Britain and her heroic people. It would enable the Navy and the Canadian army to keep Russian Manchuria, or Japan (if ultra-aggressive) in check. It is not far from Victoria to Yokohama and Vladivostock, nor is it very far from these semi-hostile ports to Thursday Island, Sydney, or New Zealand. The Japanese power is rather near to Australian ports, in fact, we do not half like it, and in preparing the germs of Federal defence, British immigration, united with a little capital, should be continuously encouraged. Open up the land for the people. Let the best bone, blood, and energy of the sons of England, Ireland, and Scotland emigrate to Australia instead of to the United States, where the land is almost alienated to the people, the crops of which will soon be required to feed that people. If Australia was populated with 25,000,000 persons, the exports of breadstuffs from France, Russia, and the United States would soon cease. Imperial Federation should stop the Baltic and Black Sea grain trade at any rate, and send it to the British Colonies. These countries are getting fat out of trade with the United Kingdom, and the large share of the profits of that trade being secured by their governments, it is used to build warships to smash the sea-borne trade of England. Therefore, let the mutual trade of England and her Colonies flourish. It is true that the proposed cable and new lines of ocean steamers in the Pacific will require protection in war-time, and, asks the patriotic Sir John Colomb, "who is going to pay for that naval protection, when England already pays 19s. 6d. per pound for defence, Australia a halfpenny, and Canada not a brass farthing?" The answer to this is that the *present* warships of the North Pacific and Australian stations are

quite sufficient to do so, together with those smart and modern designed Pacific "greyhounds" trading to Japan, China, and Australia, if manned with brave crews, a dozen 12-inch quick-firing guns, with machine guns *pro rata*. The Empress line should make fast and powerful merchant cruisers, able for offence or defence, like the old East Indiamen of 1790—1815. Cruisers of twenty-two knots are wanted in the Pacific, as well as in the Atlantic. There are also smart coastal steamers fit to be commissioned as cruisers to patrol the South Sea Islands. Trade will follow the flag in the Pacific as elsewhere. The evolution of governing the Colonial Empire is no longer a system of discredit and grievance, but as Mr. Gladstone says, "it has become one of the chief glories and main sources of the moral strength of Great Britain." "Why," said Lord Salisbury, "should we occupy this privileged position? Because the flag floats over regions wider than any other, and over a Sovereign dominion over which the sun never sets." Lord Rosebery backs this up with—"We know that every bit of country not under our flag will be closed to us by a hostile tariff; and we are anxious above all things to unify and conserve the trade within the Empire, looking to it for the vital force of the commerce of the country."

Sir Andrew Clarke, R.E., strongly favours the Pacific route, as it will be the safest during war, as they pass near no naval base like Saigon or Madagascar during war, as goods could be conveyed without much risk, as it will keep in touch the scattered forces of the Empire and bring them into play, open up fresh avenues of trade by distribution of home and Colonial goods, thus reducing the present terrible stagnation of trade, so long felt by the whole Empire. This is a phase of

the Pacific route now thoroughly understood by the Australian public, who are becoming more practical and business-like. The defence of the Empire is a mutual obligation. Australia has contributed, and will further contribute, her just share of growing cost and responsibility in the event of war. I repeat that thousands of British and Australian born will not only find money, but are ready to lay down their lives on behalf of Queen, Australia, and Empire, and that flag under which we all prosper and feel happy.

Why should Australia desire to separate? It is only the dream of degenerate Trades Unions and "Little Australians." Our constitution is evenly balanced, and so elastic, that it reflects the most popular of public opinion. It regulates the difference of power and government control, even to the very brink of socialism, happily a drop in the bucket of State wisdom. The people are all right if they would read, and digest more what they do read. There is too much cigarette-smoking, tote-ing, and outdoor sports, instead of outdoor sports with intellectual self-help. But "our boys" come of a good self-governmental and martial stock, whose fathers were hardened in adventurous conquest and struggle for national existence; fond of seeing what is on the other side of the hill, capable of overcoming difficulties with easy ingenuity, self-reliant in the battle of life, jealous of traditional liberty, bold in the assertion of Colonial rights, yet with a hazy notion of England; ready to join their elder brothers in defence of racial interests; genial, full of fun, with traits full of martial inspiration, proud of having at their own cost created States or Colonies with prodigious wealth and resources; and when danger lurks abroad they will leave the "humpy" and "beard" of a sheep station for the front line of battle.

It is a priceless heritage, this Australasia of ours. What powerful national groups are being formed, and what self-sacrifices they will make for the defence of mother, sister, wife, and—home! Give the Australian something good to do, and point out to him the patriotic path, and he is a true Britisher. The aspirations of Australia are greater than those of the Cape or Canada. The Pacific and the East is its happy cruising commercial ground, whilst the gallant memories of the by-gone army and navy are no doubt cherished, revered, and hallowed amongst the traditional and time-honoured memories of the past. They will help to maintain the onward policy of Colonial and commercial Empire, following such men as Freemantle or Seymour, Bowden-Smith or Bridge, Owen, Tulloch, Hutton, Gordon, Gunter, or Sir Charles Holled Smith—to the death.

The conduct of foreign nations in keeping pegging away at England by trying to irritate her, provoke her to war, to take advantage of every little thing likely to humiliate her proud position, and "to twist the lion's tail," has had the effect of arousing the spirit of *Rule Britannia* throughout the United Kingdom and her Colonial Empire. At the sound of Germanic intervention in the Transvaal, the whole Empire, "with one start and with one cry," rushed to arms—as in the days of the Armada, Napoleon, in the years 1854, 1882, and 1885—to await the development of events. The army and navy were never in better condition to preserve the Empire of Victoria. Cool, calm, collected, and without panic, the British people got ready their mobilization papers. Whilst her heart beat true for the United States—blood being thicker than water—she spurned the action of the German Emperor, maintained her interests in Venezuela, the

Transvaal, Africa, Australia, and the Far East. Her people stood to arms, and new fleets were created in a calm, business manner. The Queen rebuked her grandson. The Reserves were ready to join the defence forces of the country. From far and near—from Sydney, the Cape, Canada, India, and Hong Kong the cables proclaimed the unity of a loyal and contented people. In Melbourne the people compelled the German bands to play *Rule Britannia* over and over again. The German houses and bank branches in London became dull for the want of trade. Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, and Pembroke felt the excitement, and men-of-wars' men joined their ships without being press-ganged. Ministers felt secure in the situation before the insults and threats of Europe, and the disloyal language of a Redmond, O'Brien, and a Davitt. Never before has modern England been so unanimous to defend its rights, liberty, Queen, and country. At the firm attitude of Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, at the heroic ride, yet mistaken duty of Dr. Jameson, and at the singing of *Rule Britannia*, the distant ranks of Australia "could scarce forbear to cheer." That happy thought and cablegram of the Australian Premiers touched the patriotic chord and heart of Old England, thus making a covenant with each other to join in the victories and defeats of empire. Long may that cablegram of the Hon. George Houston Reid be *famed*. It responded in home music-halls—

"Back to back the world around, answer with a will—
England for her own, my boys ! It's *Rule Britannia* still!"

All parties abated partisan rancour, and arrayed themselves together in defence of country, when external dangers were bobbing around. The factions which

divided Greece and the Italian States of old were absent in England and her colonies—thus “the source of public weakness and danger” had fled. Irishmen, Englishmen, and Scots at home and abroad, less a few in America, rallied round the Imperial flag. “Nothing,” said Lord Salisbury, in reply to Mr. Reid, “can give us greater confidence in maintaining the rights of our country than the knowledge that we have the full approval and good-will of our fellow-subjects in the great colonies of the Empire.” The sequence to all the hostile combinations of treacherous Europe is Imperial unity and defence. England, India, and Canada were prepared for sudden emergencies, but the Cape, New Zealand, and Australia were not. Federal defence was non-existing, and the Commandants were ready to do their best. Christmas came and went without war, but the New Year was full of war preparation. Peace, so far, has been secured; the trade-routes of Australia are once more safe, but there must be no finality with the work of Federal defence. It remains with the people of Australia to perfect that defence. They must share the burden of defence with the other subjects of the Empire. It is only a fair thing. I have endeavoured, out of my own ideas and the opinion of experts, to prove that in the days of peace we must be ready for war, just as if we believe that in the midst of life we are in possible death. But if we sound the UNITY OF EMPIRE and *Rule Britannia*, the British Empire will not go down like Rome and Athens, like Spain and Holland, or like Venice and Carthage. As I write this book on the shores of Sydney Harbour—the further Venice and Golden Horn of the Southern seas—me-thinks, I hear over the waters, upon which our Navy is watchfully supreme, voices singing *Home Sweet Home*;

Hands all Round, Round and Round ; The Death of Nelson, The Native Born Stand Up, Rule Britannia, and God Save the Queen ; and when the noble music has died away, a TINY TIM drinks to Federal Australia, with the heartfelt prayer of “God bless us—every one !”

Vast sacrifices are now being made by the sons of the Empire to maintain the grand old Empire of the seas. The British race is in arms to day all over the globe. When the distant parts of empire are drawn tighter together in affection, trade, and patriotism, and its armed strength is fully developed, disciplined, and reduced to a practical system, Britishers need fear no foe. The Empire is at peace, if foreign hatred and threat would stop. I have hopes that foreign nations will accept in their wisdom our power to make and unmake : and when the present war-clouds have gone, when peace is likely to return with all its joys and blessings, when those Volunteers and defenders now in arms upon the parade-ground and camps of field manœuvre will have dispersed to their homes, the great problem of Federal defence and Anglo-Colonial defence will be permanently solved. There must be no stoppage in Australian defence, for in these revived days of false Talleyrands and Iago Catherines ; of the modern power of steam, electricity, science, art, invention, and foreign ambition, the engines of war are constantly improving ; therefore they should be kept oiled. When all Europe is in arms, and the British name insulted by envious States, it is time that the Anglo-Saxon-Celts should stand shoulder to shoulder, armed and disciplined. As Admiral Colomb said—“We see behind us the measured tread of a host of advancing British nations, whose common path we are prepared to make plain, and to render safe. We see before us tangled masses of confused (military)

systems which we must do our best to clear away. We are warned of the dangers of our path by the whitened bones of empires which have gone before and perished. For through the sunshine of peace, or the darkness and gloom of war, our clear duty and only hope is still to advance as one people, helping the weak and cheering on the strong, until we have prepared for those who come after us a safe camping-ground on the shores of a great future. Then, and not till then, can we take the rest of the weary, confident that we have done our part to ensure that our Empire shall remain one and indivisible *till wars have ceased in all the world.*"

"United the Empire—make it stand compact,
Shoulder to shoulder ; let its members feel
The touch of British unity, and act
As one great nation—strong and true as steel."

CHAPTER XXIV

THE AMMUNITION QUESTION

THERE are many good reasons why we in Australia should be able to read the European political horizon with the accuracy of Clement Wragge. There is a war-storm gathering from almost every point of the compass, and it is only a question of time and where the dark clouds will burst. It may be upon the Afghan or German frontiers, in Asia Minor or Manchuria, in South Africa or in Siam, on the Alps or on the Carpathians. It is impossible that the present cost of huge armies and navies can be much longer maintained by the taxpayers, nor can the conflicting nature of race interests and national aspirations remain ill at ease for long. Newspaper readers must know that the continued prosperity and expansion of colonial empire has aroused since 1871 the commercial envy of Germany, the jealousy of France, and the avarice of Russia, to say nothing of the ambition of Japan in the Pacific. Ever since the close of the Franco-German war, both of these nations have waged a trade war against the trade and commerce of England, which is not much without the colonies and Indian empire. In the midst of these war clouds, is Australia ready? I think not.

In the defence of Australia, there may be plenty of

men mobilized in confused systems ; but a vital part in the art of modern war is not only to have the troops in the right place at the right time, but these troops must have the best guns and rifles, the best material, and a sure supply of powder. The ammunition question crops up in this direction of defence ; and it would be a fatal thing for these colonies if the forces suddenly found themselves running short of powder, with our command of the sea still a disputed question. Black powder is no good for a defence force. To meet a picked body of invaders armed with magazine rifles and the best smokeless powder, would be like fighting the foe with bows and arrows, or the "awful scatterers"—the blunderbusses. There is an ammunition factory in Victoria and New Zealand, but the black powder has to be imported, and is only "made up" in these colonies. This business is simply equal to having no powder factories in Australia at all. The defence, danger, and ammunition supply remain the same if no powder factory exists to make powder within Australia.

Supposing (1) that France and Russia covered the seas and cruised in Alabama fashion in the Austral-Pacific ; (2) that if the Dual Alliance slipped a fleet out of Chinese waters or out of their European ports to meet at some point in mid-ocean near enough to swoop down upon the Pacific ; (3) that in meeting the weak British fleets of the Cape, East India, and Australia they were defeated in detail ; (4) that between the action of cruisers and fleets at sea our lines of communication with England or India were cut, and the littoral towns bombarded—the powder question would become alarming. The present supplies—most or half of which is only fit for throwing into the sea, as has been done—would soon run short during the first brunt or stages of

war, and the naval and military forces would be ships and troops without powder. In fact, the defence forces would be food for the enemy's powder, shot, and shell. The forts would be called upon for unconditional surrender, and the movable field armies would require to camp in the Blue Mountain ranges, and get starved out in the presence of the enemy like the Matabele in the Matoppo Hills. It would be *too late* to build up a smokeless or other high explosive powder factory, and make the said powder after two or three defeats at sea, and when our troops had to retire into the bush until it was got from "goodness knows where." Smokeless and flashless powders are urgent and necessary in war to cope with the attack and battle power of great military nations. Nothing must be left to chance in modern war. That Power which is slow, regardless, thoughtless of safety, and basking in the false sunshine of fancied security (upon paper) will fall down, as sure as the French were mowed down by the Germans and the Chinese by the Japs. The nation or colony which requires to be organized after war with the wasted genius of a McClellan or a Gambetta will be guilty of national murder and useless public expenditure. A General cannot be expected to defeat the foe in any shape without tools or the munitions of war. The statesman or a Ministry, during these days of Armenian, Transvaal, and hydra-headed Eastern questions, with the war-smoke very conspicuous, who does not have all the defence forces fully ready and equipped, should stand his or its trial for high State treason. This is only one definition of responsible and parliamentary government. The Labour members in the event of war should be sent to Norfolk Island, and left there to further dream of "red ruin and the break-

ing-up of laws." As Macaulay says, when the foe is seen in hostile array before an unprepared people, "no time was there for musing or debate." The *too late* policy of the colonial legislator should be banished from his mind in discussing military affairs—to use a highly classic phrase, should "shut his mouth" in the best interests of the State. Some narrow-minded critics, friends of every country but their own, may easily sneer at just enthusiasm, like the big Sydney "dailies"; but without enthusiasm and national sentiment what good has ever been done in this world, and when was England ever successful unless when the statesmen were far-searching and prompt in delivering the offensive-defence? It will be a fatal day for the colonies if the colonists lack courage, confidence, and the initiative in all things. National slumber causes national tears, and if we do not rise and awake to a deep sense of danger and unpreparedness for war the after-thought will be *tears*—Australian tears. How can we hold naval captains and artillery colonels responsible in battle if there is no sure supply of ammunition? We even hear that the Australian fleet is not over-supplied with the latest powders; and not long ago the British fleet in the Levant had a low supply of powder and magazine-rifles. Defence foresight is wanted throughout the colonies. We must take heed of to-morrow. It is not right for us to depend upon the sea-scheme for colonial defence, as the unexpected frequently happens in war. Australians go to a heavy yet not useless expense in defence—in all the four arms. If every arm is not supplied with proper smokeless powder, and accustomed to use it with guns and rifles, how much does the *morale* and discipline come to? We must strive to improve upon and maintain the practical value and results of our

military expenditure. What a greatly improved value it would give to the name and military defence of the colonies if there existed a high-class smokeless powder factory in Sydney, the naval base, and sure-to-be centre, of martial organization !

Sir G. R. Dibbs made a blunderous mistake in 1893 by signing a contract for the supply of black powder to 1900. But a glaring mistake was also made, I believe, with the other colonies. The want of military intelligence in colonial statesmen, even in some military men, accounts for the contracts being signed. A Premier whose whole thoughts are built upon running the Assembly-show has no time to read up and study the ever-increasing march of military progress and invention, but they should be guided by their respective Staff officers. But I think that the wording of the contract does not bind this or any other inter-colonial Government. The contract is worth looking into, as it is monstrous to think that this country, with all its vast mineral, pastoral, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and other resources should be left to fight the foe with an obsolete powder, rifle, and machine-gun. It is against all common sense for any contractor to expect a Government to carry on such an out-of-date contract for black powder, not made in Australia. This contract in question must be smashed up in New South Wales, as they have done in Queensland and shortly to be in Victoria. It was a selfish and disloyal act on the part of any man to ask a Government to sign a contract for an article which if used in future war would bring about defeat, disaster, and, perhaps, the conquest of Australia by a foreign power. I hope that Parliament in its wisdom will smash the contract up, and then leave some private company to relieve the Treasury by

establishing a powder factory near Sydney. The old powder factory near Narrabeen is central, most suitable, is easily worked, is well-built, and economic in the distribution of manufactured powder for the several points of defence and fortification, on land or sea, in the Austral-Pacific. A syndicate should buy it at once, to make the best and most modern smokeless powder. I am not wedded to normal nor cordite powder, as we must all sink private reasons for those of Queen, Empire, and Australia. The British race all over the world must be true to each scattered section—stand and die united, and defend the whole Empire until wars have ceased. Swinburne, writing of England's fame and name, says—

“ Far and near from the swan’s nest here the storm-birds bred of
her fair white breast,
Sons whose home was the sea-wave’s foam, have borne the fame of
her east and west;
North and south has the storm-wind’s mouth rang praise of England
and England’s quest.”

CHAPTER XXV

CRITICISM UPON AN INDO-AUSTRALIAN ALLIANCE

THE following able review of my article upon "How far Australia could help India in the Time of War," recently published in the *Journal of the United Service of India*, will be interesting to my readers of this book, as it "boils down" my ideas upon the subject, which has almost been omitted in the general context of Australian defence. This extract is taken from the *London United Service Gazette* of August 22, 1896—

"Imperial Federation as a practical question presents very many points for consideration. We are so strongly of opinion that the more these are discussed the sooner will all concerned become convinced of the desirability—nay, more, the absolute necessity—for the federation of the Empire, that we heartily welcome any fresh aspect from which to view this all-important subject. Such is afforded in a recent article published in the *Journal of the United Service of India*, where the particular branch dealt with is the manner in which India and Australia could help each other in the event of war. That portion of the Anglo-Saxon race which has migrated to Australia, has most certainly not degenerated with regard to pluck, hardihood and martial qualities, and ever since

the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny the capacity for self-defence and military duty has not been wanting to the Australian population. The spirit of the race was splendidly exhibited when England was wrongly reported to be hard pressed for troops to fight the Soudanese Arabs and the Russians, had the latter advanced on Herat. It was not the small force of about 800 men that left Sydney for the Soudan that proved what Australia could do, or how far she was able to help the mother country in the hour of danger, but it was the voice of martial Australia yearning to take part in an over-sea expedition and scatter the Queen's enemies. Only New South Wales was allowed to send military help to the Soudan, but 5000 good men and true were ready to volunteer for service.

"If the greater part of the Anglo-Indian Army should, in the event of an invasion of India, be wanted at the front, the Australian troops, together with the European Volunteer Corps of India, would assuredly create a deep sense of internal security in the rear, and thus reduce the chances of mutiny and rebellion. This is well pointed out by Mr. Craig, the author of the able article to which we have above referred. As the Editor of that excellent and patriotic Journal, the *Australian Army, Navy, and Defence Review*, the subject, we doubt not, possesses for him peculiar attraction. He is certainly justified in his estimate that in the ranks of an Australian Contingent would be found men fit to stand climatic change, the privations of active service, long marches, and the demands of army discipline, whilst their scouting and camp qualities would prove of the greatest value. The Indian cavalry is as good as any in the world, but an Anglo-Indian army wants more

of that new arm—mounted infantry. While cavalry will, under the modern conditions of warfare, have to reconnoitre, mounted infantry will have to seize hold of, and keep, valuable tactical positions until the arrival of the main army. An Australian Contingent in India would, Mr. Craig admits, be at a considerable disadvantage owing to the fact of the troops not being armed with magazine rifles, the new 12-pr. field guns and the improved Maxim and Hotchkiss quick-firers, nor supplied with high explosives and modern projectiles. If only in the interest of their own self-defence we sincerely trust that the seven colonies of Australia will unitedly make good these deficiencies without further delay.

“An Australian Contingent of 5000 men would leave Sydney, Melbourne, and other centres of population, with well-disciplined men, full of military ardour and love of the British Empire, but we cannot help thinking Mr. Craig is a little over-sanguine in expecting that, before they reached the front, they would know their work and their officers so well, that they would be fit to fall into line with either Sikh or ‘Tommy Atkins.’ They would, however, form the material for making a most excellent force, for forty per cent. of the contingent would be old soldiers, many of them Imperial Reserve men, and the other sixty per cent. would be men of over three years’ service in the ‘Defence Force.’ This contingent has no existence at present, but it is claimed that it could be mobilized in a week when called upon by the Queen in Council, or even if a cablegram were received from the Viceroy of India to the effect of ‘Come over and help us.’ In a year or two, when Colonial statesmen have learnt that the attack is superior and more final in war than a

passive defence, we may expect them, as Mr. Craig, we are glad to note, assures us, to provide a disciplined force, easily mobilized and fit to embark upon an offensive expedition. Mr. Craig, at any rate, fully appreciates the fact that it would be better to carry war into New Caledonia, to Reunion, or Vladivostoe, than to permit the troops and sailors of France or Russia to escape to sea, and to land, burn, pillage and destroy Australian commerce. Major-General Hutton was the first to demonstrate a practical scheme for the despatch of a force to relieve Hobart in Tasmania, should an enemy land there. The details of the mobilization, equipment, embarkation and despatch of an offensive-defence force from Australia, must in the same way be worked out in time of peace.

"Taking the other side of the question, it can hardly be contended that Mr. Craig is wrong, in holding it to be possible for a bold, daring and clever enemy to land a force in Northern Australia, and there entrench himself in Plevna fashion. Russia, in 1885, had a plan laid for the capture of New Zealand, whilst other Powers had designs upon Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tasmania, and the Gulf of Carpentaria. On the supposition that our Admirals missed hostile armadas, or lost their sea-power in desperate battle in the vast Pacific, a Franco-Russian or Japanese expedition could steal along the Australian coast, and effect a landing at some point far from any military centre. Our colonial armies might melt before the disciplined troops of the invaders. The fate of war, despite her inborn gallantry, self-sacrifice and obsolete harbour defences, might go against Australia, and then she might ask for help, which would mean an expedition like that sent to Abyss-

sinia and thrice to Egypt. If such assistance were wanted, the Imperial and Indian Governments could not well refuse the request, whilst the officers and men would be animated with a mutual patriotic desire to defeat the enemy. Nothing but the want of adequate previous organization can, we are certain, prevent the fulfilment of the hope that in the next great war, the soldiers of the Imperial Indian and Colonial armies will be seen marching, shoulder to shoulder, all united in a firm determination to maintain the integrity of that Empire, which it has cost so much sacrifice and heroism to establish. The result must largely depend upon the degree to which we shall at the time have strengthened our fleet, and progressed towards the realization of the grand conception of Imperial Federation."

CHAPTER XXVI

STRENGTHENING THE AUSTRALIAN FLEET

I HAVE just received news from home that my special correspondence to a service journal in London has helped to induce the Admiralty to strengthen the cruising and fighting power of the warships upon this station. It was felt that the ships of the *Mildura* type, though made of good stuff, were two knots slow, and had not the up-to-date quick-firing guns to cope with ships of the *Rossia* and *Azova* types of Russia, to say nothing of the merchant (20 and 21 knot) cruisers of France, Germany, and Japan now plying to and from Australia. As already stated in these pages, the increase of foreign navies in the Pacific, together with the rapid development of events in the East and the present rude change in international European relations, even to the reproachment of France and Italy, and of Russia and England, has largely necessitated the powerful naval increase upon this station. Admiral Bridge stated the other day in Adelaide that Sydney was still the naval base and headquarters, yet he had to do his best to visit all ports. He said the *Orlando* as a flagship was good for the next ten years if she was re-armed with the new 6-in. quick-firing guns instead of using the present 6-in. guns. But she wants the Belleville boilers and many other new

war-like appliances. In the last war with France, after fighting 74 and 44 gun ships, British captains frequently lost their prizes by the superior sailing power of the French ships by getting clear away from the scenes of action. Speed is a great factor in war, and "when the fleet is under steam" speed will tell as well as brave crews and good armament. The station now wants a flagship like the *St. George* or the *Blake*, and as the *Orlando* goes home this year, we hope to see her replaced by a 20-knot second-class battle-ship. Five men-of-war and one survey ship will have to be re-commissioned. It is said that these six crews will come out in two cruisers, but the Admiralty has resolved to replace the *Ringarooma*, *Wallaroo*, *Katoomba*, and *Mildura*, now on the station as the auxiliary ship and third-class cruisers, by the second-class and the more powerful cruisers—the *Sirius*, *Iphigenia*, *Indefatigable*, and *Tribune*. The four *Mildura* types will please Admiral Bridge, as by some sequence of thought he says they are good ships for speed, have good coal capacity, a good armament, are sea boats, have a small draft, are very useful, and good value for their money. With more quick-firing guns and boiler power we could endorse this high opinion, but they do not get on very well in a storm and strong head wind *en voyage* to New Zealand or West Australia. They are good boats for island work and short trips round the coast, but for hard work and distant operations during war they will be found very short of all expectations. Like the Admiral, I would be sorry to part with them out of Australian waters. What they are now wanted for, as drill ships at Leith, Dundee, Liverpool, and Bristol, they are also wanted as drill and reserve ships at Sydney, Melbourne, Auckland, and Brisbane, for the proposed Royal Naval Reserve and the



H.M. ships *Katoomba* and *Goldfinch*, and Government House.

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strong Naval Brigade under a complete system of Federal Naval Defence. Naval opinion in the colonies know that such ships will be urgently wanted upon final federation, or before that time, certainly before the Sydney Exhibition year of 1899. Not only do we want the new battle flagship and the four new cruisers of the *Sirius* type, but the Australian naval strength should also retain the four *Milduras* for the purposes just mentioned. A British naval officer grieves, and a foreign officer laughs to see such splendid Volunteer Naval Brigades as the colonies have drilled and disciplined as "land-lubbers." It is a crime to deny them ships—good modern ships. With regard to the *Rapid* and *Goldfinch* types, they are good warships of their class. The latter ship is a sister ship of the *Thrush* and *Sparrow*, whilst the *Rapid* and *Royalist* are sister ships of the *Raccoon*, and the *Katoomba* is of the same type as the *Philomel*—the four ships recently under fire at Zanzibar. The four *Milduras*, now about to be replaced by second-class cruisers, have eight 4·7 guns, eight 3-pounders, four machine guns, and four torpedo tubes, a displacement of 2575 tons, 4000 h.p. under natural draft, or 7500 h.p. under forced draft, and having a 19-knot speed, too slow by three knots to suit war time. The new four ships to come out this year will be a knot faster, 3600 tons, 7000 h.p. under natural and 9000 h.p. under forced draft, with an armament of two six-inch and six 4·7-inch guns, eight 6-pounders, and one 3-pounder gun, four machine guns, and four torpedo tubes. It will be seen that the new types are a better defence bargain than the *Mildura*; the *Tribune*—one of the four—is 200 tons less in displacement, but has the same twenty-knot speed, horse power, crew, and armament. It is said that the Admiralty desire to replace the *Orlando* by the *Eclipse*,

which is a slight improvement in fighting power, but the colonies should impress upon the Admiralty to send out a *Blake*, an *Endymion*, or a *Canopus*. By doing so the federated colonies should undertake to man and keep in good order the four *Milduras* as drill and coast-defence ships, and purchase right out a fleet of say twelve sea-going torpedo boats of the *Express* type. Then Australia will have done its duty to itself and the Empire during these days of Japanese navies, Russian Pacific fleets, and German treachery. This is a question to be considered as much as the Land, Old-Age Pension, and Mining Bills. If present members of the Legislative Assembly are indifferent, the people should call upon them for patriotic duty.

THE END

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“SIR,—The federation of the Empire for the protection and furtherance of our national interests would add greatly to the strength, and, I believe, the prosperity of the parent Kingdom, its Colonies and dependencies; and I am glad to find that this view is supported by such able and sagacious statesmen as Lords Rosebery, Playfair, and Salisbury, the last of whom stated two years ago that ‘Imperial Federation meant neither more nor less than the future of the British Empire.’ It is extremely satisfactory to hear that the Australian forces are improving in drill and discipline, and are, consequently, becoming better prepared to take part in the defence, not only of Australia, but of other British possessions in the East. I have always been of opinion that, if given the opportunity, the population of the self-governing colonies would prove as patriotic and as well-fitted for military or naval service as the population of the mother country. I hope that your new military journal will be a great success. Believe me, very truly yours,—ROBERTS.”

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